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The purpose of this study is to examine the presence and perceptions of politics in first-
year composition (FYC) courses. Though the “political turn” of composition studies has been the 
subject of much scholarship since the 2016 election, very little empirical research has been 
conducted in this area. As a result, this study seeks to fill that gap with empirical, mixed-methods 
research that examines the political perceptions of both students and instructors in FYC courses.  
I begin this work by reviewing the long, fraught history of politics in rhetorical education 
and propose several frameworks that are helpful for clarifying this debate, including democratic 
deliberation and rhetorical empathy. Through 38 survey responses and 13 semi-structured 
follow-up interviews, I explore when, how, and why politics come up in FYC courses and how 
participants perceive themselves and other people as political actors in those courses. Though 
most of my student participants had largely apolitical experiences, instructors had a better sense 
for the political diversity of their classes and engaged with politically charged content with 
varying degrees of success.  
In addition, I examine how my participants’ beliefs align with Roberts-Miller’s (2004) 
models of political discourse. My results demonstrate that, in their composition courses, my 
participants largely based their ideas on the liberal model of discourse and the deliberative model 
of discourse, though other models occur as well. Based on my research, I contend that 
composition instructors should reflect on what underlying assumptions about political discourse 
lie beneath their pedagogical choices. I also argue that, in order to productively integrate politics 
in their courses, instructors should leave behind thesis-based argument and lecture-based 
pedagogy in favor of exploratory argument, collaborative teaching styles, and facilitating a 
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Chapter 1: The Political Turn in First-Year Composition 
 
The election of Donald J. Trump in 2016 changed a lot for rhetorical educators—one might even 
say that it changed everything. From the white supremacists marching at Charlottesville, to the 
first impeachment, to the riot at the Capitol and his subsequent second impeachment, Trump was 
a catalyst for racist, white supremacist rhetoric and antiracist activism. From the moment he 
announced his presidential run, he exploited bombastic, scorched-earth rhetoric to grab media 
headlines and consolidate support, prompting new scholarship from rhetorical scholars 
examining the rhetoric of demagoguery (Roberts-Miller, 2017, 2019; Skinnell and Murphy, 
2019).  
It would be all too easy to center Trump’s rhetoric in discussing the ailments of public 
discourse, but the fact of the matter is that nearly 63 million Americans voted for him in 2016, 
and over 74 million voted for Trump four years later, despite his long history of demagogic 
rhetoric. “We don’t have demagoguery in our culture because a demagogue came to power,” 
Patricia Roberts-Miller (2017) argued. “[W]hen demagoguery becomes the normal way of 
participating in public discourse, then it’s just a question of time until a demagogue arises” (p. 
2). Trump, in other words, was not a rhetorical problem himself; Trump was a symptom of a 
much more fundamental problem in American civil discourse. As Heitzl and Laurin (2020) 
noted, “80% of Americans today feel unfavorable towards their partisan foes, and the portion 
feeling very unfavorable has nearly tripled since 1994” (p. 179). Demagoguery, polarization, and 
other cultural ills merely came to the surface during Trump’s presidency. In fact, they have been 
growing in American political discourse since at least 9/11 (Roberts-Miller, 2017).  
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In postsecondary education, the burden of combating demagoguery has fallen on 
rhetorical educators (Steudeman, 2019), and in particular, first-year composition instructors 
(McComiskey, 2017; Duffy, 2019; Blankenship, 2019). Nearly a decade ago, John Duffy (2012) 
wrote that first-year composition “represents one of the few places in the academic curriculum, 
in some institutions the only place, where students learn the basics of argument, or how to make 
a claim, provide evidence, and consider alternative points of view,” skills necessary for 
sustaining the American democratic project. As such, first-year composition is “a venue in which 
students can rehearse the virtues of argument so conspicuously lacking in our current political 
debates. Should students bring these virtues to the civic square, they will inevitably transform it” 
(Duffy, 2012).  
In a post-2020 world, wracked by racism, polarization, and a deadly pandemic, the topic 
of politics in the classroom matters more for critical educators than ever before, especially for 
teachers of first-year composition. Roberts-Miller (2004) writes that many disagreements in 
composition pedagogy are really disagreements “about the place and nature of argument in 
democratic society” (viii). Conversely, this means that politics—as the “site” for much argument 
in democratic society—affects our understanding of how we ought to teach first-year 
composition. Politics and rhetorical education are thus deeply intertwined.  
As a result, this project seeks to unite the two and demonstrate, through descriptive, 
empirical research, how first-year composition (FYC) can respond to the “political turn” of 
rhetoric and composition. This empirical, mixed-methods research project is explored in five 
primary movements. I begin here, in Chapter 1, by examining the past to understand the present, 
tracing a brief history of political rhetorical education, starting with Isocrates and skipping to the 
nascent discipline of composition in the 1970s and 1980s. By exploring this history, I situate this 
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project in a recent “turn” in composition, the political turn, and articulate an empathic theoretical 
framework for empirical research. In Chapter 2, I describe the methods by which I conducted my 
study. Then, I summarize the descriptive results of my research in Chapter 3 and examine my 
participants’ underlying assumptions in Chapter 4. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss the 
implications of my research and chart new directions for composition scholarship. 
Of course, this topic of discussion has a long and fraught past in rhetoric and 
composition. To better situate this project in the long arc of disciplinary history, then, I must first 
examine the arguments that have come before me. It is to that task I now turn. 
 
Literature Review 
The goal of this literature review is threefold. First, in a brief review of the historical context of 
my study, I hope to demonstrate that rhetorical education has frequently had political 
deliberation as an end goal, if not as a topos in itself, from its genesis in ancient Greece to its 
evolution in the twentieth century. Tracing the vigorous debates over politics in writing courses 
from Berlin (1988), to Hairston (1992) and beyond, I will then describe how the 2016 election 
prompted a new outpouring of scholarship in what Carter et al. (2019) called “the political turn” 
of the field. Finally, given the “political turn” and the various overlapping solutions that have 
been proposed by scholars like Carillo (2018), Duffy (2019), and Blankenship (2019), I will 
examine the relevant empirical scholarship, identify the gaps in the field, discuss the deliberative 
model of public discourse, and propose a framework for empathic empirical research in the 





With public argument and persuasion central to the study of rhetoric (Fleming, 2014), the 
discipline of rhetoric and composition has often had political inflection. In the Greek rhetorical 
tradition, rhetoric was fundamentally oriented around the polis, the city, the center of political 
life in Ancient Greece. Aristotle’s Rhetoric (2007) divided rhetoric into three public-facing 
species: deliberative (which is the most recognizably political by modern standards), judicial, 
and epideictic. Isocrates, a contemporary of Aristotle, placed more emphasis on paideia, a 
philosophical and rhetorical education for participation in the polis. Indeed, Isocrates was widely 
considered to be the father of “liberal education” (Muir, 2014, p. 427), though that term, and the 
history of the idea itself, is certainly contested (Kimball, 1986). Isocrates’s (1928) original 
model, set forth in Antidosis, educated for the good of the polis, so that young men1 might be 
formed by virtue (aretē) and enact practical deliberative judgment (doxa) in the political realm. 
Indeed, Isocrates (1928) wrote that “the study of political discourse can help more than any other 
thing to stimulate and form such qualities of character” (section 21; cf. section 275). In other 
words, the Isocratean tradition of rhetorical training—the most influential in Western 
education—is rooted in political discourse.2 
 
1The use of this term is intentional; paideia was intended for young male citizens. Isocrates and other 
Greek philosophers have been ably critiqued on the basis of gender by rhetorical scholars (see, for instance, 
Poulakos and Depew, 2004). 
 
2This is not the only possible—or even preferable—form of rhetorical education, given the ways that Greek 
and Roman texts have been historically used to construct a Western-centric narrative of “liberal education,” one rife 
with colonial, sexist, and racist structures. Communication scholars Karma Chávez (2015) and Darrel Wanzer-
Serrano (2019), among others, have rightly pointed out that the history of rhetoric often perpetuates a white, 
Western “citizenship narrative” (Chávez, 2015). Compositionists like Gilyard (2004) and Blankenship (2019) have 
addressed in part how a rhetorical education might attend to difference, diversity, and democracy without 
perpetuating oppressive structures. In light of these critiques and reformulations, throughout this text, I have tried to 
avoid the term “citizenship” in favor of “democratic” or “democracy.” For the purposes of tracing the political 
origins of a rhetorical education, however, I have chosen to review texts that influence the mainstream theories of 
first-year composition.  
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 In the early twentieth century, as college composition spread from Harvard to other 
schools, the dominant forms of rhetorical education were current-traditional approaches that 
emphasized style and literature-oriented composition courses that emphasized imitation (Hobbs 
& Berlin, 1990, pp. 251-255), though democratically oriented writers like Thomas Dewey and 
Fred Scott still argued for a more political and democratic focus in education broadly (Hobbs & 
Berlin, 1990, p. 258). In the latter half of the twentieth century, at the dawn of rhetoric and 
composition as a formal discipline, expressivism (which had existed for a number of years as an 
alternative to current-traditional approaches) regained traction in the 1960s and 1970s (Hobbs 
and Berlin, 1990). In its simplest form, expressivist writing was private, creative expression for 
an individual’s benefit. This approach to composition was counterbalanced by the “process” 
movement (Flower & Hayes, 1981), which emphasized empirical research in cognitive science 
as foundational for teaching writing. Of course, a hard distinction between expressivism and 
process elides some of the overlap between these categories; James Britton (1972), for example, 
was aligned with process theorists like Flower & Hayes in terms of his empirical methods but 
was primarily expressivist in terms of his conclusions. The point is, however, that an Isocratean 
(or even Deweyan) emphasis on democratic engagement was a secondary concern for both 
movements.  
 In the 1980s, then, one might identify three primary streams of teaching composition in 
the nascent discipline: current-traditional (writing as imitation, style, and correctness), expressive 
(writing as creative expression focused on individual identity), and process (writing as an 
individual cognitive process to be developed). At this point in the 1980s, the modern debate over 
politics in composition—and the role of composition itself—was kickstarted by scholars of the 
“social-epistemic” turn, such as James Berlin (1988) and Carolyn Miller (1984). 
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Berlin and other influential scholars drew on a fourth approach to writing pedagogy, one 
that was consciously critical and socially situated. In “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing 
Class,” Berlin (1988) argued for a reorientation of rhetoric from a category that contains 
ideology to a conception in which rhetoric is “always already ideological” (p. 477). “I am 
arguing from ideology,” he wrote, “contending that no other kind of argument is possible” (1988, 
p. 478). Reviewing three strands in rhetoric and composition scholarship—cognitive psychology 
(or what I called “process” above), expressionism, and social-epistemic—he concluded that all 
pedagogy “is imbricated in ideology, in a set of tacit assumptions about what is real, what is 
good, what is possible, and how power ought to be distributed” (p. 492). These are ideological 
questions, and as such, they are also political questions. If rhetoric in the writing classroom is not 
free of ideology, it is also not free of politics.   
Berlin’s position has been most closely identified with critical pedagogy; his piece drew 
heavily from critical pedagogy theorist Ira Shor and aligned closely with Marxist and Freirean 
critiques. His core claim—that pedagogy is always ideological and therefore always political—
has been maintained, largely unchanged, by Marxist and critical pedagogy theorists (Trimbur et 
al., 1993; Sullivan & Qualley, 1994; McLaren, 2009; Carter et al., 2019). Central to this idea is 
that pedagogy, because it is already ideological, should come from a fundamentally ideological 
approach—namely, one of radical liberation (McLaren, 2009; Brady & Ohmann, 2010). 
This reorientation of composition as always-already political led to substantial pushback 
from other scholars in the field. In the early 1990s, Maxine Hairston (1992) famously decried the 
politicization of composition and forcefully charged that politically oriented composition courses 
put “ideology before critical thinking” and that “those who advocate such courses show open 
contempt for their students' values, preferences, or interests” (p. 181). The backlash to her article 
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was just as forceful, with scholars like William Thelin and John Trimbur defending more critical 
approaches to the teaching of writing.  “Hairston would better serve our profession,” Thelin 
wrote, “by foregoing the pretense that any classroom can be apolitical and concentrating on 
ethical ways to negotiate race, class, and gender in a politically overt classroom” (Trimbur et al., 
1993, p. 253). Thelin was not the only scholar to respond; indeed, College Composition and 
Communication—the journal in which Hairston’s critique was published—received more 
responses to Hairston’s article than they had for any other publication in the history of CCC 
(Sullivan & Qualley, 1994).3 The debate over the supposed politicization of composition is one 
that still continues, most recently between Graff (2010) and Brady & Ohmann (2010).  
 
Turn of the Century Writing Pedagogy 
At the turn of the century, David Fleming (2003) proposed that compositionists return to what he 
termed “classical rhetoric,” focusing on forming certain kinds of people, rather than focusing on 
a process, a product, or distributing composition out of English altogether through writing across 
the curriculum (WAC). Fleming’s (2003) model was the progymnasmata, what one might call 
the exercise of rhetoric. He wrote,  
The relevance of the classical program resides, I believe, not in the actual exercises 
themselves…but in the very idea behind this cycle of exercises, the attempt to make of 
rhetoric not just a theory or art or an historical and cultural artifact or a sociocognitive 
process but rather a complete and developmentally attuned curriculum in written and 
spoken discourse, a multicourse program of language instruction whose end product is 
neither a text nor a skill nor some body of knowledge but a set of deep-seated verbal 




3While Hairston’s article was perhaps the most (in)famous of the time period, other scholars were tackling 
political topics as well. Donald Lazere (1992/1999), for instance, argued for a framework for teaching “the political 
conflicts” and suggested ethical practices for fostering critical inquiry into political topics.  
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Fleming’s suggestions, while not adopted wholesale by other rhetoric and composition scholars, 
were nonetheless influential and represented a profound shift in the field. The watermark 
Framework for Success in Postsecondary Writing (2011), for instance, is aimed at fostering 
“habits of mind” through experiences in “writing, reading, and critical analysis” (p. 1). While the 
Framework is not expressly civic in its orientation, as Fleming (2003) suggested, it nevertheless 
answers Fleming’s call to refocus on the ethos of one’s composition students. The “habits and 
dispositions” that Fleming (2003) focuses on had moved to the mainstream in composition 
scholarship. 
 In the twenty-first century, scholarship on democratic education flourished, in part due to 
a renewed focus on the teaching of argument. Rhetoric and composition scholarship on the 
political classroom included critical pedagogy, theory on “deep” democracy, which often draws 
from critical and Marxist theory (Gilyard, 2008; hooks, 2009; Carr, Zyngier, & Pruyn, 2014), 
deliberative approaches (Roberts-Miller, 2004; Ingalls & Morse, 2009; Jurgensmeyer & Miller, 
2013), and teaching democratic skills, whether that be through argument (Fleming, 2003, 2014; 
Lazere, 1999), public pedagogy (Weisser, 2002; Holmes, 2016), or a pedagogy of listening 
(Sullivan, 2014). This iteration of rhetorical education tended to be public-facing instruction for 
democratic engagement. What they all had in common, however, was that the focus was 
typically on the skills necessary for democratic and political engagement; the role of explicit 




4The two exceptions are some theorists of critical pedagogy, as mentioned above, and Roberts-Miller 
(2004), who explicitly named the neutrality of the instructor as an impossible task and suggested productive ways to 
integrate a deliberative model of political discourse into composition courses. 
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Composition and Rhetoric in the Trump Era 
The recent history of politics in composition, from the 1980s to the present, could be mapped out 
in three turns: first, the social-epistemic turn of Berlin (1988) and other critical theorists, which 
disrupted the supposedly apolitical pedagogies of expressivism and process and argued that 
writing classes were always already “political.” The second turn might well be termed the 
“rhetorical” turn, a turn-of-the-century umbrella category under which critical theorists, public 
pedagogues, and teachers of argument coexisted in teaching composition as a rhetorical 
education with implications for public life, exemplified in the Framework (2011). While the 
scholars differ in epistemologies and practices, such scholars generally share the goal of 
promoting some form of rhetorical knowledge (cf. Beaufort, 2007) through the teaching of 
writing. 
 The third and most recent turn is perhaps better called a swerve. The divisive and 
defining 2016 election cycle, which culminated in the narrow election of Donald Trump, has 
prompted the “political turn” (a term coined by Carter et al., 2019). The election of 2016 and the 
ensuing events—the white supremacists at Charlottesville, the impeachment of President Trump, 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the racial reckoning of Black Lives Matter and the summer of protest, 
the false claims of electoral fraud, and the domestic terrorism at the U.S. Capitol—became an 
urgent exigence for rhetoric and composition. The election revealed a set of interlocking and 
interrelated problems at the heart of our democracy and at the heart of rhetorical education, 
problems that scholars of composition and rhetoric are still working to understand and unravel. 
The field’s response to the Trump era can be roughly categorized by two terms: literacy and 
demagoguery. While this is a reductive and incomplete list, these two terms address foundational 
issues for compositionists—namely, reading critically and writing arguments. Questions of 
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literacy deal with the emerging phenomena of post-truth and “fake news”; scholarship around 
demagoguery addresses argument and the ideological and rhetorical fallout of the 2016 election, 
which featured unprecedented toxic discourse and polarization.  
In Teaching Readers in Post-Truth America, Ellen Carillo (2018) reflected on the 2016 
election and its effect on her as an educator and a scholar of reading. She wrote, “As an English 
instructor and specifically a writing instructor for more than fifteen years and a writing program 
coordinator for ten years, I felt partially responsible for the outcome of the election” (Carillo, 
2018, p. 7). In her book, Carillo (2018) argued that the way reading is taught or ignored 
exacerbates the phenomenon of post-truth. The solution is a renewed focus on critical empathy 
(Carillo, 2018, p. 62) and concrete reading practices that frame reading as a conversation, not as 
information to be unthinkingly downloaded (Carillo, 2019). Carillo was not the only scholar to 
address literacy practices; recent scholarship demonstrated a renewed focus on addressing 
literacy habits and the phenomena of fake news and post-truth (Mason et al., 2018; Carillo & 
Horning, 2020; McComiskey, 2017). The common recognition seemed to be that instructors of 
writing are ideally placed in institutional structures to make a meaningful difference in shaping 
the literacy practices of young people. “Writing teachers, perhaps better than anyone else,” Bruce 
McComiskey (2017) wrote in Post-Truth Rhetoric and Composition, “can prepare the next 
generation of voting citizens to recognize and fight against the kind of rhetoric that characterizes 
the current political climate” (p. 38). Though reading has long been ignored by postsecondary 
education (Carillo, 2018), this recent movement in composition scholarship places critical 
reading front-and-center in writing pedagogy.  
Recent scholarship also examined the troubling rhetoric of polarization, which turns 
public argument into a zero-sum game. Perhaps the most appropriate term is demagoguery, a 
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rhetorical concept refashioned for the ills of the twenty-first century (Roberts-Miller, 2017; 
Skinnell & Murphy, 2019; Steudeman, 2019). Demagogic rhetoric, according to Roberts-Miller 
(2017) in Demagoguery and Democracy, “polarizes a complicated political situation into us 
(good) and them (bad),” it reduces policy to “identity,” and it “insists that the Truth is easy to 
perceive and convey,” among many other things (pp. 34-35). However, trying to counter the 
rhetoric of demagoguery in pedagogy can sometimes lead to “pedagogic backfire,” either 
because it fosters student resentment or because the instructor is unintentionally participating in 
rhetorics of exclusion (Steudeman, 2019).  
While solutions to this political crisis differ from scholar to scholar, in a post-2016 
United States, arguing for a Hairston-style apolitical approach to rhetoric and composition no 
longer seems to be an option. “Historical exigencies,” Carter et al. (2019) argued, “call on us to 
enact a ‘political turn’ that embraces yet goes beyond more celebrated cultural, public, and social 
turns to ask critical questions about our political economy and our field’s potential response(s) to 
them” (pp. 19-20). John Duffy (2019) saw the political turmoil of the Trump era as an 
opportunity for the field to do some soul-searching. “[The] disconnection of our work from the 
conduct of public discourse,” he wrote, “is symptomatic of a greater disciplinary problem: our 
failure to explain to the general public, to colleagues in other disciplines, to our students, and 
perhaps even to ourselves what we do, why our work matters, and what is at stake in the teaching 
of writing” (Duffy, 2019, p. 9). For better or worse, rhetoric and composition has entered the 
political turn, and compositionists in particular must reckon with “what is at stake in the teaching 




The Empirical Research Gap 
Empirical scholarship on this topic from rhetoric and composition scholars is sparse, though not 
entirely absent. Most of the work in the “political turn” engages in theorizing and analysis 
(McComiskey, 2017; Roberts-Miller, 2017; Carter et al., 2019; Duffy, 2019; Blankenship, 2019; 
some essays in Duffy & Agnew, 2020) or pedagogical application (Carillo, 2018, 2019; 
Steudeman, 2019; parts of Carter et al., 2019 and Blankenship, 2019). Some recent scholarship 
nodded to empirical methods. Don Kraemer’s (2020) “Not to Mention Plato: Pedagogical 
Persuasion” addressed the role of a graduate instructor teaching composition pedagogy as a way 
to “serve the democratic community” (p. 171), but it’s unclear whether the graduate student case 
study he provided was part of an empirical project or merely an easily accessible text for 
analysis.  
One major empirical study, though it predates the 2016 election, came from Carr, 
Zyngier, and Pruyn (2014), who coordinated the Global Doing Democracy Project (GDDP). The 
GDDP was a set of smaller studies that emerged out of a conference, and many of them used a 
shared online survey to conduct their research. The participating scholars sought to describe 
perceptions of democracy and practices of democratic education in global contexts. Notably, the 
original survey did not define key terms like democracy or social justice, in order to determine 
the respondents’ perceptions of what those terms meant (Carr & Zyngier, 2014, p. 5). Carr 
(2014), in his own study, differentiated between “thin” democracy—a straightforward, voting-
oriented, representative conception of democracy—and “thick” democracy, which for Carr was a 
nuanced and participatory conception of democracy that tackles causes rather than effects.  
The GGDP and many of the other texts cited above examined postsecondary education 
broadly; in composition scholarship, there is less empirical research on these issues, with a few 
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notable exceptions. Lara Smith-Sitton and Courtney Bradford (2020) explored the politically 
charged topic of immigration in a community-based learning course and collected data from 
students to examine student perspectives, perceptions, and whether community-based learning 
leads to civic growth. The five students in their study had limited exposure to immigration before 
the course and found the class beneficial, both in terms of their new knowledge about 
immigration and their civic engagement in that area (Sitton & Bradford, 2020, p. 72). Their 
findings demonstrated that community-based learning has potential for teaching political 
literacy, especially when it centers on the lived experiences of those affected by political policy 
(in this case, immigrants). In the same edited collection, Canfield (2020) presented a case study 
from an advanced composition course, in which she found “a tendency to approach information 
from personal, unexamined biases,” even in a course aimed to foster critical information literacy 
(p. 158). In both cases, however, the researchers examined upper-level composition courses, not 
first-year composition (FYC), making their findings limited in their application to FYC. 
 In contrast, Stroup et al.’s (2013) older study was conducted in FYC courses that 
implemented explicitly political content in the curricula. They found that teaching both political 
information and dialogue led to higher levels of civic engagement. However, even though Stroup 
et al.’s study focused on first-year composition courses, their discussion was situated in political 
science and civic education scholarship rather than rhetoric and composition. First-year 
composition was merely a convenient “site” for their research, rather than integral to their 
theorizing and discussion.  
In other words, while there is some empirical scholarship on democratic education 
broadly (Carr et al., 2014), on politics in upper-level writing classes (Sitton & Bradford, 2020; 
Canfield, 2020), and even on politics in FYC (Stroup et al., 2013), there is no empirical 
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application of the “political turn” that focuses specifically on FYC as education for democracy.  
Part of the problem with conducting empirical research on politics in FYC, I would argue, is the 
field’s unwieldy definition of politics. Because teaching writing is always already politically 
inflected, the term “politics” is so expansive that it’s virtually unusable for empirical research, 
which often requires relatively stable definitions and focused, well-bounded research questions. 
Still, some scholars have come up with more focused categories. For example, 
distinctions have been made between politics and the political. Any reflection on democracy, 
wrote Muriello et al. (2012), necessarily leads to politics, in the same sense as Berlin’s (1988) 
use of the term. Alongside this acknowledgment, however, they helpfully clarified the difference 
between “the political” and “politics,” naming the latter “a complex configuration and expression 
of power,” while the political refers to the expressions of actors within a “political sphere” 
(Muriello et al., 2012, p. 160). This distinction—politics as an expression of power, and the 
political as the actors (or expressions of those actors) in the sphere of politics—may be 
summarized as explicit politics and implicit politics. Explicit politics is the tip of the iceberg, the 
inner ring of two concentric circles—the outer circle being a cultural, social, and critical 
conception of politics as relations of power. This distinction allows for empirical researchers to 
acknowledge the inherently political nature of teaching while distinguishing those political 
structures from more visible forms of politics. 
 
Constructing a Framework of Empathy 
My own study both addresses the empirical research gap and engages directly in the recent soul-
searching of the field. As the above review suggests, the question has become not whether 
teachers should engage in explicit political issues in the classroom, but how teachers ought to 
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engage it. For many scholars, the heart of this democratic crisis is a fundamental lack of empathy 
and the absence of true democratic deliberation. The solution to political demagoguery, Roberts-
Miller (2017) argued, is listening: “the best way to open the Faraday cage of demagoguery isn’t 
by aspiring to some emotion-free hyper-rationalism; it’s by practicing compassion for those 
whom demagoguery says we should treat as Other. It’s by imagining things from their 
perspective” (p. 77). Similarly, Carillo (2018) posited that critical empathy, expressed through 
dialogic and affective reading habits, was one possible solution for addressing political literacy 
and facilitating democratic engagement (pp. 32-33). 
 In other words, the proposed solutions to the two problems I have outlined above—a 
culture of demagoguery and post-truth reading habits—are both fundamentally grounded in 
empathy. Responding to Carillo’s (2018) call “to consciously incorporate attention to empathy as 
a form of constructing meaning, as a way of ‘reading’ one’s data particularly with participant-
based research within the field of rhetoric and composition” (p. 37), I propose to formulate a 
broad, flexible framework for what Carillo called “empathic research,” drawing on her 
suggestions as well as the work of Lisa Blankenship (2019) on rhetorical empathy.  
 Carillo’s (2018) recommendations for empathic research primarily relied on rejecting the 
false dichotomy of rationality and affective experience. Instead, she suggested that researchers 
should seek out the “unexamined emotional dimension of our research” (Carillo, 2018, p. 44). 
Carillo provided examples of what empathic research might look like, such as plagiarism 
scholarship of Rebecca Moore Howard, which sought to see issues of plagiarism from a 
student’s perspective. Empathic research, Carillo (2018) concluded, “is research that is not afraid 
of recognizing in our research the range of ways we construct meaning and knowledge” (p. 44) 
In other words, research based in empathy may mean “setting a research agenda that deliberately 
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allows for these emotionally inflected ways of knowing when conducting participant-based 
studies” (Carillo, 2018, p. 44). As Cindy Johanek (2000) noted, research methods should be 
contextualist. In a political landscape dominated by affective—and often toxic—forms of 
argument, a research framework like Carillo’s is essential. Empathic research encourages 
researchers to pay attention to the ways that participants, as embodied, affective creatures, may 
bring those ways of being in the world into the study. 
To clarify what is meant by “empathy” and how an empathic framework may attend to 
issues of difference and power, I turn now to the work of Lisa Blankenship (2019). 
Blankenship’s work responded to a similar exigence as Carillo (2018) and Duffy (2019) by 
seeking to remedy the polarization of the American public. Blankenship forwarded a theory 
called “rhetorical empathy” to address toxic discourse—not only in the United States broadly but 
in composition classes as well. Blankenship’s conception of rhetorical empathy is both critical 
and constructive in nature; “it balances and sustains,” with a place for “exposing the workings of 
power and for resisting the temptation to use the tactics of those we critique” (Blankenship, 
2019, p. 17). She identified four primary characteristics, which include “[y]ielding to an Other” 
through listening to their stories, considering another person’s motives, self-reflection and 
critique, and “addressing difference, power, and embodiment” (Blankenship, 2019, p. 20).  
The latter point is an acknowledgement of how terms like empathy and civility have too 
often been used to silence minority voices and perspectives. Rhetorical empathy does not ignore 
imbalances of power, and the element of self-reflection is meant to aid in examining how one 
might be implicitly reinforcing oppressive structures of power. However, Blankenship (2019) 
believed that “approaching others in rhetorical engagements must begin with changing ourselves, 
with listening, with trying to understand the personal and political factors that influence the 
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person who makes our blood boil” (p. 20). Listening is crucial to empathy, and rather than that 
call being a potential tool for oppression—telling Others to listen and, by doing so, silencing 
them—it is reflexive and begins with oneself. 
Although rhetorical empathy is a helpful framework in itself, it’s particularly insightful 
for researchers who have a positionality like mine. As a white, heterosexual, cisgender Christian 
man, I am particularly susceptible to structural biases and prejudices on race, gender, religion, 
and sexuality.5 Because rhetorical empathy requires reflexivity on the part of the practitioner, 
“[a]dopting this stance is vital for people with privilege” (Blankenship, 2019, p. 11). Rhetorical 
empathy means that I must embrace vulnerability, consider my own potential blind spots in 
regards, and attempt to see my work from the perspective of those who have been historically 
disenfranchised. As I will discuss in Chapter 5, this reflexive approach required me to seek out 
alternative perspectives and approach my data carefully.   
Taken together, the work of Carillo (2018) and Blankenship (2019) have several 
ramifications for empathic research. First, as discussed above, empathic research requires 
reflexivity on the part of the researcher; reflexive methods, such as bracketing interviews, are 
essential to that work. Second, empathic research must consider affective modes of 
communication and be attentive to the presence of “emotionally inflected ways of knowing” in 
the research (Carillo, 2018, p. 44). In this case, empathic research means that political belief 
must not be understood on a purely intellectual or cognitive level, but as part of a wider network 
of affective and embodied experiences that may come with strong emotions or influential 
narrative frames. In addition, empathic research must involve “yielding to an Other” through 
 
5For example: In my survey protocol, I never thought to ask for racial or ethnic information from my 
participants (despite revising the survey three times over the course of several months). It became a serious 
limitation in my data. I doubt one of my colleagues of color would have neglected to ask the question—and race and 
ethnicity, unsurprisingly, ended up being a theme in the follow-up interviews.  
 18 
careful listening (Blankenship, 2019). In the case of empirical participant-based research, this 
principle means careful attentiveness to my participants’ motives, experiences, and ways of 
being in the world. These three implications form the methodological foundation of the present 
study. 
 
Empathy and Democratic Deliberation 
Rhetorical empathy, in addressing the polarization of our civil discourse, requires us to reject 
problematic forms of argumentation. It is understandable, then, that scholars like Patrick Sullivan 
(2014) prefer to forego thesis-based argument entirely in favor of reflective writing, which is a 
reflection of his empathic approach to composition (p. 94). Blankenship (2019) also critiqued 
thesis-based argument, particularly “as a vestige of Aristotelian epistemology” which necessarily 
“centers on changing an Other rather than listening and seeing the world through an Other’s 
eyes” (p. 107). The result of this Aristotelian emphasis, Blankenship (2019) wrote, is that writing 
pedagogy privileges “the presence of a thesis or argument and its clear defense” (p. 107). While 
these are important critiques, rhetorical empathy need not require that writing instructors 
dispense with argument altogether; rather, it means that instructors should “ask students to 
recognize the contextual and personally situated nature of all arguments and discourse,” to 
understand the perspective behind the argument (Blankenship, 2019, p. 118). 
Such a recognition is found in the deliberative model of public discourse proposed by 
Patricia Roberts-Miller (2004), which encourages constructive conflict with an empathic 
perspective, an argument where one makes oneself “understood in the words others use” (p. 213, 
emphasis original). This model counteracts post-truth and fake news culture by reducing the 
“chances of the sort of consensus that results from discourse within an enclave” (Roberts-Miller, 
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2004, p. 186) and also pushes back against demagoguery with “good disagreements” (Roberts-
Miller, 2017, pp. 123, 127).  
It’s important to note that Roberts-Miller’s (2004) deliberative model is not necessarily 
the same thing as deliberative rhetoric, though both can be traced back to Aristotelian 
approaches. Aristotle (2007) viewed deliberative rhetoric as future-facing discourse that is aimed 
toward explicating “the advantageous and the harmful” for the polis through persuasion or 
dissuasion (p. 49). As Steven Katz (1992) wrote, “All deliberative rhetoric is concerned with 
decision and action” (p. 259). Katz (1992) famously went on to describe deliberative rhetoric as 
part of an “ethic of expediency” (an alternative translation of “advantageous”). He concluded, 
“In Aristotle’s treatment of deliberative rhetoric, then, expediency seems to become an ethical 
end in itself” (Katz, 1992, p. 261).6 In other words, Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric—in the 
context of modern-day politics—is primarily oriented toward advantageous policy (a rhetorical 
approach that Katz rightfully revealed as questionably ethical).  
While the deliberative model of public discourse that Roberts-Miller (2004) proposes is 
certainly connected to deliberative rhetoric, it is substantially reframed. For one, Roberts-Miller 
draws primarily on political theory (such as the work of Iris Young and Jürgen Habermas) rather 
than rhetorical theory. In addition, while individual rhetors may make arguments toward what 
they view to be advantageous, the structure of the deliberative model is fundamentally oriented 
around “discursive conflict” between rhetors who are “reaching across [their] own differences” 
(Roberts-Miller, 2004, pp. 184, 183). If properly facilitated, the deliberative model “teaches 
 
6Katz (1992) went on to demonstrate how this “ethic of expediency” was used in the writing of Adolf 
Hitler, convincingly displaying the dark side of deliberative rhetoric. It’s worth noting, as contemporary rhetoricians 
did, that Katz may be misreading or exaggerating Aristotle on the ethics of deliberative discourse. “[O]ne should not 
persuade what is debased,” Aristotle (2007) noted in his opening to Rhetoric (p. 35), though he acknowledges that 
deliberative rhetors in practice are not always concerned with ethics (Aristotle, 2007, p. 49). 
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rhetors to think about their argument from different perspectives (rather than striving for a 
perspective-free stance)” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 183). In other words, rhetoric in the 
deliberative model consciously makes room for difference, prioritizes listening, and is aimed 
toward collectively discussing the right course of action for a given scenario. The structure of the 
deliberative model protects and prioritizes minority perspectives where Aristotelian deliberative 
rhetoric might not. 
I have embarked on this tangential discussion for two reasons. First, while Roberts-Miller 
(2004) examined six different models of argument for the public sphere,7 I find the deliberative 
model the most persuasive. As a result, it’s important to foreground my own partiality as I 
examine my data and—as I will discuss in my methods section—use Roberts-Miller’s (2004) 
models as a heuristic for qualitative analysis. Second, the deliberative model is the form of 
argument that is most closely connected to the empathic approaches advocated by Carillo (2018) 
and Blankenship (2019). While Roberts-Miller doesn’t frame the deliberative model in terms of 
empathy, democratic deliberation nevertheless prioritizes listening and reaching out to the Other. 
In other words, the deliberative model is the form of argument that can short-circuit the rhetoric 
of demagoguery through Other-centered empathy (Roberts-Miller, 2017). As a result, I view the 
deliberative approach and the empathic approach as inextricably intertwined. Together, the 
empathic and the deliberative form the theoretical foundation for the present study. They also 
inform my overall goal: to find productive ways for teachers of writing to respond to the urgent 
exigencies of the “political turn.” 
 
 
7The other five models, which will be discussed in the methods section, are the liberal model, the 
technocratic model, the interest-based model, the communitarian model, and the agonistic model. Roberts-Miller 
(2004) argued that the liberal model, which is closely aligned with the “liberal education” tradition, was the most 
dominant in composition pedagogy. 
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Conclusion: Research Questions and Structure of the Thesis 
Based on the above literature review, this study will fill several significant gaps in composition 
scholarship. First, it seeks to study student perspectives on political content in the classroom, 
which has, until now, been limited to anecdotal evidence in larger, primarily theoretical 
conversations on writing pedagogy. This data will not only inform current pedagogical practice 
but will also seek to fulfill the ethical obligation that writing researchers have to represent their 
students fairly (Johnson, 2019). Second, this study will provide descriptive data, similar to the 
GDDP, that provides insight into the current political practices of composition instructors and 
how their students perceive those practices. Finally, this study will conduct new empirical 
research into this highly theorized but under-researched topic and will also suggest new 
directions for research. 
 The discussion above led to the following research questions for the current study. Given 
the dearth of empirical research on this topic, descriptive, exploratory research is needed to 
define the boundaries of this area of study and what factors might influence the perspectives of 
students and instructors in composition courses. Accordingly, this study seeks to answer the 
following research questions: 
• In what ways do political topics come up in first-year composition classes, and 
how?  
• If professors bring up political topics in any form, why do they do so? If not, why 
do they avoid it?  
• How do students perceive what happens in class politically, especially when the 
professor or their classmates introduce political discussions, issues, or topics into 
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the classroom? Conversely, how do instructors perceive it when their students 
introduce political discussions, issues, or topics into the classroom? 
• What are the differences, if any, between the perceptions of students and 
instructors on this topic? 
• Given the answers to the above questions, in what ways can political topics be 
addressed in FYC in a constructive and empathic fashion? 
 
In order to investigate these research questions, I have structured this thesis in five chapters. 
Based on the theoretical framework I have just described here in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 details my 
mixed-methods methodology, which sought descriptive, statistical survey data and followed up 
with semi-structured interviews of both students and instructors in Fall 2020. I also survey my 
coding scheme, which was in part built on Roberts-Miller’s (2004) six models of discourse, plus 
her later conception of demagoguery (Roberts-Miller, 2017).  
In Chapter 3, I begin to describe the results of my study, focusing on my descriptive 
research questions and providing an overview of the data: when, how, and why politics came up 
in FYC courses and how participants perceived themselves and other people as political actors in 
those courses. By combining statistical data with qualitative trends, I provide a comprehensive 
picture of my participants’ views and explore their differences.  
I continue to explore my results in Chapter 4, which seeks to dig beneath the surface of 
the descriptive trends and understand the underlying assumptions that my participants have about 
public discourse and FYC. I lean heavily on Roberts-Miller (2004) and demonstrate that, in their 
composition courses, my participants largely based their ideas on the liberal model of discourse 
and (surprisingly) the deliberative model of discourse, though other models occur as well. I close 
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the chapter by beginning to discuss the implications of these discourse models, specifically by 
examining how relying on the liberal model led to ideological inconsistency on the part of two 
instructors. 
I conclude this study in Chapter 5, which discusses the implications of this research at 
length and begins to chart paths forward for ethically integrating politics in FYC. I do so by 
examining my own positionality as a researcher before providing suggestions on instructor 
positionality, curricular change, and directions for future research. I end in the hope that others 




Chapter 2: An Empathic Methodology 
 
Given the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, this study both seeks to describe what is 
happening politically in first-year composition (FYC) courses and understand the perspectives of 
students and instructors on this topic. Since rhetorical empathy is the cornerstone of my 
approach, I sought to listen to and understand the perspectives of the primary stakeholders in 
composition courses: instructors and their students. In this way, I have tried to practice “yielding 
to an Other” by listening to the stories my participants share (Blankenship, 2019, p. 20). Because 
empathic research calls instructors of writing to try to understand other perspectives, listening to 
students in particular is one of the basic goals of this project. Because students can sometimes be 
“Othered” in composition scholarship (see, for instance, the checkered history of religious 
rhetorics, summarized by Vander Lei, 2014; Marzluf, 2011), researchers have a responsibility to 
seek out the perspectives of the students affected by pedagogical practices and represent them 
carefully (Johnson, 2019).8 
 Before I describe my methods, participants, and strategies in detail, a clarification of 
terms is in order. In this study, I have specifically defined politics in what I have described above 
as “explicit” politics. “Explicit” politics may be defined as topics, issues, and discussions that 
revolve around what a country, state, area, or city should do or be, primarily on a governmental 
level. These political issues may be social in nature, such as LGBTQ+ rights, racism, and 
sexism; they may also be regulatory issues (for example, regulatory political topics might include 
the minimum wage, gun control, or drug offenses); they might address fiscal issues, such as 
 
8This listening practice extends to instructor perspectives as well, though they are not often mentioned in 
composition scholarship in terms of ethical representation. In my study, I was conscious that I might not share 
approaches, beliefs, or pedagogical strategies with the instructors that I interviewed; “yielding to an Other” was a 
practice that was crucial to representing them ethically as well. 
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local, state, or national budgets, the national debt, or questions of public salary; or they may deal 
with the words and actions of political figures. While this list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates 
that politics, as used in this study, is focused in definition but topically broad.  
Some political issues, especially social ones, are ideological icebergs, which manifest 
themselves on a governmental level and can be addressed at a governmental level but cut deep to 
the core of a society’s values. As mentioned in the literature review above, many scholars 
recognize the teaching of composition as inherently political (Trimbur et al., 1993; McLaren, 
2009; Muriello et al., 2012). This study is not meant to argue against the essentially political 
nature of the classroom. However, defined as such, political ideologies are difficult to 
consistently identify in a classroom context, and many students in the classroom may not 
recognize them as political per se. Thus, this study follows Murriello et al. (2012) in separating 
politics—as an expression of power—from the political, which deals primarily with rhetoric and 
actions in the public sphere. In other words, this project deals with the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg.  
In my study, I utilized a mixed-methods approach, which allowed me to seek (limited) 
generalizations about my topic while also collecting rich qualitative data to contextualize and 
complicate my numerical data. Specifically, I collected quantitative data in the form of Likert 
scale survey questions from a group of students and instructors (n = 38), and then followed up on 
the survey data with individual interviews of a smaller number of students and instructors (n = 
13). The interview participants were randomly selected from a list of students and instructors 
who had agreed to continue participating.  
In what follows, I describe my method in five parts. First, I summarize my institutional 
context and examine how it may have impacted my study. Second, I describe how I constructed 
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my survey and interview protocol and briefly summarize the protocol.9 Third, I summarize my 
participants’ demographics for both the surveys and the follow-up interviews. Fourth, I explain 
and define how I analyzed my data and explore the coding scheme that I used for my qualitative 
analysis. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the limitations of this project.  
 
Institutional Context 
This study was conducted at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, an R1 land-grant university 
and flagship of the University of Tennessee system. About 30,000 students attend the school, 
according to the Office of Institutional Research and Development’s (n.d.) Quick Facts page. 
That number includes approximately 5,500 first-year students who enrolled Fall 2020 (Office of 
Institutional Research and Development, n.d.). Undergraduates are primarily in-state students—
78% overall—and the university is a predominantly white institution (PWI), with students of 
color comprising less than 20% of the student population (Office of Institutional Research and 
Development, n.d.). 
 The Writing Program at the University of Tennessee is a transfer-based curriculum and a 
recipient of the 2012 CCCC Certificate of Excellence (University of Tennessee Knoxville News, 
2012). The average student at the university is required to take a two-course sequence: English 
101 and English 102. While both are positioned in the tradition of rhetorical education, English 
101 primarily teaches rhetorical concepts, such as rhetorical analysis, stasis theory, and 
argument, while English 102 focuses on academic research, aiming to facilitate transfer through 
inquiry-based writing (see Fishman & Reiff, 2008). Both sequences, as Fishman and Reiff 
(2008) note, are based in research on “teaching for transfer” and rely on transfer-based 
 
9See Appendix A and Appendix B for full-length copies of the survey and interview protocol.  
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frameworks from scholars like Anne Beaufort (2007). Graduate instruction in composition 
pedagogy is required for master’s students in English and is strongly advised for PhD students 
without teaching experience; new instructors are required to attend teaching workshops to learn 
the specifics of the curriculum. 
 As I will discuss below, the majority of students and all of the instructors were enrolled 
in or teaching English 101. Of the two course sequences, English 101 lends itself the most to 
rhetorical inquiry and political topics. Some common topics, such as social media, healthcare, 
and “fake news,” are relatively political in nature; others, such as metacognition, are less 
expressly political. As the results of my study indicate, because English 101 involves teaching 
argument, even ostensibly apolitical course topics can be taken in political directions by students. 
As such, English 101 courses were an ideal site for research on politics in FYC during a 
presidential election season—though, as I will discuss in the next chapter, those courses were 
substantially impacted by their modality and perhaps the timing of the study. 
 
Survey Protocol  
For this study, I constructed two survey instruments: one for students, and one for instructors. 
The survey protocol was meant to directly answer the descriptive research questions guiding my 
study, seeking information about how “politicized” students and instructors perceive their 
class(es) to be and what factors influence those perceptions. Like other descriptive studies on 
democratic engagement in education (Carr, 2014; Zyngier, 2014), my protocol relied primarily 
on Likert-scale questions. Generally, the questions were ordered from least sensitive to most 
sensitive, as advocated by MacNealy (1999), and from simple and descriptive to complex. 
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Not counting questions involving informed consent and eligibility, the student survey 
contained 28 questions (including sub-questions) and the instructor survey contained 31 
questions (including sub-questions). The student survey asked seven categorical questions with 
two open-answer questions; the remaining 20 questions were on a five-point Likert rating scale 
from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly Disagree.” The instructor survey was similarly constructed, 
though it had eight categorical questions and three open-answer questions; the remaining 20 
questions were also Likert scale. The surveys collected categorical data about the participant’s 
gender, FYC course, course theme, and the reason(s) why politics comes up in class. The 
instructor survey also included a question about institutional standing (i.e. tenure-line, nontenure-
line, and GTA).  
While the categorical questions mostly related to background information, the Likert-
scale questions primarily examined the perceptions of the participants: perceptions of the course, 
perceptions of one’s own political positionality, and perceptions of politics in FYC courses in 
general. The student questionnaire included questions about the students’ perceptions of their 
classmates and their professor; the instructor survey asked about the instructors’ perceptions of 
their students. Through each of these questionnaires, I sought to obtain information that would 
tell me where, from whom, and how politics came up in FYC and what factors influenced those 
perceptions. 
Once the survey protocol was complete, I used QuestionPro to create a secure online 
questionnaire. To seek valid data for comparing students and instructors, I sent both surveys to 
instructors first; if an instructor opted to participate and completed the survey, they would then 
forward the student survey to their class(es), using a template email that I provided. Ultimately, 
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14 instructors and 24 students responded, for a total of 38 participants (see “Participants” below 
for more information). 
 
Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol was semi-structured and asked about the experiences of the participant in 
FYC while also following up on their survey responses. I chose a semi-structured protocol for its 
flexibility; it gave me the structure to compare themes across multiple interviews while also 
allowing me to follow up on striking statements, key terms, or meaningful experiences from my 
participants. In my interview technique, I generally drew on the insights of Seidman (2019), 
which include prioritizing listening, asking participants to reconstruct their experiences, and 
requesting that the participants tell me a story about the topic under discussion. One important 
aspect of Seidman’s approach, which is echoed elsewhere in the literature review above, is the 
idea of interviewing as a relationship. Because politics has the potential to be an emotionally 
charged and even distressing topic of discussion, foregrounding the interviews as relational was 
crucial.  
 Before each interview, I reviewed the survey responses of each individual and marked 
particularly striking patterns or answers that might benefit from clarification or elaboration. I 
began each interview by asking the participant to define politics for me; after discussing their 
survey answers, I asked the participants macro-level questions about the role of politics in FYC 
and what positive or negative experiences they might have had with political discussions or 
interactions in FYC. In doing so, I hoped to enrich and nuance my survey-based answers to my 
descriptive research questions. In addition, I wanted to seek out the “why” behind instructor 




As previously mentioned, the study had a total of 38 participants, with 14 instructors and 24 
students participating. In addition, 6 students and 7 instructors participated in follow-up 
interviews that ranged from 15 minutes long to an hour. The background and demographics of 
the participants are described below. 
 
Instructors 
Fourteen instructors chose to participate in my survey questionnaire. All of the instructors were 
teaching English 101 at the time. Twelve of the participants identified as female; the other two 
identified as male. Racial and ethnic data were not collected. In follow-up interviews, one 
instructor identified as a gay woman, and one instructor identified as white, straight, and 
cisgender; no other demographic information relating to racial, ethnic, or sexual identity was 
offered by the instructors in their interviews. The participants in the survey were evenly split 
between graduate teaching associates and nontenure-line faculty, with seven participants each. 
The majority of the participants were teaching online asynchronously, and 50% were using the 
same course theme (metacognition). Only two were teaching hybrid or in-person. Thirteen out of 
the 14 instructors identified as at least somewhat politically liberal; the remaining instructor 
somewhat agreed to the statement, “I consider myself politically conservative.” 
 Among the participants in follow-up interviews were four graduate teaching associates 
(GTAs), both MA and PhD students: Amos, Donna, Mandy, and Amy.10  In addition, I 
 
10The names used in this study are pseudonymous. Some pseudonyms were selected by the participants 
themselves, and the rest were assigned after each interview was completed.  
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interviewed three nontenure-line faculty: CJ, Josiah, and Deborah. Five of the instructors 
identified as female, and two identified as male. Five of the instructors were teaching entirely 
online; one instructor taught a hybrid course, and another taught an entirely face-to-face class. 
All seven instructors identified as at least somewhat politically liberal, although their definitions 
of the term ranged from libertarian to progressive to socialist. 
 
Students 
A total of 24 students completed the survey, though not all of them answered every question. 
Approximately 63% of the student participants identified as female, and the remainder (37%) 
identified as male, which roughly corresponds with the Fall 2020 entering class, though women 
are slightly overrepresented.11 As with the instructor surveys, racial and ethnic data were not 
collected. In follow-up interviews, one student identified himself as an international student from 
the Caribbean, and two more identified themselves as being the children of immigrants from 
Asia. No other demographic information related to racial, ethnic, or sexual identity was offered 
by the students interviewed. There was a major contingent of English 102 students in the survey 
results (34% of the total). The majority of students were taking an asynchronous online course 
(73%), with 41% being in a metacognition-themed English 101 course (10 out of the 15 students 
in English 101). None of the participants were in a hybrid or in-person class.  
The political demographics of the student participants were more mixed than those of the 
instructors. Two-thirds of students identified as at least somewhat liberal (about 66%), including 
eight students (33%) who strongly agreed to the statement, “I consider myself politically liberal.” 
 
11According to the university factbook (Office of Institutional Research and Development, n.d.), 
approximately 57% of entering freshmen identified as female (43% as male).  
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On the flip side, 8% of students strongly agreed to the statement, “I consider myself politically 
conservative,” and a further 30% agreed or somewhat agreed.12 
 Six students participated in follow-up interviews, evenly split between male and female 
students: Abby, Ember, Josh, Kate, Leo, and Matt. While none of them were in a hybrid or in-
person course, they were split between asynchronous courses and courses that were a 
combination of synchronous and asynchronous elements, with three students each. All of the 
students considered themselves politically liberal, and their answers to my follow-up questions 
regarding their political beliefs ranged from centrist to progressive.  
 
Data Analysis: Descriptive and Magnitude Coding 
After all of the surveys were collected and the interviews were completed, I transcribed each 
interview manually and used a loosely descriptive coding method (Saldaña, 2016, p. 102-105) to 
identify the primary topics addressed across all 13 interviews. Given that descriptive coding tells 
the researcher what’s in the data, not what the data means, I then designed a coding scheme to 
better answer my research questions. The codebook I developed after transcribing my interviews 
has three main components: descriptive codes, magnitude codes, and hypothesis codes.13 
 First, I maintained some descriptive codes in order to better answer my descriptive 
research questions. Unlike my original descriptive codes, which were numbered in the dozens, I 
narrowed my descriptive codes down to four primary perceptions: Perception of Class, which 
primarily dealt with politics in FYC course content; Perception of Instructor, for students who 
specifically commented on their FYC instructor as a political actor; Perception of 
 
12The disparity between the two questions can be explained by one student who identified as libertarian in 
an open-answer response, and thus identified as neither conservative nor liberal. 
 
13I am grateful to Jeff Ringer for suggesting this structure to me. 
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Students/Classmates, which addresses students as political actors in FYC; and Perception of Self, 
which refers to student and instructor self-perceptions as political actors in FYC. After coding 
through the data once, I revised the codebook to split up Perception of Class into two codes: 
Perception of Class and Perception of Class (Hypothetical), which refers to participants 
speculating about the role of politics in a composition course. 
 The values of these categories were coded with magnitude coding (Saldaña, 2016, 86-
91). Four magnitude codes—positive, negative, mixed, and neutral—were combined with two 
categories (political and apolitical) for a total of eight magnitude codes. Each time a descriptive 
code occurred in a transcript, then, a magnitude code was applied to measure whether that 
perception was political or apolitical and whether it was positive, negative, mixed, or neutral. 
Placing the magnitude and descriptive codes in matrices allowed me to track whether certain 
perceptions correlated (whether, for example, “Perception of Class” and “Political-Negative” 
overlapped frequently). 
 Finally, I also created seven hypothesis codes, which emerged from Patricia Roberts-
Miller’s (2004, 2017) work but were revised and reworked whenever the qualitative data 
required new flexibility or emerging definitions. Thus, any given codable unit in an interview 
transcript could have up to three codes applied: a descriptive code, a magnitude code, and a 
hypothesis code. Because the hypothesis codes were particularly complex, I will devote an entire 
section to describing those codes below.  
 
Data Analysis: Hypothesis Coding  
My hypothesis codes were developed from six models of public discourse proposed by Patricia 
Roberts-Miller (2004), with the addition of a seventh category outlined by Roberts-Miller in 
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Demagoguery and Democracy (2017). The seven models are: the liberal model, the technocratic 
model, the interest-based model, the communitarian model, the agonistic model, the deliberative 
model, and demagoguery. The purpose of these models is for my project—as it was for Roberts-
Miller in hers—to see what these models of discourse reveal about participants’ political 
assumptions, particularly their assumptions about what discourse should look like and how 
arguments should be conducted in the public sphere. These assumptions are fundamental to the 
teaching of composition, particularly if composition is seen as a rhetorical education and/or as a 
way to teach argument. As Roberts-Miller (2004) wrote, “Much of our disagreement about 
pedagogical practices is disagreement about what it means (or should mean) to participate in a 
democratic public sphere” (p. 4). As such, these models are a helpful framework for defining the 
more fundamental disagreements that may exist between instructors and between instructors and 
students.  
It’s important to note that this taxonomy is not meant to be definitive or settle the 
discussion once and for all; Roberts-Miller (2004) acknowledged that her own book “makes a 
monolith of each models discussed, obscures important distinctions, ignores various traditions, 
and implies a necessary connection between theory and practice” (p. 222). “The last thing I 
want,” she wrote, “is for my very ad hoc definitions to be reified” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 222). 
Rather, Roberts-Miller meant to spark a conversation, to provide critical frameworks with which 
to examine the political foundations of composition practices. It is in this spirit of critical inquiry 
that I use her formulation of these models of discourse. Indeed, though Roberts-Miller’s 
definitions remain at the core of each of the models, the specific iterations that I describe evolved 
as a result of the coding process, making my framework more of a heuristic than static 
categories. Rather than using them as an inert framework, I sought to develop the seven models 
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iteratively, allowing them to inform my data and allowing my data to challenge and refine my 
models. Not only does this process make the framework more valid for qualitative inquiry, but 
it’s also a way I sought to “listen” to my participants and allow my results to emerge organically 
from their experiences, rather than deductively from my preexisting assumptions. Below, I 
describe each code and outline how it was defined for my analysis. 
 
The Liberal Model 
Roberts-Miller (2004) summarized the liberal model in this way: “The liberal model theorizes a 
public space where people rely on rational discourse in order to determine what is in the 
universal best interest” (p.  4). The liberal model relies on persuading a “hypothetically neutral or 
mildly skeptical audience,” rather than persuading the opposition (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 7). It 
is identified primarily with current-traditional pedagogy, “grounded in enlightenment values of 
civility, rationality, neutrality, and autonomy” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 18). Difference must be 
“transcended,” in favor of profound individuality and the ability to think critically and 
objectively (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 35).  Roberts-Miller (2004) noted that the common 
definition of liberal in political terms is “only grammatically related” to the liberal model of 
discourse (p. 21), which simply emphasizes tolerance, personal and religious freedom, fair 
elections, and so on—not a certain political party or standpoint. In terms of human identity, the 
liberal model relies on autonomy “as a goal for how people should try to think,” and the 
hallmark of autonomy is rationality (Roberts-Miller, 2004, pp. 67, 71).  
This definition of the liberal model had several implications for coding. First, neutrality is 
a keyword for the liberal model, particularly neutrality that assumes that that which is traditional 
is neutral (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 28). In addition, the liberal model in education often holds 
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the goal of forming a student “who transcends the particularities of his/her identity and 
experiences in order to evaluate policy proposals from a neutral perspective” (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 92). This manifests in two ways: first, a “liberal education” that emphasizes conformity 
to traditional ways of knowing, transcending difference, and the universality of truth, which is 
found in acculturation (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 92).  Second, and more commonly, the liberal 
model’s ideal of the autonomous, educated self can be seen in instructors taking on the role of 
referee, making no judgements about the good (i.e. being neutral on most topics) but still 
concerned with the right (issues of justice), intervening only when “one student interferes with 
the autonomy of another student” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 95). 
Thus, when coding for the liberal model, I sought evidence of the following 
characteristics: neutrality on the part of the instructor; “banking” pedagogical methods (i.e. 
depositing a certain rational disposition; “liberal education”); writing argument as a thesis-driven 
list of reasons; and student autonomy as an ultimate goal, particularly with regard to their own 
conception of “the good.” Of course, some statements may seem to represent the liberal model 
on the surface but may be more nuanced or complicated. Accordingly, if the participant 
emphasized neutrality or objectivity with caveats (such as the impossibility of being unbiased), if 
student autonomy meant something other than the ability to transcend one's own perspective, and 






14Much of this paragraph, and the parallel paragraphs in each section below, is adapted from my 
codebook’s inclusion and exclusion criteria. The full codebook can be found in Appendix C.  
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The Technocratic Model 
According to Roberts-Miller (2004), the technocratic model “assumes that policy questions are 
fundamentally technical questions and are best solved either through letting technical experts 
make the decisions or through using the public sphere for the dissemination of technical 
information” (p. 4). It may be extreme, where “experts make the decisions,” or it may be less 
extreme, “in which the general public makes the decisions after listening to information from the 
experts” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 37). Either way, it is “policies without politics” (Roberts-
Miller, 2004, p. 37).  
In coding, I looked for the assumption that the role of first-year composition is “technical 
training” in “giving students technical competence” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 38). Such an 
assumption conflates public discourse and technical discourse as being the same thing (Roberts-
Miller, 2004, p. 39). I did not apply this code if the statement implied that the “technical skills” 
of composition are apolitical training in public discourse, or if it seemed to view information 
from experts as one option among many for seeing a political issue (rather than the only 
perspective that matters).  
 
The Interest-Based Model 
The interest-based model is fundamentally based in “self-interest in regard to public policies” 
(Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 5). Any political conflict is settled, not through argument, but through 
“bargaining, relying on market forces, and/or advertising” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 5). The 
interest-based model often manifests most clearly when one assumes that “people’s political 
stances are the result of their socioeconomic status and interest” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 6) and 
is one way to abandon the liberal ideal of neutrality (p. 98). It has strong connections to the 
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adversary model of democracy, which assumes that democracy is simply a struggle of power 
where winning is the goal, and principles only surface after power is seized (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 100; though see the discussion of demagoguery below). In this model, democracy is 
simply balancing competing needs and interests, and “identification [is] the main rhetorical 
strategy” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 111). Ultimately, it results in “expressivist argumentation,” 
where the goal of argument is simply “to express one’s opinions in ways that seem authentic 
representations of one’s self” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 117).  
When coding for the interest-based model, I looked for theories that see the “major 
responsibility of the rhetor as making his/her policies the most attractive” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, 
p. 99), particularly statements that seem to reduce public rhetoric to identification with the 
audience or beliefs about policy to one’s socioeconomic or cultural positionality. I also looked 
for expressive argument (though see demagoguery below for a discussion of how expressive 
argument functions in that context). I did not apply this code if a statement implied audience 
identification is one of several possible strategies, or if audience identification was expressly 
factional.  
 
The Agonistic Model 
Much more “conflictual than communitarian or liberal discourse but not quite the verbal free-for-
all of interest-based discourse” (p. 5), the agonistic model—as Roberts-Miller (2004) explored 
through the work of Hannah Arendt—emphasizes that a “confrontational method” of civil 
discourse is “the best way to prevent tyranny and totalitarianism, to ensure that injustices are 
discussed” (pp. 121, 122). It is not “expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist” (Roberts-
Miller, 2004, p. 125); rather, it searches for truth in both “individuality and commonality” (p. 
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126) by rhetors agreeing to disagree—in other words, agreeing to “engage one another” in 
continuing disagreement (p. 127). In this way, agonism (especially polemical agonism) is “how 
one tests the validity of one’s thought,” through sustained disagreements (Roberts-Miller, 2004, 
p. 131).  
To code for agonism, I searched for statements that emphasized the presence of (if not the 
value of) conflict, confrontation, or adversarial argument about a political topic, or statements 
that indicated that conflict or argument was a tool for clarifying positions. I also looked for 
places where my participants saw conflict as productive in itself, rather than as a tool to move 
beyond one's enclave or reach out across difference.  
During the process of coding, this definition was refined substantially as a result of two 
instructor interviews. Part of the problem was that Roberts-Miller did not make a clear 
distinction between agonism and the deliberative model (which is a difference-oriented, agonistic 
form of the liberal model). Thus, after coding the two instructor interviews once, I returned to 
my codebook and rewrote the deliberative and agonistic sections. Based on the instructor 
interviews and on Roberts-Miller’s (2004) definition of the deliberative model, I made one 
primary distinction between deliberation and agonism. I coded for agonism whenever conflict 
was seen as helpful in itself and there was no clear movement toward reaching out across 
differences; I coded for the deliberative model whenever conflict was present, but the participant 
emphasized the need to reach beyond one’s subjectivity and frame one’s argument in the terms 
that the other person would use (cf. Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 213). The difference between 
listening-oriented agonism and conflictual deliberation, in other words, is direction—are the 
participants reaching out across their differences (deliberative) or not (agonistic)? This question 
became crucial for navigating the more complex sections of my data. 
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The Communitarian Model 
Sometimes referred to as a “neo-Aristotelian” model, the communitarian model critiques 
liberalism for its “transhistorical foundations for democratic practice,” preferring social 
constructivism, and rejects the “privileging of the autonomous individual,” because such priority 
of autonomy makes liberalism functionally based in self-interest (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 5). 
The communitarian model does not pretend to be neutral, as the liberal model does, or devolve 
into base self-interest, as the interest-based model does (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 143). Instead, it 
is aimed toward the common good and believes that political communities should not be neutral 
in that regard; political communities should promote “the spirit of community engagement” 
(Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 143). According to Roberts-Miller (2004), legislation in the 
communitarian model “always does and always must have a moral basis, and that a society must 
be grounded in some kind of moral consensus” (p. 145). This moral consensus is one of the roles 
of education, “enculturation into democratic values, like altruism, civic-mindedness, mutual 
respect” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 146).  
In composition, the idea of discourse communities can be closely identified with the 
communitarian model, since in discourse community theory, writing courses “become rites of 
passage into communities whose very nature students lack the ability to critique or change,” 
where membership “means conforming” to the standards of the community (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 156). While both the liberal model and the communitarian model see education as the 
inculcation of democratic values, if one sees the origin of democratic values “in particular 
sociohistorical trends” and aimed toward the common good, that is an indication of a 
communitarian position (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 180).  
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In coding for the communitarian model, then, I looked for consensus-building, civility, 
acculturation toward democratic values and the common good, normative discourse 
communities, and communally oriented social constructivism. I did not code for the 
communitarian model if the inculcation of character is aimed toward individual autonomy rather 
than the common good, or if democratic values are universal values rather than socially 
constructed norms; both of these are characteristic of the liberal model.  
 
The Deliberative Model 
The deliberative model is somewhat similar to liberalism, in that it relies on “who makes the best 
argument, not who has the most power,” but is more attentive to the broader nuances of 
“argument” and includes affective modes (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 5). It also acknowledges, 
unlike the liberal model, that “we cannot free ourselves of our own perspective” (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 182); in the deliberative model, rhetors are “expected to move beyond one’s own 
subjectivity, but not to free oneself of it entirely” (p. 183).  
As an Other-oriented model of discourse, the deliberative model “requires that people try 
to present their own arguments in ways that people who are very different might understand” 
(Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 197). It is ultimately agonistic, because it prioritizes difference as the 
key to successful deliberation; one’s own perspective is ultimately tested and refined by 
encountering different perspectives. Crucially, it requires contextualizing one’s perspective to the 
Other: “In deliberative democracy, one must make one’s argument understood in the words 
others use” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 213, emphasis original).  
Roberts-Miller noted that in the liberal model (as well as the technocratic), the personal is 
“nondeliberative,” where personal experience is fundamentally “nonargumentative” and is thus 
 42 
not valid for discussion. At the very least, that one “cannot critique or disagree with someone’s 
personal experience”—it is merely expressive (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 210). In contrast, the 
deliberative model holds space for personal experience, not just as an expressive argument, but 
as “something with which people might disagree” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 211). In other words, 
experience is neither unique nor universal, but is itself a kind of evidence that can be persuasive 
or contested.  
As noted previously, the primary difference between the deliberative model and the 
agonistic model is the deliberative model’s attention to reaching out across difference. 
Accordingly, when coding for the deliberative model, I sought instances where difference was a 
key for refining public discussion, while still requiring a culture of listening aimed toward 
communication. I also looked for partition-based explorative argument (rather than thesis-based); 
student discourse as peer discourse; fairness as the role of the teacher (not neutrality); and 
affective argument and experience as valid for discussion.  
The process of coding my interviews led to a key distinction in my deliberative coding. 
Each of these models exist on a flexible matrix, where one axis is expressive to deliberative, and 
the other axis is irenic (i.e. conflict-avoidant) to agonistic. While this spectrum can be used to 
define each model, it was a particularly useful heuristic for developing the deliberative model. 
Specifically, two instructors both appeared to draw on the deliberative model, but they did so in 
very different ways. One instructor emphasized mediation and finding common ground; another 
emphasized clarifying conflict and class discussion. To account for this, I distinguished between 
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the irenic deliberative, which is mediative and seeks temporary points of agreement, and the 
agonistic deliberative, which is highly conflictual.15 
 
Demagoguery 
Demagoguery is not a model of discourse per se, but a degradation of the interest-based model of 
discourse.16 Roberts-Miller examines the concept of demagoguery at length in her book 
Demagoguery and Democracy (2017). At its core, Roberts-Miller (2017) wrote, demagoguery 
“is about identity. It says that complicated policy issues can be reduced to a binary of us (good) 
versus them (bad)” (p. 8). In demagoguery, politics becomes a “zero-sum game—the more they 
succeed, the more we lose” (Roberts-Miller, 2017, p. 13). Public disagreement in demagoguery 
can be grouped into three categories: “group identity…need…and what level of punishment to 
enact against the out-group” (Roberts-Miller, 2017, p. 33). In other words, who is in and who is 
out? How can we blame “them” for our problems? How should we punish those on the outside? 
Demagoguery relies on a variety of tactics, including increasing polarization, charismatic 
authority, the perceived simplicity of truth (which is easy to understand and anyone who doesn’t 
is dumb or evil), discrediting any opposition argument as “biased” and thus not worth engaging, 
and “universalized nostalgia,” the misleading notion that a particular tradition is just how things 
are done (Roberts-Miller, 2017, pp. 34-35, 59-61, 39, 47). It’s also notable that Roberts-Miller 
(2017) connected demagoguery with her earlier matrix of public discourse, arguing that 
demagoguery “thrives in an expressive public sphere” that can be either irenic (silencing dissent) 
 
15I am grateful to the JAHWC research group for this insight, which occurred during a group coding 
session; I coded a section as agonistic and my colleagues coded it as primarily deliberative.  
 
16I’ll note here that this is a conclusion I’ve drawn myself; as far as I know, Roberts-Miller has not 
expressly connected her scholarship on demagoguery to her earlier work on models of public discourse.  
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or agonistic (shouting down dissent)—though she used the terms “niceness” and “antagonistic” 
in the text (p. 85).  
When coding, I looked both for evidence of demagogic rhetoric (such as binaries of “us” 
vs. “them”) and evidence of a wider culture of demagoguery (toxic patterns of argument that 
may not explicitly appeal to identity). Specifically, I searched for content that referred to highly 
polarized communities or rhetoric; the perceived simplicity of truth (i.e. black-and-white 
thinking that adheres to political factionalism); constructions of “need” that blame an outside 
group for the problem; accusations of bias that allow an argument to be dismissed on the basis of 
identity; and aggressive rhetoric that sees political deliberation as a zero-sum game. 
 
Limitations 
This dataset, and thus the results and conclusions of my research, are limited in several ways: my 
student and instructor correspondence, sample size, context, and demographic representation. 
First, it seems there was a substantial mismatch between the students and instructors, despite my 
best efforts to design the study to allow for direct comparison. This mismatch occurred in both 
the surveys and in the interviews. For example, 9 students who completed the survey identified 
as students in English 102 (including one of my interviewees), but none of the instructors who 
completed the survey were currently teaching English 102, perhaps indicating that an instructor 
misunderstood the instructions or forgot to take the survey. There was also some mismatching in 
terms of modality. For instance, I interviewed (by chance) the only two instructors who were 
teaching hybrid or in-person classes, whereas all of the students interviewed (indeed, all of the 
students who completed the survey) were enrolled in online FYC courses. This disproportionate 
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representation makes my survey results of limited value in comparing the data between the two 
populations and drawing conclusions.17 
 The institutional context, while useful for studying rhetorical education as a specific site 
for research, also substantially limits my results. The pandemic meant that many instructors used 
an online course template to structure their courses; in the case of instructors like Amos, that 
meant that instructors who had previously encouraged political discussions steered away from 
them in order to maintain focus on the template topic. In addition, because English 101 is a 
predominantly rhetorical and transfer-based course, my results are not necessarily generalizable 
to writing about writing (WAW) courses, writing-across-the-curriculum (WAC), or pedagogies 
that focus on academic literacies rather than rhetorical knowledge.  
In addition, the sample size for the survey data (38 total participants) means that only 
very limited conclusions can be drawn about wider trends. As I will discuss later, statistical tests 
and models may not yield statistically significant results from such as small sample, particularly 
if the responses are subsequently divided into smaller categories (such as students and 
instructors). While some conclusions can be drawn, any generalizable conclusions must be 
couched in the most tentative terms.  
 Finally, the demographic representation also limits the scope of my data in two different 
ways. As mentioned earlier, I did not collect data about race, ethnicity, or sexuality in either the 
surveys or the interviews, though it came up in both. The lack of questions on those topics was a 
significant oversight on my part and means that an important theme in the interviews—the role 
 
17Outside of course modality, the sample for interviewees was fairly balanced. The interview participants 
are a nearly even split between students (6) and instructors (7), with both GTAs (4) and nontenure-line faculty (3), 
men (5) and women (8), with representation from students of color (at least 3), and with both 
synchronous/asynchronous modalities among students and instructors.  
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of one’s racial, ethnic, and cultural background in political identity—cannot be more fully 
explored in this study. 
In addition, although I did not reveal my own political beliefs, it’s likely that selection 
bias played a role in my student sample. Though roughly one third of the student participants in 
my survey identified as politically conservative, not a single conservative student was 
interviewed. Multiple conservative students agreed to continue participating, and although 
conservative students were contacted as part of a random sampling of potential interview 
participants, none responded to my requests. Since I identify as politically liberal, the “Other” in 
many of my political arguments are conservatives; because this study does not include any 
conservative voices (outside of short survey answers), it is perhaps the biggest limitation in the 
present study.18  
  
 
18The interviews were conducted shortly after the November 2020 general election, which was likely a 
significant factor in participant self-selection. 
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Chapter 3: Politics in First-Year Composition: Initial Trends and Perceptions 
 
This chapter seeks to outline the initial results of my study by synthesizing statistical data and 
providing a bird’s-eye view of the qualitative trends. Specifically, I will answer my descriptive 
research questions by exploring how and when political topics emerge in FYC; how students and 
instructors perceive what happens in the class politically; and what differences there are between 
the perceptions of students and instructors.  
To answer these questions, this chapter will have five primary sections. First, I will begin 
by exploring how “explicit” politics emerge in FYC contexts, including in asynchronous 
modules, on Zoom, and in face-to-face classrooms; this initial section will summarize the survey 
data on how, when, and how often politics comes up in FYC. Then, in the second section, I will 
evaluate potential factors that may influence the data discussed in the first section. In the third 
section, I will move beyond describing what’s happening politically in FYC into how 
participants perceive the class, as well as how they perceive themselves and others as political 
actors. Once I’ve discussed the quantitative and qualitative data on participant perceptions, I will 
then examine disparities between various groups in the data, primarily focusing on the 
differences between students and instructors. The chapter will then conclude with a summary of 
how students and instructors perceive the role of politics in composition (that is, looking beyond 
their current class to reflect on what’s possible in FYC), which will synthesize both the survey 





Perceptions of “Explicit” Politics in First-Year Composition 
By and large, despite the fact that this study took place during the 2020 election cycle, students 
and instructors had largely apolitical experiences in their composition courses. Approximately 
38% of instructors surveyed at least somewhat agreed that politics came up often in their course, 
though few agreed moderately or strongly (15%).19 This trend was even more striking for 
students; only 13% of students at least somewhat agreed that politics came up often in their 
course. In addition, a substantial majority of students and instructors did not believe that their 
class topics were political, a trend that was nearly identical for students (60%) and instructors 
(64%).   
Compared to the survey sample, the interview participants in politically charged FYC 
classes were somewhat overrepresented, but their responses still generally indicated that FYC 
courses were mixed-to-apolitical. Six of the 13 participants in follow-up interviews were in 
apolitical FYC courses, with three additional participants describing their experience of the 
course as sometimes political. Only two participants—both instructors—described their course as 
unequivocally political.  
 Very few participants brought up politics of their own volition in their FYC courses, 
including instructors. In answer to the statement, “I bring up politics often [in my class],” only 
two instructors (15% overall) at least somewhat agreed, with an identical number of students 
saying the same (8% overall). While the language of “often” could mask participants who might 
broach political topics infrequently, a large plurality (48%) of students strongly disagreed with 
that statement, and a majority of instructors (62%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed. These 
 
19The statistics in this chapter have been rounded to the nearest whole number for ease of reading. As a 
result, some of the percentages may not add up exactly to 100.  
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responses, taken together, seem to indicate that a majority of the participants avoid political 
topics altogether.  
 When political topics did come up in these FYC courses, there were several reasons why, 
with some striking differences between students and instructors. About one third of students 
(29%) indicated that politics didn’t come up in their course at all. The remaining 71% identified 
one or more of the following reasons that politics came up in their course: the class theme, the 
class assignments, the instructor’s examples, or one’s classmates (see Figure 1). Among these 
categories, the most common was the class theme (35%), followed by the course assignments 
(26%), one’s classmates (22%), and the examples of the instructor (17%). In contrast, there was 
a clear plurality among the instructor responses (see Figure 2). Among the 79% of instructors 
who indicated that politics did come up in their courses, 35% of instructors identified their 
students as one of the reasons why. The other categories were tied, with 22% each.20  
While the overall picture is still blurry—there appear to be multiple reasons why political 
topics may be broached in an FYC course, including course content, the students, and the 
instructor—the instructor survey data mentioned above matches a trend in the qualitative data. 
Several instructors who personally avoided politics in their teaching allowed their students to 
explore politically charged topics. One instructor, Josiah, described this as an “opt-in” situation, 
since students had the freedom to choose their topics: “Several students do opt in to discussing 
[political] themes…but many also don't opt into it. So I see a wide array of engagement with 
overtly political things and stuff that's less overtly political.” This sentiment is echoed by other 
instructors and may indicate why instructors were more likely to say that political topics were 
brought up often in their courses.   
 
20One student and one instructor also used an open-answer option to identify the election as a reason why 
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Overall, then, the participants in my study—both students and instructors—had largely 
apolitical experiences in their FYC courses, and few participants intentionally brought up 
political topics in their class. While instructors were slightly more likely to see the class topic as 
political and to see political topics come up, this trend seems to be due to the fact that individual 
students sometimes chose to pursue political topics (even if the course topic was ostensibly 
apolitical). The other reasons behind these trends—and the factors that influenced these 
answers—will be explored below.  
 
Factors in Political or Apolitical Composition Courses 
There are three main factors that will be explored in this section, factors that relate directly to 
how, when, and for what reason political topics crop up in FYC courses. These three factors are 
course theme, modality, and one’s definition of politics (a primarily qualitative question 
addressed in the interviews). As I will demonstrate below, the results were illuminating, though 
ultimately inconclusive.  
One of the assumptions explored in this study was that course theme has a significant 
influence on whether students and instructors perceived their course topic to be political. This 
hypothesis is supported by the data, though the picture is complex and limited by the sample 
size. As stated above, 36% of instructors and 40% of students saw their class topic as at least 
somewhat political. While this trend did change somewhat depending on one’s course theme, the 
data is too limited to draw definitive conclusions. The most common course theme—cited by 18 
participants overall—was metacognition. Out of those participants, 33% overall (38% of 
instructors and 30% of students) saw the course theme as at least somewhat political, which is 
slightly lower than but still comparable to the overall average. This number is smaller for 
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students and instructors in a social media-themed course (20% overall) but with a much smaller 
sample size (n = 5). The more politically charged course topics were also more idiosyncratic; 
44% of the students in a food-themed English 102 course identified the topic as at least 
somewhat political (n = 9), and 50% of those who identified their course theme as “Other” also 
saw the topic as politically charged (n = 6). Follow-up interviews with instructors who taught 
these “other” courses indicated that the courses were organized around themes like human 
behavior and information literacy. 
In other words, according to the survey data, themes like metacognition and social media 
seemed to be less politically charged than themes like information literacy or food, but the small 
sample size for themes outside of metacognition limits the scope of these conclusions. For 
instance, a t-test comparing metacognition to the other themes (in response to the question “My 
class topic is political”) does not yield a statistically significant result (p = .36) and has a small 
effect size (r = 0.16). A t-test with the course theme and the question “Politics comes up often in 
my class” yields a more substantial result, with a lower p-value (p = .1) and a small-to-medium 
effect (r = 0.23). In both cases, metacognition courses were less politically charged in 
comparison to the aggregate of the other course themes.  
All in all, course theme (particularly course themes that seemed inherently politically 
charged, like information literacy) seemed to influence whether a participant had a political 
experience in FYC but did not seem to substantially determine it. These results may indicate that 
the “opt-in” approach described by Josiah was common for other instructors, and that almost any 
flexible course theme could become “political” if a student choose to go that direction. For 
example, Josh—one of the students interviewed—was enrolled in a social media FYC course. 
When asked whether he saw the theme as political, Josh said that he saw the course theme as a 
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“base foundation from which we can write” and that he specifically chose to examine political 
misinformation in his paper—implying that other students might have chosen to go in different, 
more apolitical directions.  
The second major factor this study examined was course modality. Because this study 
took place during the first full semester of the COVID-19 pandemic, participants could have five 
possible course modalities: asynchronous online, synchronous online, a combination of both, 
hybrid, and fully face-to-face.21 Of the participants who were teaching or taking fully 
asynchronous courses (n = 24), 17% at least somewhat agreed that politics came up often in their 
course, compared to 29% of participants in other modalities (n = 14).  That being said, t-tests 
based on course modality (divided up into asynchronous vs. other) did not yield any statistically 
significant results or substantial effect sizes when compared to questions that asked about the 
political nature of their current class. The only notable difference was when participants were 
asked about their students or classmates bringing up politics often. Participants in asynchronous 
classes disagreed more strongly than participants in other modalities (p = .24, effect size r = 
0.22, indicating a small-to-medium effect). This difference was largely influenced by instructors, 
since 29% agreed or somewhat agreed that their students brought up politics often, compared to 
just a single student (6% of the total) who somewhat agreed that their classmates brought up 
politics often. This difference is likely due to the fact that students in asynchronous classes 
interacted with their classmates rarely—a common theme in the qualitative data—and instructors 
teaching asynchronously interacted with individual students frequently through grading and 
conferencing. Overall, then, while it seemed that participants in asynchronous classes were a 
little less likely to have political interactions, the data is inconclusive. 
 
21Technically, hybrid could also be divided up into multiple subcategories. Only one participant—an 
instructor—taught or took a hybrid course; they had both synchronous and asynchronous online elements.  
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In contrast, in the qualitative data, modality seemed to have a more substantial effect on 
whether instructors and students engaged politically with one another or with others in the class. 
Multiple students I interviewed said that, because their class was asynchronous, they had little to 
no interaction with their classmates or professor, much less political interactions. Some implied 
that political topics might have emerged if their course were more interactive. While instructor 
responses were more mixed—they interacted with dozens of students at a time through grading 
and feedback, and thus had more opportunities for political interactions—one instructor said that 
their students never mentioned politics during asynchronous activities, but that those same 
students would bring up political topics in synchronous class sessions. While this statement alone 
doesn’t establish a correlation between asynchronous online coursework and apolitical FYC 
experiences, course modality did seem to have an effect to some degree.  
The third and final factor examined here is the participant’s definition of politics. This 
factor was explored primarily through the qualitative data. Though politics was defined at the 
beginning of the survey, I opened each follow-up interview by asking the participant to define 
politics for me. Specifically, I asked them to name what “working definition” they had in mind 
while they were taking the survey. The results from my participants varied significantly. Most 
students and instructors understandably connected politics to the 2020 election or to the 
workings of government. Several instructors and students saw politics as social—not just in 
terms of social issues (that is, issues of social justice), but in terms of politics as a social act. 
There was also a significant trend of referring to politics in cultural terms and in terms of identity 
(i.e. race, ethnicity, and sexuality). Mandy, an instructor, defined politics in terms of identity and 
self-awareness; as a result, she saw metacognition as an inherently political course theme, 
because it dealt with questions of the self. One of the students interviewed, Leo, primarily saw 
 55 
politics in cultural terms—perhaps unsurprisingly, since he was an international student. He 
frequently conflated cultural artifacts (such as food) with political discussion, which led him to 
say that his class was politically charged. While each participant’s definition of politics was not 
examined quantitatively in the survey data, in the qualitative data, it was substantially related to 
the participant’s perceptions of their FYC class.  
Each of the three factors examined here seemed to have some degree of impact on the 
participants’ experiences in FYC. While course theme and modality appear to be loosely related 
to one’s political experiences—that is, some course themes are more politically charged than 
others, and non-asynchronous courses appear to open up the possibility of more political 
interactions—the stronger correlation seems to be with each individual’s definition of politics. 
This trend opens up a conversation on how a participant’s positionality and beliefs might 
influence their perception of politics in FYC. It is to this topic that I now turn, first to describe 
how participants perceived themselves and others as political actors, and then to compare the 
responses of students and instructors (as well as other discrete groups in the data).  
 
Participant Perceptions: Class, Self, and Others 
The previous section dealt with how, when, and for what reason political topics crop up in FYC 
courses. In other words, it described participants’ political experiences in FYC and examined 
what factors influenced the presence of politics in FYC courses. This section aims to broaden the 
conversation by moving from description to perception: how participants perceive the course 
itself politically, as well as how they perceive others and themselves as political actors with 
political beliefs. The summary below will draw on survey questions as well as the descriptive 
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and magnitude codes in the qualitative data. Because this study seeks to examine both student 
and instructor perspectives, each group will be discussed separately.  
 
Student Perceptions of the Course 
As mentioned above, only 40% of students agreed that their class topic was political (and most 
of those students only somewhat agreed to the statement). Only 13% of students somewhat 
agreed that politics came up often in their class. That being said, nearly two-thirds of students 
(64%) indicated that they were at least somewhat comfortable with political discussions in class 
(with 48% agreeing or strongly agreeing), and only 8% of students strongly disagreed (see 
Figure 3). An identical number (64%) agreed that politics makes their English class more 
interesting, though of that sample, the students who somewhat agreed (24%) were in the 
plurality.  
Notably, the responses were even more positive when students were asked whether 
political references or discussions benefited the class or were constructive (72% at least 
somewhat agreed to both). There is a caveat here: 36% of students believed that politics 
distracted from the class. In addition, 8% of students indicated they had felt frustrated as a result 
of a political discussion in class, compared to 64% who said they had not. (An additional 28% 
said they weren’t sure if they had ever felt frustrated.) It’s notable that both of the students who 
had indicated frustration had also identified earlier as politically conservative; one student noted 
their dislike for government was not an opinion widely shared among their peers, and the other 
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Some of the nuances in these numbers get teased out in the qualitative data, which 
indicated that students generally didn’t mind political topics in the classroom but were wary of 
emotionally charged political rhetoric. While counting the number of codes can be a crude 
measurement of the trends in the data, it’s illustrative here. In a matrix that examines when 
descriptive codes and magnitude codes overlapped in the data (Table 1), “Perception of Class” 
occurred 12 times in conjunction with “Political-Positive” and 13 times with “Political-Neutral.” 
In contrast, “Political-Negative” and “Political-Mixed” were only coded alongside “Perception 
of the Class” three times in total.22 In all three cases, the negative or mixed codes were referring 
to a highly polarized kind of political argument (which was later coded for demagoguery).   
In sum, though most students had fairly apolitical experiences, they were largely open to 
politics in their courses, as evidenced by the large majorities that thought political references or 
discussions were constructive or made class more interesting. The students who were later 
interviewed provided insight on the students who might have been more hesitant: they thought 
that talking about politics in FYC left open the possibility for polarized and emotionally charged 
arguments, and they favored a more regulated approach to political discussion. In Kate’s words, 
constructive discussion involved “giving a lot more direction” than simply asking for students’ 
thoughts on a political topic.  
 
Instructor Perceptions of the Course 
As discussed previously, 36% of instructors somewhat agreed that their class topic was political, 
and 38% somewhat agreed that politics came up often in their course(s). Instructors were also  
  
 
22Political codes in the table are overrepresented in terms of sheer numbers and don’t necessarily reflect the 
political nature of these classes. In the interviews, I typically followed up on any political references, sometimes 
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asked a series of questions about whether they were comfortable with discussing political 
discussions and whether political topics or discussions aided their teaching. 54% of instructors 
indicated that they were at least somewhat uncomfortable with discussing politics in class (with a 
mean of 3.5, indicating mixed or neutral results; see Figure 4). When asked about politics in the 
course in general, however, 82% of instructors believed that political references or discussions 
benefited the class to some degree and 91% thought that discussing politics in class was 
constructive. Some instructors believed that politics could be distracting; 27% somewhat agreed 
that political references or discussions distracted from the class material. In addition, 50% 
indicated that they have felt frustrated as a result of a political discussion or topic in their FYC 
class(es). 
Though most instructors said that political references or discussions were beneficial or 
constructive, in follow-up interviews, instructors indicated that they generally limited the scope 
of politically charged topics or assignments. These instructors didn’t demonstrate enthusiasm for 
political topics so much as they did their functional use. In a matrix that combines the descriptive 
and magnitude codes (Table 2), the “Political-Positive” code appeared with “Perception of 
Class” 17 times, compared to 23 occurrences of “Political-Neutral,” indicating frequent (but 
primarily functional) use of political topics by some instructors. “Political-Mixed” and “Political-
Negative” occurred a total of six times, usually in reference to the possibility for backfire, 
polarization, or distraction from the “class concepts” (broadly construed).  
Two instructors didn’t limit political topics in the same way as the others. Mandy, who 
was teaching the metacognition theme, connected her theme to human identity, and so politics 
was an integral (if implicit) part of that course. “Students sort of have to have an awareness of 
who they are as people,” she said, “like in terms of identity politics—and thinking about how   
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Figure 4: Instructor Comfort Level with Political Discussions 
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that relates to metacognition, in terms of how they relate to their world based on their identity 
politics.” The last instructor, Deborah, taught an explicitly political course theme. She used 
political content as, in her words, “a means of encouraging critical thinking.” Unlike the other 
instructors, she saw rhetoric as fundamentally political, and so politics was primary, not 
secondary, in her courses. When teaching rhetorical analysis, she would ask her students: “How 
are you being manipulated here? How are they trying to get you to believe what they're saying?” 
She added, “That's politics, that's all of it.” 
 
Student Perceptions of Instructor 
Only 8% of students at least somewhat agreed that their instructor brought up politics often, with 
the vast majority (74%) either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. In addition, 17% of students 
noted that their instructor’s examples were one of the reasons that politics would come up in 
their FYC course. While no survey questions asked whether students responded positively or 
negatively to their instructor’s comments, one student did bring up their professor’s political 
conduct in an open-answer response. The response followed up on a question about whether 
students had ever felt frustrated as a result of a political discussion in their class; the student said, 
“Blatant Liberal comments from professors are frustrating.” In a later open-answer response, that 
same student wrote, “I feel if Professors and students can make broad liberal comments they 
should be able to listen and except [sic] when conservatives come forward with their opinions.” 
Because no conservative students were interviewed, there is no other qualitative data to follow 
up on the possibility that conservative students might be more frustrated by their instructors than 
liberal students. 
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 In the qualitative data available, students were largely agnostic on their perception of 
instructors as political actors. As shown in Table 1, 11 of the 14 codes for “Student Perception of 
Instructor” were in the apolitical category. Both “Apolitical-Positive” codes occur in Abby’s 
interview. She told me, “This semester I have not had any interaction with any teachers, like 
politically.  I just—I feel like that's how it should be, anyways.” What ideas students did have 
about their instructor’s political positions were largely speculative. According to Josh, who was 
in a partially synchronous class, “I got the general sense that she might be—this is shooting into 
the dark, mind you—I get the general sense that she might be, if we're talking political spectrum, 
maybe left-leaning.” He promptly followed this up by saying, “I honestly have no real clue,” 
which was par for the course in the rest of the student interviews.  
 
Instructor Perceptions of Self 
A number of questions in the survey and interview protocol asked how instructors perceived 
themselves as political actors in the classroom. As discussed previously, all but one instructor 
(92%) considered themselves politically liberal, and there was near unanimity in questions about 
the importance of politics (all agreed, and 75% strongly agreed, with a mean rating of 1.5), how 
closely one follows politics (83% agreed that they followed politics closely, with a mean rating 
of 1.8), and whether they considered themselves politically informed (all instructors at least 
somewhat agreed, with 83% agreeing or strongly agreeing). Collectively, these results indicate a 
substantial difference between instructors’ personal views (which place politics in high priority) 
and their professional roles (which are much more mixed).  
 The qualitative data helps to unpack this difference more thoroughly and reveal some of 
the nuances of these questions. Instructors’ views on political topics have been explored above, 
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and the results indicate that most of them saw politics as secondary to the course content. In 
other words, even though instructors personally believed in the importance of politics, they saw 
themselves as instructors of politically neutral “course content,” such as literacy and rhetorical 
awareness. Political topics were largely secondary to those pedagogical goals.  
That being said, instructors chose to go about handling those secondary topics in different 
ways. Three out of the seven instructors interviewed saw their role in the classroom as mostly 
apolitical and neutral; they did not bring up political topics and did not engage in political 
discussion, except when students broached those topics of their own accord. Three other 
instructors, however, saw their role in the classroom as at least somewhat political, even if their 
classes were ostensibly apolitical. Amy, for instance, acknowledged that her political perspective 
“intersects in the way that I grade them on conventions and style in their writing…. If I can read 
what it says, and it doesn't interfere with the meaning, and it doesn't detract from whatever genre 
we're teaching in, then I'm very very lenient on grammar.” Another instructor, CJ, said, “It might 
be expedient for me to at least bring my politics in as far as they relate to social justice issues.” 
In this way, she acknowledged, she is not neutral or apolitical, though she still tried not to “make 
it incredibly apparent” what her political views were. The third instructor saw their23 very 
presence in the classroom as political, since they openly identified as gay. “I'm gonna be gay 
because I'm gay,” they told me. 
The outlier, of course, is Deborah, who identified as progressive and not at all apolitical. 
When asked to elaborate on that term, Deborah said, “Being progressive means actively trying to 
make change, whether that be in terms of how I vote, in terms of the things I talk about, and 
things I teach…. I mean, it's pretty clear what side of the divide I'm on, I don't think you can hide 
 
23In order to better protect my participants, I have chosen to use gender-neutral pronouns when referencing 
characteristics or beliefs that might risk revealing their identities.  
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that.” While she didn’t want students to simply adopt her point of view, she also didn’t think 
neutrality was possible. 
Regardless of whether they believed instructors should be political or apolitical in their 
teaching, instructors shared similar strategies for dealing with political topics. For example, CJ, 
Amy, and Donna had strikingly different approaches to political content in their courses. CJ’s 
course theme was expressly political, and she saw her role in her class as somewhat political as 
well. Amy saw her role as political—insofar as grading was concerned—but tried to avoid 
political topics in her class. Donna believed it was her responsibility to be apolitical both in her 
role as the instructor and in her facilitation of the course theme. Despite these differences, all 
three shared a similar tactic to dealing with students who brought up political topics, especially if 
those topics were particularly polarizing or delicate: redirection. In essence, these instructors 
tried to guide any particularly delicate or sensitive political content back to the (usually 
apolitical, or at least neutral) assignment prompt. CJ said, “I try to just redirect back to the 
assignment [when inappropriate political content comes up]. Because I don't—I feel like it's my 
responsibility to teach them how to engage with material more ethically, but I don't think it's my 
responsibility to change their political views.” Donna agreed, framing it in terms of transfer: “I 
don't feel like I need to do the work of showing them that they need to transfer [evaluation of 
credible sources] to the political arena. I feel like my job is to show them how to gain that skill 
and then they can, if they choose to, transfer it there.” 
While these responses demonstrate a diversity of viewpoints, ranging from apolitical and 
neutral roles to expressly political and ideological ones, instructors generally agreed that they 
should not impose their viewpoints on their students, and most of them acknowledged that their 
political positionality influenced their instruction to some degree or another. Sometimes this 
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belief took the form of apolitical neutrality, and sometimes it took the form of challenging 
student beliefs directly, but in each case, instructors emphasized the tools of rhetorical concepts 
and critical literacy that their courses offered students. 
 
Student Perceptions of Self 
Student perceptions of themselves as political actors generally tracked with instructor responses, 
though students were more moderate. Students primarily identified as liberal (one third strongly 
agreed, and two thirds at least somewhat agreed), and they generally agreed that politics was 
important (96%), that they followed politics closely (79%, though with 33% only somewhat 
agreeing), and that they considered themselves politically informed (87%, though 39% only 
somewhat agreed). Nearly all students (88%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed that they 
brought up politics often in their class, and only 8% somewhat agreed to that statement, 
indicating that students generally avoided bringing up politics in their course or pursuing a 
political topic.  
 For the most part, this trend held true in the qualitative data as well. Few students 
reflected at all on their political role in class, and most of the students (5 out of 6) chose not to 
bring up politics in any form or fashion in their courses. The exception was Josh, who was in a 
social media themed course and chose to study political disinformation on social media. All three 
of the “Political-Neutral” and “Student Perception of Self” codes in Table 1 were from Josh’s 
interview. As I will discuss later on, Josh didn’t believe his political beliefs played a role in his 
research and writing. He told me, “Whenever it comes to writing specifically, I try to quarantine 
my political thought. I try my best to write as balanced as possible.” For the most part, then, the 
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students interviewed either avoided politics or tried to be as objective as possible when engaging 
with political topics.  
 
Instructor Perceptions of Students 
A substantial majority (77%) of instructors disagreed that their students brought up politics often, 
with 46% either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. These results seem to indicate that 
instructors saw the majority of their students as apolitical in their FYC courses, though (as I will 
discuss below), there’s a difference between the instructor and student responses in this regard. A 
majority of instructors (55%) somewhat agreed with the statement, “My students usually agree 
with my political opinions,” with 64% overall either agreeing or somewhat agreeing with that 
statement. One instructor (9% overall) strongly disagreed with that statement. The fact that a 
strong majority (73%) either somewhat agreed or somewhat disagreed with the statement 
demonstrated ambivalence or neutrality overall. When asked the inverse—whether they usually 
agreed with their students’ opinions—the results were even more ambivalent, with 83% either 
somewhat agreeing (67%) or somewhat disagreeing (17%). The mean Likert values for both of 
these data points are 3.6 and 3.5 respectively, which is the exact middle of the scale. 
Combined, these two data points support the trend in the qualitative data: many 
instructors simply didn’t get a sense for their students’ beliefs, which shows up as a wash in the 
data. Mandy told me, “I haven't necessarily gotten as much of a sense of political background 
[on my students] this semester, with the exception of the few who have focused on politics for 
their…papers.” Even when some students specifically chose to discuss politics in (or after) a 
class session, those students seemed to be in the minority. Amy noted one particularly striking 
political discussion that she had with her students:  
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Some of them hung back in a Zoom room on the day of the election—they chose to 
because they wanted to ask me just, off the record, what I thought. And I didn't really 
speak a whole lot in this session—it was mostly them ranting. But all who were the ones 
who held back were very liberal…. But, y'know, that's four out of fifteen, so another 
eleven were not interested in doing that.  
 
As teachers, these instructors saw a range of perspectives from their students, including both 
apolitical and political ones. While instructors like Donna had students with political 
perspectives to offer—two of her students chose to pursue political topics for their papers—she 
said her students were generally “sick of talking about politics.”  
Except for those students who specifically decided to write on politically charged issues, 
then, instructors generally didn’t get a sense for their students’ political perspectives. Even CJ, 
who taught an explicitly political course topic, said, “I'll have a lot of students who, through their 
responses, will make sure to throw in, I don't really care about politics…. It tends to be [that] 
most of the students seem like they're disinterested or disengaged or tired of [talking about 
politics].” That made determining students’ political perspectives difficult, since that conjecture 
was largely based on individual students. What political encounters instructors did have with 
students were often negative, evidenced by the 22 concurrent codes of “Perception of Students” 
and “Political-Negative.” 
 When instructor interviewees did venture a guess on their students’ political beliefs, the 
results varied drastically depending on the instructor. One instructor, Donna, believed that her 
students were a mix of political affiliations; that is, she thought there was a fairly even 
distribution of students from across the political spectrum in her class. Three instructors 
believed—with caveats—that their students leaned more in a liberal direction, chalking it up to 
their generational influence. Another three instructors believed that their students were largely 
conservative based on the university’s location in Tennessee, a Republican-dominated state. In 
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other words, the lack of consensus in the qualitative data seems to confirm the survey results—
instructors are mostly uncertain about their students’ political beliefs, and what assumptions they 
do have may rely more on conjecture or extrapolating from individual interactions with students.  
Instructors seemed to appreciate that their students were politically diverse, however, 
even if they disagreed about which population was in the majority. 92% of instructors at least 
somewhat agreed with the statement, “I think the students in my class(es) have a lot of different 
political opinions,” including over two-thirds (69%) who agreed or strongly agreed to the 
statement. Only one instructor disagreed. In the qualitative data, instructors generally focused on 
specific students who engaged political topics, but most of them still hinted at or explicitly stated 
that their students brought multiple different perspectives to the course. As Amos said, “I think if 
I were to survey them, I think they would have a diversity of political opinions.” 
 When asked about students’ comfort (or discomfort) with political discussions in class, 
instructors somewhat agreed that their students seemed comfortable with such discussions (67% 
agreed overall), but with a mean Likert value of 3.4, which may demonstrate that, as with 
students’ political opinions, instructors are unsure of their students’ perspectives on this matter. 
In the follow-up interviews, instructors thought that students might be uncomfortable for two 
reasons: self-censorship and “political fatigue,” a phrase that Josiah coined.24  
 Self-censorship seemed to be connected to fear of what one’s classmates or one’s 
professor might think if a student showed their political leanings. CJ said,  
The students are uncomfortable talking through their political views probably for the 
same reason that I am—except for the ones who are like, I'm out and proud, left or 
right—because I think they're worried about how their classmates will perceive them or 
how I'll perceive them…. So I can tell that people are holding back a lot of the time, 
especially in the more public groups. 
 
 
24Most of this reasoning seemed to be speculative; only Josiah and Deborah named specific instances where 
a student was uncomfortable or could have been potentially uncomfortable.  
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This phenomenon of “holding back” seemed primarily connected to conservative students, which 
may be why it never came up in the student interviews. Josiah connected this phenomenon to the 
trope of the liberal college professor. He said, “I feel like a lot of times many students, especially 
from a moderate to a conservative background, will be a little afraid to explore topics that are 
often labeled as politically conservative at the university.” From Josiah’s perspective, many of 
his students had an upbringing where they were taught (rightly or wrongly) that liberal college 
professors were going to challenge them on their conservative beliefs. He went on to say: 
Some of the more conservative-leaning students might have viewpoints on stuff, but 
they're scared to bring it up because they're afraid that it's gonna be held against them, 
that the instructor is not going to agree with them and that's gonna hurt them on the 
assignment, or even other students might disagree with them. And just kind of the culture 
in the South in general…people just, if you don't agree with somebody, you just be quiet 
a lot of times and just be polite and cordial and stuff like that. And, of course, that doesn't 
always happen, but I think that there is kind of this silent, if not majority, then silent large 
contingency of students who do hold moderate to conservative views in class. And I think 
students are a lot more conservative than it appears in these classes, a lot of times. 
 
Josiah even named a specific instance where a conservative student thanked him for letting her 
explore the potentially fraught topic of Confederate statues and cultural heritage, which was 
something she felt like she couldn’t do in other classes. 
 Political fatigue was another factor in student discomfort that instructors discussed. 
Donna said her students were “sick of talking about politics,” and instructors like Josiah agreed 
that students were just tired of political division: “I don't know the exact reason behind it, but I 
feel like a lot of times politics are thought of as very divisive and can really highlight differences 
in people…. I think a lot of students just get tired of that, from hearing it all day, all over the 
news, and they just get tired of being enemies with everybody.” In other words, “political 
fatigue” seemed to be largely due to the character of political discourse as divisive and 
exhausting, rather than the subject of politics itself.   
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Student Perceptions of Classmates  
Most students disagreed that their classmates brought up politics often, with 36% strongly 
disagreeing; this is borne out in the qualitative data, where 16 out of the 22 occurrences of 
“Student Perception of Classmates” were coded as apolitical. Students did not seem to have 
strong opinions on the question, “I usually agree with my classmates’ political opinions,” with 
76% either somewhat agreeing (16%) or somewhat disagreeing (60%). The remaining 24% 
disagreed (16%) or strongly disagreed (8%), indicating that most students perceived themselves 
as political minorities in their classrooms. According to the students who were interviewed, this 
perception was mostly conjecture. Ember, for instance, stated that she probably disagreed with 
her classmates’ opinions. When I asked why, she said: “It's hard to tell, 'cause I don't know them. 
And no one ever turns their cameras on in class, so I don't really know anything. But I don't 
know. I just feel like, sometimes, it can feel like that. But like, for no reason in specific.” 
Students like Josh reiterated that they rarely interacted with their classmates. “I honestly have no 
real clue what other people typically write about,” Josh said.  
 Despite this lack of interaction, student perceptions of their classmates were not always 
positive. A majority of students (64%) at least somewhat disagreed that their classmates’ 
political opinions made their class more interesting, and of the 36% who agreed, 20% of them 
only somewhat agreed. Still, students generally agreed (60%) that their classmates had a lot of 
different opinions, though the overall mean (3.32) indicates a wide spread—24% of students 
disagreed or strongly disagreed, compared to 28% of students who agreed or strongly agreed. 
Again, these answers seemed mostly based on guesswork or extrapolation from other 
circumstances. Ember told me that her perception of her classmates was based on GroupMe 
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chats for other courses and other forms of interaction: “People just, especially like this month, 
people talking about the whole election and everything, the things that my roommate and I have 
heard other people say…just sounds so empty-headed.” It’s possible that the variety of responses 
on these questions indicates a polarization among the student body that mirrors the polarization 
of the American public. Ultimately, however, students didn’t interact with one another enough to 
know for sure. Josh, for example, guessed that his classmates were primarily liberal, but he said 
to me with a laugh, “This is me BS-ing it, this is me shooting into the dark once again…” 
 
Comparing Students, Instructors, and Other Groups  
Some of the themes discussed above reveal substantial differences between the survey and 
qualitative answers of students and instructors. To examine these differences statistically, I 
conducted a series of t-tests on Likert-scale survey results, which allowed me to quantify the 
differences between discrete groups. Below, I will discuss the differences between students and 
instructors before examining other categorical differences: modality, gender, and whether the 
participant has ever been frustrated by a class-related political discussion or encounter.  
 
Comparing Students and Instructors 
In the t-tests that follow, a participant’s role in the classroom (either student or instructor) is 
taken as the independent variable, while the Likert-scale questions are taken as dependent 
variables (where 1 = strongly agree and 6 = strongly disagree). Every test where p < .3 has been 
reported in Table 3 below, along with their effect sizes.25 Two results were shown to be 
statistically significant (p < .05), with medium effect sizes.  
 
25A p-value of .3 or lower indicates that there is a 30% chance or lower that these differences are due to 














p value Effect Size r 
My class topic is interesting. 2.71 2.14 .21 0.25 
I think politics is important. 1.74 1.42 .27 0.20 
I consider myself politically liberal. 3.00 2.00 .05 0.34 
I consider myself politically conservative. 4.17 5.00 .08 0.31 
Politics comes up often in my class. 4.91 4.15 .14 0.34 
I (instructor)/my professor brings up politics 
often. 
5.04 4.38 .19 0.31 
I (students)/my students feel comfortable with 
political discussions. 
2.96 3.67 .13 0.28 
My students/classmates bring up politics 
often. 
4.92 4.38 .25 0.27 
 I think the students in my class have a lot 
of different political opinions. 




Before discussing the results of these tests, it’s important to note what is not included in 
this table; in other words, there were a number of questions where the student responses and 
instructor responses did not vary considerably. There were no significant differences between 
student and instructor perceptions of how closely they followed politics, how politically 
informed they were, and whether they thought political references or discussions distracted from 
the class, benefited the class, or made class more interesting. Most striking of all, there was no 
significant difference between students and instructors on the question, “I consider my class 
topic to be political.” Now, this list does not indicate that there were no differences between 
students and instructors on these topics, but those differences were not statistically significant 
and did not have substantial effect sizes.  
 Among the responses listed in the table above, two are statistically significant (p < .05). 
Instructors were much more likely than students to identify as politically liberal, and they were 
also significantly more likely to believe that the students in their class were ideologically diverse. 
The first result is not particularly surprising, given the widely recognized correlation between 
graduate education and political liberalism, particularly in the humanities. The second result is 
perhaps more difficult to parse out. Given the qualitative data, however, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that instructors appreciated student diversity more because they interacted with each 
individual student to some degree, whereas students in online courses were much less likely to 
interact with their peers. This phenomenon is also a reasonable explanation for other, less 
statistically significant results, such as why instructors are more likely to say politics came up 
often in their course, and why instructors were more likely to say they (and their students) bring 
up politics often. 
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 Two other results were notable, though they were not statistically significant. First, 
students were more likely to say they were comfortable with political discussions than instructors 
perceived them to be, with a medium effect size (r = 0.28). In addition, instructors were 
somewhat more likely than students to deem politics important. Though they were also slightly 
more likely to consider themselves politically informed and follow politics closely, those 
differences were minor enough that they did not yield statistically significant results or 
substantial effect sizes. While the similarities of student and instructor responses may seem 
surprising, the timing of the study may have played a role. As Matt, one of the student 
interviewees, put it: “I really don't seek out politics. It's almost like I'll only pay attention when 
it's all over the news and people are talking about it and it's in the zeitgeist. So, yeah, I guess now 
is when I'm more politically informed than ever.” In other words, the exigence of the 2020 
election may have prompted students to stay more politically informed than they would have 
otherwise.  
 
Course Modality: Asynchronous vs. Other 
Course modality was one of the factors discussed in an earlier section on how, when, and for 
what reason political topics came up in FYC. Accordingly, I separated the survey results into two 
categories: asynchronous and “other.” Since asynchronous was the largest modality represented, 
I consolidated the remaining categories, which included primarily synchronous modalities (in 
addition to one hybrid course and one in-person course). 
Every test where p < .3 has been reported in Table 4 below, along with their effect sizes. 
Four of the results are statistically significant (p < .05) and one of the results is highly 














p value Effect Size r 
My class topic is interesting. 2.92 1.79 .002 0.48 
I consider myself politically liberal. 2.91 2.17 .21 0.24 
I consider myself politically informed. 3.45 2.79 .14 0.25 
My students/classmates bring up politics 
often. 
4.91 4.43 .24 0.22 
I think the students in my class have a 
lot of different political opinions. 
3.35 2.43 .03 0.37 
Political references or discussions make 
class interesting. 
3.32 2.23 .01 0.42 
Political references or discussions 
benefit the class. 
3.27 2.38 .03 0.37 
Discussing politics in class is 
constructive. 




While I will not exhaustively review the questions not included on this list, the most 
notable absence is “I consider my class topic to be political.” In other words, students or 
instructors in asynchronous classes did not have significantly different perspectives on their 
course topic than students or instructors in other modalities, which is somewhat surprising. The  
variety of perspectives on whether “metacognition” (the most common asynchronous theme) is a 
political topic may explain why no significant differences were found. 
 Some of these differences seem to be inexplicable at first glance and point to potential 
sampling issues. For instance, participants in synchronous, hybrid, or in-person classes were 
more likely to consider themselves liberal. This result may be due to the fact that instructors are 
somewhat oversampled in the “Other” category (six out of the 14 participants). That theory may 
also explain the differences between modalities in “I consider myself politically informed” and 
“My students/classmates bring up politics often.”  
 The statistically significant results are the most striking and may point to modality being 
a more substantial factor for a participant’s openness to politics in the classroom, even though 
modality was not a significant factor in the actual presence of politics in a given class. 
Participants in alternative modalities were significantly more likely than participants in 
asynchronous courses to think politics were beneficial or constructive in FYC or made the class 
more interesting. These results may indicate that participants simply didn’t see how political 
topics or discussions would add value in a synchronous course. Participants in other modalities 
were also more likely than participants in asynchronous courses to believe that the students in 
their class(es) had a lot of different political opinions. Given the role human interaction plays in 
encountering different perspectives, this difference demonstrates that non-asynchronous 
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modalities opened up students and instructors to recognize the breadth of perspectives students 
brought to FYC.  
 
Participant Frustration 
One of the survey questions asked whether the participant had ever been frustrated as a result of 
a political discussion or encounter in an FYC course. After removing all of the “maybe” answers, 
I ran t-tests to see whether a person’s frustrating experience(s) seemed to influence other aspects 
of the study. Largely due to the limited sample size (only 8 out of the 28 participants selected 
had answered “yes,” including just 2 students), only two tests yielded results where p < .3. The 
results were ultimately unclear. Participants who did not express frustration with political 
discussions, topics, or encounters were slightly more likely to consider their class topic 
interesting (p < .26, r = 0.28) and consider themselves politically informed (p < .27, r = 0.28). 
Given the sample size of the “frustrated” category and the overrepresentation of instructors, it’s 
difficult to explain why these results might have occurred.  
 
Gender 
The final set of t-tests I ran dealt with gender. As none of my participants identified as nonbinary 
or gender nonconforming, only two groups were present: female and male. The results of the t-
tests where p < .3 have been reported in Table 5, with one statistically significant result (p < .05) 
and one very statistically significant result (p < .01) with a large effect size (r = 0.59). The most 
striking result here, of course, is that men were much more likely than women to consider 
themselves politically conservative, a trend that matches political patterns in the United States 















Table 5: Results of Gender T-Tests 
 
Female Male p value Effect 
Size r 
I follow politics closely. 2.65 2.08 .26 0.24 
I consider myself politically informed. 2.52 1.82 .08 0.32 
I consider myself politically liberal. 2.30 3.33 .13 0.35 
I consider myself politically conservative. 5.00 3.42 .007 0.59 
Politics comes up often in my class. 4.83 4.25 .20 0.26 
I (students) / my students feel comfortable 
with political discussions. 
3.50 2.58 .03 0.36 




considered themselves more politically liberal than men did (that difference was not statistically 
significant) but because they disagreed so strongly with conservatism. The numerical gap 
between men and women’s Likert-scale averages was 1.03 on the liberalism question and 1.58 
on the conservatism question. 
In addition, men were generally more likely than women to say they followed politics 
closely and stayed politically informed. They were also somewhat more likely to say politics 
came up often in their class and were more likely to see political discussions as constructive. 
Notably, there was a statistically significant difference between men and women on whether they 
(if they were a student) or their students (if they were an instructor) felt comfortable with 
political discussions in class. Men were more likely to think that they/their students were 
comfortable with such discussions. This trend also held true if instructor comfort with political 
discussions were examined by gender. Though only two male instructors took my survey 
(limiting the generalizability of the results), a t-test with gender as the independent variable 
revealed that male instructors were much more comfortable with political discussions than 
female instructors, with a highly statistically significant difference (p < .001).  
Taken as a whole, these results indicate that the men in this study tended to engage more 
politically, inside and outside of class, and had a relatively high comfort level with such 
engagement. They also perceived, more so than women, that others in the class were more 
comfortable. This trend was borne out in the qualitative data and may be due to the fact that 
female instructors and students seemed to be more attentive to the possibility of alienation and 
polarized arguments and were more careful about sharing their own views.26 As Donna said, 
drawing from her own experiences,  
 
26The exception here, as usual, is Deborah, who had a highly conflictual teaching style—that phenomenon 
will be discussed more in the next chapter.  
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I think I have [an] understanding of uncomfortable it can be when your instructor just 
assumes that you agree with everything they're saying…. I feel like it, in a way, would 
probably make my job a bit harder if I came in super strong with my political views, 
because I think that might alienate some of the students and make them resistant to the 
things I'm trying to teach them. 
 
While the two male instructors I interviewed did reflect on how their students might feel 
alienated by political discussions, Josiah intentionally tried to create a welcoming atmosphere (in 
part by avoiding his own positions) and Amos had never encountered a student who was 
uncomfortable with a political discussion: “Although I never got the sense that any one student 
was triggered by [a political discussion] or made uncomfortable by the topic, I can imagine that 
there were some for whom that was not a comfortable discussion. I never really experienced a 
student being uncomfortable in a political discussion, but I'm sure it has happened.” Both of 
them expressed that they were comfortable with facilitating such political discussions, a view 
that was not always shared by female colleagues.  
 
Participant Perspectives on the Role of Politics in Composition  
The previous sections dealt with descriptive questions (when, how, and why politics came up in 
composition courses), perceptive questions (how students and instructors perceived their courses, 
themselves, and one another politically), and questions of disparity, examining the differences 
between students, instructors, and other discrete groups in the data. This section seeks to move 
from what politics in FYC does look like into what politics in FYC could look like, according to 
my participants. In follow-up interviews, I asked participants to look beyond their current 
experiences and perceptions to think about what FYC should be like in relation to political 
topics. While this topic does relate to some themes in the survey data (for instance, whether a 
participant thought discussing politics in FYC was constructive), to avoid retreading the data, I 
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will focus solely on qualitative information. Specifically, I will discuss the student and instructor 
interviews in relation to the code “Perception of Class (Hypothetical).”  
 
Instructor Perspectives on the Role of Politics 
As indicated by the results in Table 2, instructors were generally open to including political 
topics or discussions in their courses (13 of the 26 codes in the hypothetical category were 
“Political-Positive”) but they thought that such content should be limited. Five out of the seven 
instructors interviewed said that politics should be secondary to class concepts to some degree, 
though instructors disagreed as to what those “class concepts” entailed—some emphasized 
literacy, some emphasized research methods, and others prioritized rhetorical concepts.  
Among the five instructors who said political topics should be secondary to class 
concepts, there was agreement that political discussions could be potentially distracting. One 
instructor, Amos, said, “I would be wary about the English classroom turning into a political 
science classroom or a current events classroom or something like that. The focus has to be on 
the inquiry itself, regardless of subject matter, or it just turns into the subject matter class…. 
[T]hat's not the main point.” This perspective was echoed by other instructors, who saw politics 
as a potentially useful topic or a helpful illustration, but not necessarily as a primary site of 
inquiry. “I don't think [political discussion] necessarily inherently belongs [in FYC],” CJ told 
me, though she was open to using it as a means for teaching information literacy.  
Another instructor, Donna, specifically pointed out that political issues are so polarized 
that it made broaching political topics problematic for teaching. In today’s society, she told me, 
“You're kind of primed to be very us vs. them, you're primed to treat people who disagree with 
your views in a very oppositional way, and so I think it can just lead to a lot of discomfort and 
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again just take away from the things you're actually trying to teach.” While Donna occasionally 
used political topics to illustrate an example in class, she otherwise avoided them: “I think just 
the amount of energy it takes to do all that work and do it well, and then to try to do composition 
stuff too is just a lot.” Of the seven instructors interviewed, Donna was the only one whose view 
of politics in FYC was primarily negative.27 
 Other instructors were less hesitant. “It's a liberal arts class,” Deborah told me. “It's really 
hard to depoliticize it. No matter what you have them read, it's going to have a political bent.” As 
a result, Deborah saw the role of politics in composition as “a means for getting them to think 
critically and analyze multiple perspectives of something, which varies for the class topic and 
approach.” While most instructors didn’t share her explicitly political approach, they generally 
agreed that politics should be used as a means to an end in FYC—whether that be critical 
thinking, information literacy, or the practical and rhetorical methods of inquiry. 
 
Student Perspectives on the Role of Politics 
In general, students also saw a beneficial role for political discussions and topics; 10 out of the 
16 overlapping codes for “Perception of Politics (Hypothetical)” were “Political-Positive,” with a 
scattering of codes from other categories. Though only Leo saw his class topic as explicitly 
political, four of the six students thought that politics was useful as a topic of discussion 
(especially if the topics were somewhat non-controversial). Leo said political topics gave 
composition more “flavor,” and Kate thought that political discussion was “a lot more interesting 
to me than just the normal discussions, just because it's actually relevant.” A fifth student, Josh, 
suggested that political topics could contribute to the development of “critical thought.” The 
 
27It’s worth noting, as I did in an earlier section, that Donna is also the only instructor whose definition of 
politics was explicitly factional, which likely played a major role in her view of integrating it in her classroom.  
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remaining student, Ember, wanted a more limited role for politics. All three of the “Apolitical-
Positive” codes occurred in her interview. “I feel like honestly leaving them out would be 
completely fine,” she told me. “Some people are very passionate about it, and so [to] not create 
arguments, maybe leaving it out [would be fine].” By passionate, Ember didn’t just mean strong 
opinions and emotion; she clarified later that she was referencing conversations where no one 
was willing to listen to anyone else. That being said, Ember liked how potentially political topics 
were presented in her class: “It's good that we see them as examples,” she said. 
 Ember’s concern about “passionate” arguments was shared by other students. Kate said, 
“I mean, I think it would be very interesting to have more political conversations in class. But 
again, the arguments might get out of hand.” Josh was also concerned about that possibility: 
“Individuals who are incredibly stratified to either side of the spectrum, they can't make 
connections, they cannot find middle ground—no compromise, no way to move forward from 
the issue. It has to be my way or the highway.” While he did not experience that kind of rhetoric 
in his online class, he thought that it would “crop up fairly quickly” in an in-person class. Still, 
that possibility did not necessarily dissuade them; both Kate and Josh were open to or 
enthusiastic about the idea of politics in FYC. When asked what it would take to avoid 
arguments that might get “out of hand,” Kate suggested “an assignment or two that involves 
research, so that it's not just solely opinion-based and that people are able to see both sides of a 
discussion and actually be more informed on what they support.” In other words, Kate wanted to 
avoid an “opinion-based” approach to politics in favor of an approach based in research and 





That final quote from Kate demonstrates awareness of what Roberts-Miller (2004) would call 
expressive argument versus deliberative argument. Kate thought that merely sharing one’s 
opinion was unproductive and could lead to political arguments getting out of hand. Instead, she 
suggested a research-based process of inquiry. Though Kate has likely never read Roberts-
Miller, she intuitively reached for the solution that Roberts-Miller proposed for a toxic public 
sphere: argument based in democratic deliberation.  
 In this chapter, I have reviewed the bird’s-eye results of my study. I have demonstrated 
that, though the majority of composition courses in this study were ostensibly apolitical, political 
topics did occasionally come up, and a participant’s political experience was at least somewhat 
influenced by their course theme, their modality, and their personal definition of politics. By and 
large, instructors and students avoided political topics, though they found politics important and 
thought that discussing politics in class could be productive. Students viewed themselves and 
their instructors as mostly apolitical; what encounters they had with their fellow students seemed 
to be somewhat negative. Instructor perceptions of students, of course, were more of a mixed 
bag. While most students didn’t engage political topics, others chose to, and demonstrated to 
their instructors the breadth of opinions held by their students (which occasionally led to 
frustrating encounters). Most instructors themselves attempted to be politically neutral in the 
classroom, though they were divided about whether (and to what extent) politics should be a 
subject for FYC. I have also shown that some key differences exist between students and 
instructors, between asynchronous modalities and others, and between women and men.  
 What Kate’s example demonstrates, however, is that merely describing these 
experiences, perceptions, and differences is not quite enough to understand them. Kate knew that 
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political topics were not in themselves good or bad in FYC; rather, it was how those discussions 
were conducted that mattered to her. In other words, these experiences, perceptions, and beliefs 
are tied to underlying assumptions about the nature of politics, the meaning of composition, and 
how a participant defines argument. Investigating and interrogating these foundations is an 




Chapter 4: Demagoguery, Deliberation, and Liberalism in FYC 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the tip of the iceberg: participants’ current experiences, 
perceptions, and beliefs about politics in FYC. In this chapter, I seek to go beneath the surface 
and examine what assumptions lie beneath those experiences, perceptions and beliefs. To do so, I 
will use the hypothesis codes I formulated based on Roberts-Miller’s (2004) models of discourse, 
as a method of revealing what assumptions my participants held about what democratic 
argument should look like, both in the public sphere and in FYC. As Roberts-Miller (2004) 
wrote, “[M]uch of our disagreement about pedagogical practices is disagreement about what it 
means (or should mean) to participate in a democratic public sphere. We are arguing about 
pedagogy because we disagree about political theory” (p. 4). By investigating these fundamental 
theoretical differences, composition scholars and instructors can establish stasis and begin to 
chart a path forward.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, these models exist on multiple spectra, and depending on 
where a person situates themselves or others on those spectra, they may match characteristics of 
multiple models. The agonistic and deliberative models, for instance, share much in common; the 
more a rhetor facilitates Other-centered argument and seeking contingent agreement, the more 
they favor the deliberative model, and the more a rhetor seeks to challenge other positions 
through productive (and even unpleasant) conflict, the more they favor the agonistic model. In 
this way, a student or instructor may exhibit characteristics of multiple models, multiple ways of 
approaching political discourse. 
In addition to overlapping categories, however, a person may exhibit a “mutt” of multiple 
approaches that, on a theoretical level, are fundamentally incompatible. For example, the 
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communitarian model is constructivist in its conception of truth, and the liberal model relies on a 
universal, rational conception of truth. A person who is an avowed social constructivist may yet 
hold liberal assumptions or engage in liberal practices that are incompatible with constructivism. 
This “mutt” feature is, for instructors, what Roberts-Miller (2004) called “unreflective grounding 
of teaching practices in muddled combinations of different models, or the assumption of a model 
that has implications with which the instructor is deeply uncomfortable” (p. 17). Thus, part of 
this chapter will seek to explore how the underlying assumptions beneath the “muddled 
combinations” in the data may work against the express goals or values of the participant, 
particularly with instructors.   
 This chapter will be structured in five sections. First, I will discuss the notable absences 
and limited occurrences of three models of discourse in particular (technocratic, communitarian, 
and interest-based). Second, I will examine how my participants discussed demagoguery—a 
rhetorical stance that none of the participants engaged in and one that provoked a universally 
negative reaction. I will then investigate the pervasive presence of the agonistic code in 
Deborah’s interview (a code that was mostly absent from other interviews) and distinguish 
between the agonistic deliberative and the irenic deliberative. Fourth, I will discuss the two most 
common codes in the interviews and their relation to one another: the liberal model and the 
deliberative model (in both its agonistic and irenic forms). Finally, I will conclude with a 
discussion of what these trends mean and what they suggest for composition pedagogy.  
 
Uncommon Assumptions: Technocratic, Communitarian, and Interest-Based Models  
The three most uncommon codes in the data were the technocratic model, the communitarian 
model, and the interest-based model. In fact, the technocratic model—a model of discourse that 
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assumes that all political discourse is the domain of experts and requires technical knowledge—
did not occur at all in the data. This absence is perhaps unsurprising, given that Roberts-Miller 
(2004) wrote that it was “not explicitly advocated by composition theorists,” though it is 
sometimes “implied in some pedagogies” that focus on composition as technical or professional 
training, such as writing in the disciplines (p. 4). That being said, because English 101 at the 
University of Tennessee typically focuses on rhetorical concepts, the lack of technocratic 
assumptions is notable but predictable.  
 Of the hypothesis codes that did occur in the data, the communitarian model of discourse 
was the most uncommon. The communitarian model, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a model of 
social constructivist discourse that sees the end goal of politics as the public good, and education 
as the inculcation of shared values. Communitarian discourse seeks to build consensus and work 
toward the good of the community. Two participants—one student and one instructor—
referenced political argument in a way that demonstrated some communitarian assumptions, for 
a total of three occurrences (see Table 6).  
The emergence of the communitarian code in Abby’s interview was in reference to other 
students. Abby said, “I feel like a lot of people right now, they don't really educate themselves 
from a political standpoint. They just [argue] based on other people's opinions rather than their 
own.” In her interview, Abby seemed to be communicating that some students took their 
opinions from their community rather than formulating those opinions for themselves. Abby's 
reference could also be coded as demagoguery (in which someone takes on the opinions of their 
specific “faction”) but either way, it expressed her own point of view, which was decidedly 


























0 1 0 0 1 10 
Communitarian 
Model 
0 0 0 1 2 0 
Deliberative 
Model 
0 1 1 1 1 15 
Demagoguery 0 0 1 13 1 0 
Interest-Based 
Model 
0 0 0 3 3 2 




There was also a hint of the communitarian model in Donna's interview, most notably in 
Donna's implied prioritization of discourse communities (she told students to look for what “we” 
would find credible in a source), finding common ground with her students, and a strong 
emphasis on “being respectful.” Her approach to students’ political arguments was a blend of 
communitarian approaches (in that she emphasized consensus-building) and liberal assumptions: 
I'm at a weird place, because I felt a kind of agreement with the first student who wrote 
the paper about the EMT. I was like, yeah, I totally get where you're going with this. And 
I felt like, when he first brought up the topic to me, he was a bit like, uh, how is she 
gonna react, you know? Which is so sad. So I like, agreed with what he was saying and 
thought that the points were really good points. And then I also understood where my 
other student was coming from and agreed with her about healthcare reform. And it's 
like, yeah, this is really important and a worthwhile topic. So, you know what I mean? 
I'm able to agree with—as long as they're being respectful and not saying blatantly 
terrible things, I'm able to see. 
 
One paper was from a student who viewed himself as conservative; the other student viewed 
herself as liberal. In both cases, Donna emphasized the core values of respect and tolerance while 
building consensus on certain points that they made in their papers, which are communitarian 
values. As I will discuss later, however, respect and civility can also be code for liberal 
assumptions about neutrality and discourage affective and embodied approaches to argument.  
 The interest-based model was somewhat more common than the communitarian model, 
though the participants’ views of that approach were varied. At the heart of the interest-based 
model is the idea that politics fundamentally comes down to self-interest, even if one pretends to 
aim for rational decision-making or the common good. Political argument is then about 
expressing one’s opinions, which—lacking some referent for what constitutes a good 
argument—means that all arguments are valid and come from one’s position in the world. The 
participants whose ideas were coded for the interest-based model thought about it in three main 
ways: in terms of expressive argument, audience-centered appeals, and positionality.  
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Expressive argument is most characteristic of the interest-based model. The student 
participant Leo, for instance, made an offhand reference that was coded as interest-based, since 
he primarily saw political argument as expressive; while he was open to listen to other point of 
views, he saw no need to argue with another person’s “opinion.” In other words, Leo held to the 
oft-cited adage: “Everyone is entitled to their own opinion.” For Amos, an instructor, expressive 
argument was a source of frustration, since he saw research and writing as a process of inquiry 
rather than a site of expression: “I think that's where the [people at my previous college], they 
focused too much on English as a way to express my opinion and give it some validity, rather 
than as a place of inquiry that then gets expressed.”  
Argument was also seen (in part) as audience-centered by one instructor, CJ. To deal with 
potentially fraught situations where a student was using inappropriate, partisan sources, CJ 
pointed students to their intended audience: 
I would just say, hey, I ran this through Media Bias Fact Check, you should know it's 
rated as “Mixed.” So, that means that it's not necessarily untrue, but it's probably been 
manipulated in some way and therefore I would consider finding a different source, 
because, in terms of making your argument credible to your audience, if they can easily 
find out that this isn't a good source, this isn't gonna be helpful to you. 
 
While this could be coded as communitarian, the communitarian model emphasizes conformity 
and discourse communities, while CJ framed the students' audience in terms of what will be 
“helpful” for them—in other words, what will help them succeed and look credible to their 
audience. This emphasis on being able to “win” an argument is characteristic of the interest-
based model. As Roberts-Miller (2004) explained, interest-based assumptions crop up “in 
pedagogies that describe the major responsibility of a rhetor as making his/her policies the most 
attractive, and using rhetoric that is conciliatory and pleasing” (p. 99). Of course, not all (or even 
most) audience-based pedagogies are built on the interest-based model. However, when audience 
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awareness becomes the primary reason to avoid unreliable information, audience—rather than 
accuracy, truthfulness, and critical thought—becomes the “major responsibility” of the writer.  
While CJ’s pedagogy as a whole was more nuanced than mere rhetorical bargaining, it was clear 
that some of her pedagogical framing did buy into interest-based assumptions.  
The interest-based model is also centered around positionality. If political argument is 
fundamentally based in self-interest, after all, who a person is and where they came from become 
the major determinants of what they believe politically. A nuanced conception of interest-based 
positionality was at the core of Mandy’s approach to teaching her classes. Mandy’s model of 
political discourse revolved around a sort of inward contemplation, an examination of how one's 
political beliefs may have been formed by one's circumstances, culture, and background. Mandy 
asked her students to interrogate their own “identity politics” and understand how their identity is 
linked to their beliefs.  
Of course, interrogating one’s position in the world is not inherent to the interest-based 
model. In fact, this method could go in three directions: it could be used as the basis of 
understanding where and how to reach across difference (deliberative), it could function as the 
site of being challenged by others’ perspectives (agonistic), or it could be the primary factor that 
determines one’s political positions (interest-based). In general, Mandy’s method emphasized 
self-reflection, and perhaps even solipsism, about one's position in the world, and thus was most 
characterized by the interest-based model. Mandy wanted her students to “take that [insight] 
farther” and understand how they were “important participants” in our democracy. That phrasing 
seemed deliberative, and perhaps Mandy was reaching toward the deliberative model, but she 
never explored what taking it “farther” meant. The implications for political discourse stopped at 
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self-reflection; Mandy seemed to assume that understanding who one is and where one comes 
from automatically led to certain political positions.  
A similar conception of positionality cropped up in Amy’s interview. While Amy was 
reflecting on the beliefs of her students, she said that some of her students are likely conservative 
because their families are conservative. “It's just very red state,” she told me, “and if they're from 
anywhere in this region, they mostly identify with their family's political beliefs, and most of 
those political beliefs are gonna be pretty conservative.” This unit was initially coded as 
communitarian and then as demagoguery, since it implied a certain level of relational belonging 
connected to policy positions. However, what it really revealed is that Amy saw political beliefs 
as at least partially deterministic, connected to one's cultural and economic position. As such, it 
implied some level of the interest-based model of discourse (though there is certainly room for 
the subjectivity of one's position in the communitarian and deliberative models).  
 
A Culture of Demagoguery 
One of the most pervasive codes in these interviews was demagoguery—political discourse that 
turns policy issues into identity issues, pitting “us” versus “them.” As Table 6 demonstrates, 
however, no participant actually advocated for this point of view, though many of them brought 
it up of their own accord. In each case, demagoguery was something that others participated in, 
and functioned as a primary reason why the participants were hesitant about engaging politics in 
FYC. 
In CJ's interview, the demagoguery code was frequent, and it primarily applied to 
conservative student discourse. It was particularly striking in an interaction with a student who 
had failed an assignment because of his passionate defense of a cable news celebrity 
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(identification with an in-group figure being a classic case of demagogic rhetoric). The student, 
who had not fulfilled the primary purpose of the assignment, then accused CJ of politically 
motivated grading. Resistant students like him substantially shaped how CJ approached the 
classroom. CJ presented herself as neutral in the class, not because she thought she could be 
neutral or because she believed it was the role of the professor to be neutral, but because she 
believed her students would be “irritated” if they knew her political identity. Because 
demagoguery thrives on “identity” politics, particularly party politics obsessed with labels and 
in-group/out-group argument, CJ's fear was that her students would react to her with demagogic 
rhetoric. 
Like CJ, Josiah’s references to demagoguery were primarily concerned with conservative 
students. But unlike CJ, Josiah didn’t see conservative students engaging in demagoguery; 
rather, he believed they feared bias or retribution on the part of their classmates or professors if 
they spoke up with their opinions. “Persecuted is a strong word,” he said, but there was “fear of 
being vilified to some extent or at least challenged. They just don't want to deal with being 
challenged in a public forum, or they don't want to deal with having to potentially lose points on 
their essay from some sort of bias or agenda from their instructor.” In other words, Josiah 
perceived that his students feared a wider culture of demagoguery, where they thought would be 
“vilified” because of their political beliefs.  
Deborah explicitly combated this kind of rhetoric in her classes. “We're at this horrible 
point,” she said, “where we see politically sides as the same as we see sports teams. We won, 
you lost, get over it. Our team won, well, that's everybody…. We're really the same team. I tell 
them, look, you can't just go, they're crap and they're lying and that's it. You have to recognize 
that this is valid for them.” Deborah’s solution, notably, was somewhat expressive: recognizing 
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that other perspectives were “valid” was the first step to recognizing that everyone was on “the 
same team.” What exactly counts as “valid” was left unsaid, as I will discuss in the next section. 
Demagoguery also emerged at several points in student interviews. Josh, for instance, 
critiqued our current form of argument: “Individuals who are incredibly stratified to either side 
of the spectrum, they can't make connections, they cannot find middle ground—no compromise, 
no way to move forward from the issue. It has to be my way or the highway.” He saw this as the 
primary kind of argument in the public sphere and found it frustrating and limiting. Ember, 
another student, agreed: “I don't really like to get into politics, because usually it just leads into 
an argument, and no one's ever willing to listen.” It’s notable that, in this quote, Ember conflated 
arguments with being unwilling to listen; in a culture of demagoguery, argument itself becomes a 
negative term.  
In sum, the pervasive presence of political demagoguery led to frustration, fear, and 
discomfort in both students and instructors. Instructors generally didn’t want to bring up political 
topics or their own perspectives for fear of backlash; while students were more open to political 
discussions, they too were concerned that, without proper boundaries and a culture of listening, 
political arguments could get out of control.  
 
Agonistic Composition: Clarifying Conflict 
As stated in Chapter 2, most political discourse lies on a spectrum of irenic (conflict-avoiding) 
and agonistic (conflict-embracing). The belief that political conflict can be a good thing was a 
consistent theme across several interviews and represented an agonistic approach. Agonism is a 
“conflictual” approach to argument, aiming to disrupt consensus and potentially oppressive 
rhetoric, without being the “verbal free-for-all of interest-based discourse” (Roberts-Miller, 
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2004, p. 5). For some instructors, conflict represented a site of exploration. As Amos said, 
“Everyone has a perspective on [politics] that they can bring to the table, even if that is a 
disagreement and is something that you can explore further.” This awareness of multiple 
perspectives was important for Josiah’s pedagogy as well. Josiah said, “I think my goal is if 
students are critically engaging more with content, which I would probably define as cultivating 
multiple perspectives and understanding different positions…then I would call that success.” 
That being said, Josiah also expressed hesitancy about a highly conflictual, agonistic approach: 
It's becoming more and more politically normalized on the left—and I don't know if this 
is entirely fair—but to be a little bit more confrontational with perspectives that you deem 
are dangerous or toxic. So to try to more overtly convert people to certain perspectives on 
things, whereas I'm much more of like, engage but listen a little bit more…. And I think 
that a lot more people are…saying you need to be more engaged, you need to be more 
aggressive and take what you want. There's all of these problems inherent in the system, 
and you need to challenge and break parts of that system off more, you can't operate 
within the system the way it's currently constructed. 
 
Given Josiah’s own political beliefs as a self-described liberal who sought “nuance” and middle 
ground on most issues, his hesitancy was unsurprising, but it did represent some of the concerns 
that other instructors had about political conflict in the classroom.   
Though agonism did occur in multiple interviews, Deborah’s interview represented the 
vast majority of the agonistic codes; it was the most dominant model of discourse in her writing 
pedagogy. In Deborah’s interview, difference was an end in itself, and clarifying alternative 
points of view was Deborah's primary goal as a progressive instructor: 
I try to keep—I mean, it's pretty clear what side of the divide I'm on, I don't think you can 
hide that. But I try to choose texts that challenge the idea that we just have to meet in the 
middle, or challenge the idea of normalcy, that this is just—white people are just normal, 
cis people are just normal—and get them to start thinking critically about how they 
perceive the world. 
 
While this position could be perceived as interest-based, arguments for Deborah were not purely 
expressive; Deborah’s goal for her students was for them to look beyond their own self-interest 
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and think critically about their own conceptions of normative identity and behavior.28 “Let's talk 
about this” was Deborah's refrain—hashing out issues and clarifying one another's points of view 
was seen as a good in itself in Deborah’s pedagogy.  
 At times, the kind of agonism espoused by Deborah is similar to the deliberative model: 
highly conflictual and conscious of difference. Though she rarely moved from clarifying 
differences to reaching out across differences (a key distinction between the two models), some 
of her practices did reflect deliberative values. For example, the deliberative model only works if 
“there is equal access on the part of people with genuinely different points of view” and some 
level of “moderation” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, pp. 186, 191). Along those same lines, Deborah 
said that she aimed “to encourage discussion without enabling bigoted or hypocritical or 
whatever perspective[s]. And so, for the most part…it works in the classroom environment. 
Because they are, I've found that, all of them, across the board, the majority of them are able to 
discuss a lot of these things comfortably.” Encouraging students to feel comfortable discussing 
their views, within certain parameters, is a key element of the deliberative public sphere. In this 
way, Deborah demonstrated what I’ve called the “agonistic deliberative,” a contrast to a more 
moderated, compromise-seeking “irenic deliberative” (discussed more in the next section).  
The agonistic deliberative was particularly clear when Deborah pushed back against the 
notion of “civility” while explaining her view of tolerance: 
And I'm not saying, be nice and be civil. This isn't like Minnesota nice, where if you 
think about somebody who is a person of color in Minnesota, where you're in a society 
where “just be nice” means you can't speak up for your rights. I'm not telling them to just 
be civil and play nice and go, uh huh, but to critically think about their positions, where 
they come from, and trying not to limit the lives of others, limit the identities of others, 
based on their personal truths. 
 
 
28Roberts-Miller (2004), it’s worth noting, argued that “the interest-based model is connected to the 
agonistic tradition,” since both often result in confrontational or aggressive rhetoric (p. 121). She essentially saw the 
agonistic tradition as conflictual discourse with guardrails, in the tradition of Hannah Arendt.  
 99 
In other words, political discourse has limits (not imposing one’s views on the lives and 
identities of others), but there is no element of “civility” that might lead to silencing a minority 
perspective.  
As the final sentence of that paragraph demonstrates, however, Deborah’s agonistic 
approach became a little muddled when she discussed the idea of “personal truths” and accepting 
other opinions as valid. Though Deborah's overall approach was agonistic, some of her 
assumptions in this area were more similar to the liberal model. To clarify these differences, I 
turn now to discuss how liberalism and deliberation undergird certain practices and beliefs in 
FYC.  
 
Neutrality, Diversity, and Otherness: Liberalism and Deliberation in FYC 
As mentioned earlier, the liberal model and the deliberative model have much in common. Both 
models assume that the “best interest” of a given society can be pursued through public 
argument, and both models assume that public argument should be rational. Where they begin to 
differ is on how they define rationality and to what extent they are agonistic. In the liberal model, 
disagreement exists because of faulty reasoning, a lack of objectivity, or because a rhetor is 
uncultured (in the sense that they have not gained intellectual autonomy through liberal 
education). Discussion exists so that the best arguments can be aired and the rational, educated 
interlocutors standing by can judge which is better—in a democracy, by voting. In the liberal 
public sphere, conflict is temporary, and emotions are not welcome. In the deliberative model, 
disagreement exists because difference exists: subjective, situated difference that comes from 
embodied experience, perspective, and positionality (differences that are up for debate as part of 
what constitutes “rational” argument). Discussion exists so that many different perspectives can 
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be heard—to disrupt consensus and enclave-based discourse—and so that arguments can thus be 
made “from different perspectives,” as opposed to being made from a “perspective-free stance” 
(Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 183). 
 In the qualitative data, the liberal model and the deliberative model were the two most 
common models espoused by the participants. In what follows, I summarize the trends in how 
participants drew on the liberal model before discussing how the deliberative model appeared in 
several interviews.  
Three participants seemed primarily based in the liberal model of discourse, with one 
student (Josh) and two instructors (Donna and CJ). Although Josh didn't comment on or evaluate 
the role of the instructor, his own approach to argument was very much in the liberal line of 
thought. Josh believed one can set aside one's biases and neutrally and rationally evaluate a topic 
using just the “facts.” In an apt turn of phrase, Josh referred to this as “quarantining” his own 
beliefs: 
Whenever it comes to writing specifically, I try to quarantine my political thought. I try 
my best to write as balanced as possible. I focus on, whenever I'm writing, is the truth, 
the facts, as they stand. Whatever perspective you can angle onto the truth and facts, 
that's fine, but what I focus on is that nutrient-dense, what is the actual thing that's 
happening, rather than just a perspective on it. 
 
In other words, Josh understood writing as a process of learning how to think critically and 
neutrally about a given topic to discern the “truth.” He told me, “My perspective is, truth trumps 
over all. You cannot bend the truth and the facts; they are what they are.” Needless to say, such 
statements are characteristic of Enlightenment assumptions about the nature of truth. 
Josh’s view of the role of politics in FYC classes also implied a liberal model. He told me 
that English contributed to “critical thought” and allowed one to see something from multiple 
perspectives. While seeing something from different perspectives could mean valuing diversity 
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(as found in the agonistic and the deliberative models), his statement seemed more connected to 
being able to transcend one’s own perspective and write autonomously. 
Liberalism also characterized Donna's approach to teaching FYC. Donna’s own views 
seemed strongly derived from the liberal model's distinction between the right and the good; 
student autonomy and choice are her core values. “I just find it really difficult for me to tell other 
people what they should believe,” she told me. “I believe what I believe, and as long as people 
are being respectful to other people—I can think they're dead wrong—but as long as they're not 
hurting somebody, I don't really care.” In addition, Donna valued neutrality in the classroom and 
tried her hardest not to bring up political topics (unless she found them helpful to illustrate a 
class concept).  
Perhaps the strongest indication of the liberal model, however, was Donna's sense that 
she didn’t have to tell her students to use the rhetorical tools they gained in her class to engage in 
political issues: “I don't feel like I need to do the work of showing them that they need to transfer 
that to the political arena. I feel like my job is to show them how to gain that skill and then they 
can, if they choose to, transfer it there. But I don't view it as my place to make that connection 
for them.” In other words, she viewed it as the responsibility of the student to use their rhetorical 
skills in public life. As such, Donna's teaching was very much liberal “apolitical training in 
discourse” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 39), in which the classroom is a place for students to learn 
and practice rational thought.  
Finally, CJ understood her role and her class in distinctively liberal ways as well. Like 
Donna, CJ explicitly distinguished between notions of the “right” (i.e. ethics) and the “good” 
(i.e. students' own political beliefs): “I feel like it's my responsibility,” she said, “to teach [my 
students] how to engage with material more ethically, but I don't think it's my responsibility to 
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change their political views. And honestly at the end of the day, I think you can have whatever 
political views you're gonna have as long as they're logically consistent and ethically sourced.” 
Unlike Donna, CJ had other assumptions underlying her pedagogy—particularly the interest-
based model—but in terms of her own position in the classroom, her assumptions were very 
much based in liberalism.  
Though no other students or instructors relied on liberalism as their primary means of 
understanding public discourse, the liberal model occurred in some form or fashion in almost 
every interview. For example, though Josiah was under no illusions that he was neutral in the 
classroom—he saw his neutrality as a “rhetorical effect” to make students comfortable—he 
relied on the liberal model in other ways. The “self-actualization” of students was important to 
him, and he believed he could teach students “how to think, but not what to think.” This 
separation of training in discourse and the political effects of such training is a liberal move, 
since such intellectual training is not seen as politically formative in itself.  
In general, other instructors seemed to position their conceptions of political discourse in 
composition courses between the liberal model and the deliberative model. Amos, for instance, 
saw his role in political discussions as “mediator” and thought that his students generally agreed 
with his “liberal-humanist” principles of social justice. The language of mediation suggests a 
liberal conception of that role as a neutral arbiter, enforcing a concept of “right” while being 
neutral on “the good.” The language of principles likewise expresses some sort of transcendent 
truth that can be grasped by most (if they are liberally educated). In addition, when responding to 
student writing, Amos pushed back against what he saw to be “enforcing an ideology” on a 
research question, which implied some sort of neutrality was possible. 
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 While the liberal model was somewhat more common, the deliberative model was a 
surprisingly pervasive trend in the qualitative data, particularly in student interviews. For 
example, Ember spent part of her interview reflecting on how she stayed politically informed and 
made political decisions. Her approach was highly nuanced, parsing through the biases of others 
and her own biases (without chalking up political positions to one's place in the world, as the 
interest-based model would have it). She relied on primary sources, such as campaign websites, 
to understand how political figures speak about themselves. As such, her approach was 
democratic deliberation all the way down. This remarkable nuance in her own political life was 
contrasted with her class, which she saw as fundamentally disconnected from politics. She told 
me that politics could probably be left out of English composition and it would be fine. As a 
result, though Ember had a deliberative approach in her own life, she still made the liberal 
assumption that the research, rhetoric, and argument could be taught apolitically. 
In addition, Kate's responses were characterized by the deliberative model of discourse; 
she also critiqued two other models (demagoguery and interest-based). Since demagoguery is 
really a degradation of the interest-based model, Kate's reference to demagoguery—political 
arguments that caused “hate”—was analogous to her reference to expressive, interest-based 
discourse. The solution to both, according to Kate, was a classroom where students could explore 
multiple perspectives and perhaps even do research and write from a perspective that they did 
not hold. In other words, Kate sought a deliberative classroom, one that was attentive to 
difference and the process of deliberation. 
While Matt didn’t want to address controversial issues, he proposed a similarly 
deliberative approach to (non-controversial) political topics. He said, “I think it could be 
interesting to implement politics into English class, and maybe like, write, introduce a problem 
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and then have the assignment be, write about a solution to it.” The only problem was the 
possibility of running into strong disagreement. But if he knew his classmates better and if they 
avoided polarizing topics, Matt told me, then discussing politics in composition could be 
interesting and fun: “I guess there's a couple things that could make me comfortable. One, if I 
was just comfortable with all my peers, like if I knew my peers better. Again, like in high school, 
I went to a smaller school, it was only like a thirty-person class, and I knew everybody. And 
then, maybe just the topic of discussion, if it's about politics but it's not a hot-button topic.” In 
other words, Matt sought a deliberative, but irenic, classroom environment. 
The deliberative model was also common in instructor interviews, though it was 
sometimes mixed with other models. Amy, for instance, said that politics in FYC can be useful 
for “looking at making strong claims and being able to support those claims.” Such assertive 
argument, particularly argument that functions as “thesis-driven list of reasons” (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 215), assumes a universal audience and thus buys into the liberal model of discourse. 
Yet Amy also consciously rejected Enlightenment conceptions of individualism in her 
classroom, which seemed to position her in the deliberative model of discourse. She was mindful 
of student difference and prioritized reaching out to one’s audience when writing. Notably, she 
connected issues of grammar and audience to her progressive beliefs: 
I tell them Units 1 and 2, I don't care about your grammar. Make sure it's readable, make 
sure it's appropriate and run spell-check, don't leave it in there just for the fun of it. This 
is more of a gatekeeping thing than anything else, and I don't focus on it in Units 1 and 2. 
And then I contrast that in Unit 3 and say, okay, it matters now, because you've got a 
different audience now. I'm not your primary audience anymore, although I intersect with 
your primary audience.  
 
By teaching students to recognize audience as a rhetorical concept—particular, not universal—
Amy facilitated reaching across difference toward an Other (even if by being more careful with 
one’s grammar). 
 105 
The deliberative model was strongly represented in the approaches of other instructors. In 
his class, Josiah prioritized different perspectives but seemed to opt for a more irenic view of 
what discourse should look like (in part because he was sensitive to the demagogic atmosphere). 
Indeed, Josiah’s impulse toward moderation and nuance looked a lot like what Roberts-Miller 
(2004) referred to as mediation, or attempting to find temporary, contingent points of agreement 
in the deliberative process (pp. 203-204). Ultimately, the fact that he created a culture of 
listening in order for students to explore topics (rather than simply be challenged by alternative 
perspectives)29 meant that his classroom was ultimately deliberative:  
I try to be as welcoming as possible if [my students] want to explore topics that are more 
conservative or even more somewhere different on the spectrum…. So I want to, I try to 
make it as welcoming as possible because I feel like if they're able to explore those and 
talk about those, if there are any opportunities to engage with them and maybe challenge 
certain kinds of assumptions they have or invite them to look at it from different 
perspectives, they'll feel more comfortable listening to me and listening to other people in 
class, because we're more comfortable listening to them. 
 
This quote not only illustrates Josiah’s listening-oriented approach to the classroom, but it also 
demonstrates how his “irenic deliberative” is still ultimately agonistic, even if it’s much more 
nondirective than Deborah’s approach. By creating a culture of listening, Josiah created an 
opening to push back on unquestioned assumptions. When he encountered “implicit biases or 
lack of imagination” for understanding different perspectives, he could then point “that stuff out 
or [ask them to think] about ways that they could have a more well-rounded view on something 
like that.”  
Like Josiah, Amos valued mediation and exploration in his FYC courses. When 
discussing a composition class at another institution, he described helping students think through 
how a controversy they were studying in largely deliberative terms. He wanted them to suss out, 
 
29It's notable that in several places, Josiah did simply acknowledge other perspectives and lacked movement 
toward the “Other”—a sort of “soft” agonism that reaches toward but doesn't quite make it to deliberation. 
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he told me, “how their lived experience touched on larger political questions and how they were 
inculcated in those.” The language of experience and inculcation implies certain affective modes 
of reasoning that the liberal model typically avoids but which the deliberative model embraces. 
In addition, his mediation was not, in his words, “an antagonistic back and forth” but more of a 
“Socratic questioning of their beliefs or their claims, trying to get them to articulate them in a 
way that they would have to make explicit the warrants underneath them.” Arguing about how to 
argue—making explicit one's warrants—is characteristic of the deliberative model of discourse. 
While the liberal model also prioritizes consistent reasoning, Amos was “trying to cultivate 
inquiry” rather than teach students to simply argue for a thesis. 
Even for instructors who primarily relied on other models of discourse, the deliberative 
model did occur occasionally. For example, CJ discussed a positive political experience she had 
with a student, who approached issues of racial justice with an open mind and explored, rather 
than argued, the topic. “Seeing [students] form an opinion on something that they didn't really 
have strong opinion or policy idea of what might work has been a cool experience,” she said.  
While having a “strong opinion” and crafting a research-based argument centered around a thesis 
is a fundamentally liberal way to teach argument, CJ seemed to be referring to argument as 
exploration here. In this case, though CJ primarily relied on the liberal and interest-based models 
in her instruction, her most treasured moments from her FYC course emerged from coaching a 
deliberative process.  
Similarly, toward the end of her interview, Donna described the kinds of arguments that 
would counteract demagogic rhetoric: “In order to have a good political discussion where you're 
actually gonna accomplish something, both sides have to be willing to be persuaded. Both sides 
have to be willing to admit that they're wrong. You have to have some degree of vulnerability.” 
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This vulnerability comes about, she told me, by being willing to go outside of the “echo 
chambers” one might be in. Though Donna never drew on that approach in her teaching—she 
preferred to keep politics secondary in her course—it remained her standard for what “good 
arguments” could look like. 
 
Conclusion: The Trouble with Discourse Models 
The discussion above demonstrates the diverse, broad, and idiosyncratic approaches that students 
and instructors bring to FYC. Indeed, most participants drew on multiple models of discourse 
(all, in fact, except Josh), as summarized in Table 7 below.  
While there is nothing wrong with drawing on multiple methods for teaching for 
democratic engagement or engaging in argument, the problem is when multiple models are 
irreconcilably in conflict, leading to contradictions between what a person believes about 
political argument and how they actually approach it in FYC. I’ll start with a minor example: 
Amy’s approach to teaching argument (as described above), which was largely deliberative. One 
of the reasons that Amy found politics helpful in FYC was to help students analyze and create 
“strong claims” with supporting evidence. In an ideal world, the deliberative model sees 
argument as exploratory and invitational, partition-based rather than claims-based. The “thesis 
plus reasons” conception of argument is much more based in the liberal model of discourse, 
which presumes a dispassionate, universal audience that won’t be turned off by overly aggressive 
or confident rhetoric. There is a minor disconnect, then, from what model of discourse Amy 
seemed to rely on (the deliberative model) and the way she taught political argument. 
While this disconnect is relatively small and probably contestable, the “muddled 





Table 7: Number of Hypothesis Codes per Participant 
 





0 1 0 0 0 1 
Amos 
(Instructor) 
1 0 3 0 2 4 
Amy 
(Instructor) 
0 0 2 0 1 1 
CJ 
(Instructor) 
0 0 1 5 3 2 
Deborah 
(Instructor) 
11 0 1 2 1 9 
Donna 
(Instructor) 
1 4 1 5 0 11 
Ember 
(Student) 
1 0 3 2 0 1 
Josh 
(Student) 
0 0 0 4 0 4 
Josiah 
(Instructor) 
4 0 10 6 0 4 
Kate 
(Student) 
0 0 2 1 1 0 
Leo 
(Student) 
0 0 2 0 1 0 
Mandy 
(Instructor) 
0 0 3 1 2 3 
Matt 
(Student) 




discuss how the unreflective combination of discourse models might lead to inconsistency, I will 
briefly review two examples from Deborah and Josiah. Though they are largely consistent and 
(by my own reckoning) are thoughtful, critical instructors who care about their students deeply, 
these models of discourse nevertheless reveal hidden contradictions that run contrary to some of 
their professed values.   
As discussed in the previous section, Josiah’s approach to the FYC classroom was 
primarily deliberative. While he saw his neutrality as a “rhetorical effect,” other portions of his 
interview demonstrated some level of buy-in to the liberal model of discourse. For example, he 
said: 
I sort of see my role as an instructor in the classroom as being a facilitator and a guide and 
just teaching them how to think critically, how to engage with different topics, but not 
teaching them what to think. So how to think, but not necessarily what to think. I think 
their path to becoming the kind of citizen they want to become is ultimately gonna be up 
to them.  
 
This distinction between the “how” and “what” of thinking critically leads to a strange 
disconnect in Josiah's approach. On one hand, student self-actualization was important to him, 
and he believed he was not teaching his students “what to think.” On the other hand, however, 
the practical effect of him presenting his students with diverse perspectives was that they 
changed their minds: they moved toward nuance and moderation. Indeed, Josiah saw this change 
as productive, and he was consciously trying to move them in that direction. He wanted to, in his 
words, “help students become more nuanced thinkers.” When talking about his pro-life students, 
he told me, “I get [my students] to maybe say, alright, maybe [alternatives to banning abortion 
are] okay sometimes. So just trying to find middle ground on a lot of stuff is what I try to do a lot 
of times.” In other words, practically speaking, Josiah was telling students “what to think”; he 
was trying to nudge his students toward a nuanced middle ground. Even if he was not trying to 
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get them to transform their positions, by moving students toward more moderated opinions, 
Josiah was shaping their political beliefs.  
This tension shows up even more strongly in Deborah’s interview. In her interview, 
Deborah demarcated the “right” and the “good” (though she didn’t use those specific terms). 
Deborah rightly saw racism, bigotry, and exclusivism as something she must regulate as part of 
the “right,” which ensures equal access for minority or historically oppressed perspectives and 
people. It is, in other words, a deliberative move, because it prioritizes difference. Yet Deborah 
also valued student autonomy and critical thought on questions of the good, which was a more 
liberal assumption. This approach to the classroom was particularly noticeable when it came to 
her conservative and/or religious students, specifically Christian ones. For Deborah, “your truth” 
and “my truth” could not truly be in dialogue, except to clarify the differences between them: 
“I'm not trying to get you, to not, or to stop believing in what you believe,” she would tell her 
students, “but you have to accept that [a writer’s perception] of the creation of the world, for 
example, is just as valid to them as the biblical one is as valid to you. You don't have to accept it 
as truth, but you have to understand that they accept that as truth. And so, if you value them as a 
person, then you have to accept their sense of the world.” Certain kinds of truth—she named 
religion and identity (race, gender, sexual orientation) as two examples—were simply comparing 
apples to oranges and were not up for argument. In other words, these highly subjective, 
expressive forms of truth were outside the realm of public deliberation.  
Shortly after making this point, Deborah clarified that this distinction wasn’t quite true of 
political identity—she critiqued Trump's lies, for instance, after saying that her students “don't 
have to not vote for Trump” to engage in her class. She told me, “Now, I look at somebody who 
is in the cult of Trump's popularity, and I recognize that that's valid for them, but then I'm also 
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concerned, because it's valid for them, and if I look at it factually, I know it's not real, a lot of it.” 
As she worked to parse out the difference between validity and facts, Deborah eventually said 
that while one could prove Trump wrong with facts, one could not prove faith or identity wrong 
with comparable forms of data. “It's not so much of a religious truth,” she said, “or a racial or 
cultural identity and so on, but we know that a lot, or a majority of what he's saying isn't 
grounded in fact. And so it is a little different than other kinds of self-definition.” In creating this 
dichotomy, Deborah leaned on the liberal distinction between more empirical, “provable” forms 
of rationality and more experiential and expressive beliefs. In the liberal calculus, the latter are 
mere perspectives that one can hold, not opinions that one can debate (at least outside of 
religious settings). The problem with this assumption is that Deborah's perspective on the right 
(such as tolerance and pluralism) and professed neutrality on questions of the good (such who 
one votes for) in fact disadvantaged religious perspectives whose conceptions of the good 
influenced their perspectives on the right. 
In her discussion, Deborah assumed her students’ Christianity could coexist with the kind 
of pluralism that she is espousing. In fact, because experience and one's own identity-related 
perspective were an invalid form of evidence, this dichotomy created a situation where religious 
students could not allow their religious perspective to be a part of the conversation, and no 
religious perspective was better or more rational than any other.30 This problem, of course, 
comes squarely from the liberal model, and is addressed at length in Roberts-Miller's (2004) 
critique of deontological liberalism. Roberts-Miller (2004) wrote that authors like Fishman and 
McCarthy (1996) professed to be neutral, but their pedagogy suggested that they favor certain 
 
30As a religious person myself—a positionality I will discuss more in the next chapter in relation to this 
analysis—I would like to be able to argue that right-wing Christian evangelicalism is politically and morally inferior 
to, say, the moderate evangelicalism expressed in publications like Christianity Today. The liberal model allows for 
no such discussion. 
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kinds of outcomes—or, as they termed it, “student change.” Roberts-Miller (2004) went on to 
say: 
That Fishman is far from neutral is not in and of itself a problem, but it does strike me as 
a problem that Fishman appears not to see the contradiction between the claims of equal 
respect for all positions and the actual favoring of certain kinds of stances. This is exactly 
the criticism made of deontological liberalism—that its apparent neutrality on questions 
of the good in fact privileges certain philosophies, and that deeply held spiritual beliefs 
are disadvantaged in liberal public discourse. (p. 97) 
 
Similarly, that Deborah was not neutral in advocating for a pluralistic approach was not a 
problem in itself, but because the validity of certain identity-based positions (such as religious 
belief) was not up for discussion, such students were disadvantaged. Ultimately, though Deborah 
told students she was not trying to get them to change what they believed (theologically or 
politically), her approach nevertheless asked them to adopt a certain kind of pluralism that did 
change their beliefs: that all religious perspectives are equally valid. She mentioned, for instance, 
a student whose “attitudes towards things had changed over time” where Deborah’s course was 
an “epiphany” for them. “They became sort of a super progressive,” Deborah said, concluding: 
“Those are often the things that make me happy. It's not that the students agree with my 
perspective that makes me happy, but that students recognize the value of other peoples' 
perspectives.” Yet it’s difficult to extricate the two; in the case Deborah cited, recognizing the 
value of a certain perspective led to agreeing with that perspective, to becoming “a super 
progressive.” As with Josiah’s approach to helping students become “nuanced thinkers,” by 
exposing students to different perspectives, Deborah was asking—however implicitly—for 
students to change their beliefs.  
 If this liberal ideal of neutrality is problematic, however, what can be done to replace it? 
How might instructors and students move forward with political topics in FYC, given their 
current perceptions about the topic and assumptions of how political argument should function in 
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a democracy? In my final chapter, I attempt to answer these questions and chart a path forward 
for politics in FYC.  
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Chapter 5: Toward a Deliberative Composition 
 
 In my previous chapters, I have discussed the long and fraught history of politics in 
composition courses, from Berlin and Hairston to Duffy and Blankenship. By examining my 
quantitative and qualitative data at length, I have explored how instructors shied away from 
politics as a subject of discussion and limited the scope of political topics; how student 
experiences were largely apolitical (though not by choice); and how participants were 
remarkably open to politics in composition, within certain boundaries. In the previous chapter, I 
attempted to dive beneath the surface and investigate the assumptions behind these practices and 
beliefs, demonstrating that most students and instructors held to some combination of liberal and 
deliberative beliefs about politics in FYC.  
 In this chapter, I hope to bring each of these threads together and chart a path forward for 
politics in composition based on the findings of this study. To do so, I will first reflect on my 
own position as a researcher, a teacher, and a religious rhetor and reflect on the affordances and 
limitations of my own identity. I will then discuss the openness of most participants to 
integrating politics in FYC in some form or fashion before tackling the difficult subject of 
instructor positionality. Once I survey the role of the instructor, I will turn to curriculum, 
summarizing the implications for practice that arise from the study (as well as the tension 
between demagoguery and deliberation). Finally, I will conclude with suggestions for future 
research—most importantly, the need to hear directly from conservative students, who were 




Researcher Positionality and Advocacy 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, my position as a heterosexual, cisgender, white Christian male 
(who favors a deliberative approach to public discourse) necessarily colored my approach to this 
data. At some points, it meant that I did not collect data that would have allowed for a more 
thorough, contextual consideration of participant positionality and motives, such as ethnic and 
racial information. Though I presented myself as neutral in my interviews—a necessary move to 
preserve the validity of the data—my neutrality concealed the fact that my ulterior motive was 
advocacy for my own perspective. I believed strongly (and still do) that a deliberative approach 
to civil discourse is the best solution to our toxic public sphere, and that FYC is a particularly 
useful site for exploring those deliberative values.  
While that desire was not problematic in and of itself, like other belief systems, it 
functioned as a terministic screen. Because my eventual goal was to advocate for a deliberative, 
democratic, and socially just public sphere, I interpreted my data through that lens. During the 
coding process, for example, I noticed how I was quick to code portions of a participant’s 
interview that represented approaches that I found problematic—liberal assumptions about 
neutrality, for instance, or deterministic, interest-based ideas about how a person’s position in the 
world led to their political positions. Often, what I was seeking was not the authentic truth of my 
participants’ experiences (which sometimes challenged my frameworks and troubled my 
definitions), but to validate a preexisting hypothesis. In other words, I had a tendency to obscure 
the places where a participant would engage in deliberative practices in favor of exposing the 
ways that my participants drew on other models. 
To conduct my research reflexively, I relied on three methods to counterbalance my own 
positionality and the biases that accompanied it: dialogue with other scholars, a bracketing 
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interview, and recoding my most troubling data. As part of my research process, I worked with 
half a dozen colleagues—both from writing studies and from literature by training, ranging from 
experienced tenured professors to graduate students—to test my codebook on some of my most 
difficult data (which included selections from CJ, Deborah, and Josiah’s interviews). This 
process revealed two things. First, by and large, the consensus of the group (which applied the 
codes without my input) generally matched my own coding strategies. While there was some 
difference on specific applications, their conclusions mirrored my own most of the time. Second, 
however, there was a notable departure from that trend of consistency: where I had coded 
Deborah’s interview as entirely agonistic, my colleagues saw her interview as characterized by 
both agonism and the deliberative model. To reconcile these differences, I returned to my 
codebook and distinguished between the agonistic deliberative and the irenic deliberative. 
In addition, I relied on a lengthy bracketing interview to help me think through the 
implications of my work. While the practice of “bracketing” in qualitative research—using an 
interview to set aside or challenge researcher biases when a researcher has a personal connection 
to their study—is methodologically varied (Tufford & Newman, 2010), I worked with my 
interviewer to be consistent with the assumptions in my own methodology. I wanted to avoid a 
liberal-style method of bracketing that meant I would “bracket” my own opinions and separate 
them from my analysis so that I can be “objective.” Rather, I wanted to be productively 
challenged by others' perspectives so that I could analyze my data in a way that is fair and 
nuanced (rather than detached and neutral). 
The results of the bracketing interview indicated that I, too, worked from liberal 
assumptions some of the time; despite my empathic, affective, dialogic framework, I often 
analyzed my data from a highly cognitive perspective and—outside of the informed consent 
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process—never addressed my position as the researcher with my participants. I tacitly assumed 
that I could be apolitical in the research process (despite conducting my research in the aftermath 
of the 2020 election). Yet, as my interviewer brought up, I was unable to recruit conservative 
students. Although I assumed it was simply an issue of sampling—only three conservative 
students had originally agreed to be contacted for a follow-up interview—the absence begged the 
question whether I, as a researcher in the Department of English, was implicitly coded as 
“liberal” and thus potentially hostile. Researcher positionality can lead to the allowance or denial 
of access, as Cope and Ringer (2014) note with religiously inflected research. In this case, my 
lack of consideration of how participants might perceive me as a researcher may have closed the 
door to conservative perspectives or may have affected the responses of what participants I did 
interview.  
These two challenges to my assumptions—coding my data with other scholars and 
exploring my research through a bracketing interview—led me to my third method of 
counterbalancing my positionality: recoding my interviews. As part of the process of listening 
well to my participants, I spent a lot of time rethinking and reviewing my hypothesis codes. 
Some interviews were recoded two or three times as my underlying assumptions were revealed 
and as my codebook evolved. At times, I meditated on my interview transcripts as one might 
explicate a poem or exegete a religious text, attending to the specifics of language, nuance, and 
emotional inflection in search of better understanding.  
It may seem that exploring this reflexive process is more appropriate for a methodology 
discussion or better left out of an academic text altogether. However, I reflect on this process 
here to intentionally foreground the subjectivity of my own perspective as I draw conclusions 
from my data. The discussion at the end of the previous chapter, for instance, was only made 
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possible by extensive contemplation on my own positionality. Deborah’s interaction with a 
conservative religious student was difficult for me as a researcher and as a religious rhetor, 
especially since she occasionally used negatively coded language to describe the interaction: the 
religious student had “gotten his tail-feathers ruffled” by the text, she told me. As a colleague 
pointed out, at one point, I had been that student as a freshman in college, and my prior 
experiences led to what Catherine Pavia (2015) called Burkean identification with a research 
participant. Yet my ethical obligation as an empathic, deliberative researcher was to portray my 
participants in terms consistent with how they would see themselves. I wrestled with how to do 
this; I pored over Deborah’s interview transcript for hours. I left it and pondered my own 
emotional reactions to her statements; I returned to it and recoded it again. It was only until I felt 
like I understood Deborah’s approach—however imperfectly—that I was able to code that 
section effectively and begin to write about it. The analysis required that I respected her position 
and recognized her love for her students; in Blankenship’s (2019) terms, I had to begin with 
“changing” myself, “with listening, with trying to understand the personal and political factors 
that influence the person” (p. 20). I had to start with myself—with reflexive listening—before I 
was able to engage her perspective. 
I am trying to say, in other words, that my positionality and my conclusions from my data 
are inextricable. It is my hope that, by reviewing my own biases and the ways I have attempted 
to be thoughtful and reflexive about this process, my conclusions have been challenged and 
refined by other perspectives. Indeed, many of my takeaways below are drawn directly from my 
participants, rather than from my personal perspective alone. At the very least, my reader should 
be empowered to understand where my conclusions come from and how they might be 
ideologically inflected.  
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Openness to Integrating Politics and FYC 
One of the biggest takeaways from the quantitative and qualitative data is the openness on the 
part of students and instructors to integrating politics in FYC. Though instructors were hesitant 
about how political topics could be integrated, students were more open to these ideas. Eleven 
out of the 13 participants interviewed had at least a mixed-positive view of integrating politics in 
FYC in some form, and both of the remaining participants (Donna and Ember) thought that 
political examples could be useful as illustrations or examples. Notably, though instructors 
almost universally believed (with the exception of Deborah) that politics should be secondary to 
course concepts, students saw politics as a potential topic for discussion (Abby, Kate, Leo), if a 
noncontroversial one (Matt), or a means of developing critical thinking (Josh). In other words, 
students were more open than instructors to integrating politics into FYC in a variety of ways.  
 With the caveat that no conservative students were interviewed, these results indicate that 
students may be more willing to engage with politics as a class topic than most instructors 
believe. Though Donna said that most of her students were “sick of talking about politics,” I 
wonder whether they were, like Ember, sick of particular method of talking about politics. 
Ember, as noted in the previous chapter, conflated argument with hateful or polarizing 
discussion; while she was somewhat open to limited political examples, she was hesitant because 
of her own experiences: “I don't really like to get into politics, because usually it just leads into 
an argument, and no one's ever willing to listen.” Ember and Donna both saw “politics” in 
polarized ways; in fact, such polarization was at the core of Donna’s professed definition of 
politics. Perhaps what they were sick of was not politics itself, but of demagogic politics.  
 What is necessary, then, is not to throw out political topics altogether, but to clearly 
define how to argue about politics—to explicitly name toxic forms of argument and regulate 
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them. Given the openness of the other students interviewed, and the tendency to conflate 
demagoguery with political argument, a productive path forward seems to revolve around 
teaching political topics with guardrails and a culture of listening. If instructors of FYC are to 
productively engage in political topics in their courses, ensuring that students are on the same 
page about what constitutes an “argument” and prioritizing an atmosphere of listening are 
paramount. In other words, work needs to be done on the stasis of definition: once “good 
arguments” are clearly defined and limitations to political arguments are in place (to ensure equal 
access and participation), both students and instructors might find themselves willing or even 
eager to engage in political topics. This possibility, at any rate, is what students seem to be open 
to.  
 
The Role of the Instructor: Neutral Arbiter or Fair Facilitator? 
If instructors take on political topics, however, they must wrestle with their role in the classroom 
and how they propose to address their own political beliefs. To “quarantine” one’s political 
thought (to quote Josh’s turn of phrase) is to buy into the liberal assumption that attempting to be 
unbiased is both possible and desirable. Yet most FYC instructors don’t consciously believe that 
they can be unbiased; “social constructivism remains hegemonic” in writing studies, as Roberts-
Miller (2004) observed over a decade ago (p. 161), and it shows no signs of going away. Berlin 
(1988) and his social-epistemic theories are mainstream concepts in writing studies. As Josiah 
told me, “I think neutrality is pretty much impossible when it comes to almost anything—
everyone has a position, everyone has a rhetorical perspective.” 
 Despite the hegemony of constructivist epistemologies in writing studies, most of the 
instructors in my study saw politics as somehow separate from a rhetorical education. (Deborah, 
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as always, remains an asterisk to this claim. Rhetorical education? “That’s politics, all of it,” she 
remarked.) Three out of seven instructors interviewed saw themselves as apolitical in their 
instruction, and five out of the seven instructors saw their role in the classroom as primarily 
neutral. One of the remaining instructors primarily connected their political role to their LGBTQ 
identity, rather than any political positions. In other words, a substantial number of instructors 
saw their roles as apolitical, and most of them conceived of themselves as neutral arbiters in the 
classroom, even if their classes were political to some extent.  
Seeing politics as “secondary to class concepts” (as most of the instructors did) required 
seeing the class concepts as apolitical in themselves—abstract rhetorical principles (or literacy 
practices) that can then be applied to political situations. A rhetorical education is, in other 
words, “apolitical training in discourse,” the foundation of the liberal model (Roberts-Miller, 
2004, p. 39). Yet, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, even teaching students “how to think” while 
consciously avoiding telling them what to think has a political effect, especially for religious 
students (see, for instance, Anderson, 1989; Ringer, 2013).  
 If seeing rhetorical education as fundamentally apolitical is untenable—and I believe it 
is—then instructors must formulate ethical ways to approach a classroom that is, in Berlin’s 
(1988) terms, “always already ideological” (p. 477). Such an approach doesn’t have to mean that 
the instructor must take a political stand in the classroom, as some critical pedagogy adherents 
advocate. As Donna put it, “If they're just, your instructor just, sipping their coffee, talks about 
their own politics, that's probably pretty jarring [for students].” The deliberative model offers an 
alternative to the untenable neutrality of the liberal model while avoiding the blatant advocacy 
that led to objections from past generations of instructors like Hairston (1992).  
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The choice between neutrality and open bias, as Roberts-Miller (2004) noted, is a false 
dichotomy; it “obscures the other options that instructors have, such as being fair” (p. 207). 
Neutral, she argued, implies some sort of epistemological claim about how one thinks; in 
contrast, fairness is “behavioral…describing how one treats students” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 
207). In other words, instructors in the deliberative model do not have to be objective or neutral 
to be fair; they need only consider that “the instructor’s voice always carries more power” in the 
classroom and carefully strategize about how one might create an environment of “equal respect” 
where “a set of grading criteria are applied to all students equally, and...the same discursive 
demands” are made of all students (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 207).  
To explore what “fairness” versus “neutrality” might look like, I’ll use an example from 
two instructors. Several instructors that I interviewed used similar tactics with potentially 
sensitive political situations, which I termed “redirection.” The core of this strategy is to avoid 
engaging politically with a student; when inappropriate political content is raised, the instructor 
redirects the student back to the assignment prompt. Two of these instructors—Amy and CJ—
had striking similarities when they applied this tactic. Both Amy and CJ were liberal, if not 
progressive; both of them had course themes with political overtones (social media and 
information literacy); and both of them used the same redirective approach to deal with students 
who inappropriately brought in their political views. In both cases, the student had raised a 
potentially polarizing right-wing objection and didn’t answer the prompt. That strategy worked 
for Amy—her student removed the content—but it backfired for CJ: her student just ignored her 
feedback and sent her an angry email after she gave him a low grade.  
In part, it seemed like the difference was the prompt. CJ's prompt was explicitly political: 
find good sources to disprove right-wing conspiracy theories. Amy's prompt was not political; 
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she wanted them to write annotated bibliographic entries for their sources, and the student's 
political opinions didn’t fall in the realm of “summary.” The student in CJ's class seemed to 
disagree with the premise of the prompt, whereas the student in Amy's class accepted the premise 
of the prompt. In other words, CJ’s professed neutrality belied the political nature of the prompt, 
which might be seen as discriminatory or biased by conservative students. It certainly asked 
them to think about source material in ways that they might not be accustomed to, particularly if 
they distrusted the mainstream media. When the student’s assignment received a failing grade, it 
seemed that the student’s suspicions were confirmed, and he accused her of politically motivated 
grading. From CJ’s perspective, she was being politically neutral and never took a side; from the 
student’s perspective, she was biased and unfair.  
The solution that the deliberative model suggests is to ensure “equal respect” and the 
“same discursive demands” for every student (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 207). In other words, the 
deliberative models requires that instructors (and other rhetors in a democracy) “give reasons 
that people from a different perspective will consider valid” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 203). In 
the case of CJ’s student, the situation might have been avoided if CJ discussed with the student 
the underlying premise of the prompt and had given the student an opportunity to contest the 
fairness of the prompt itself. If CJ had been able to unpack some of those assumptions—asking 
the student, for example, to differentiate between what arguments get made and how they get 
made—the situation may not have backfired. 
In other words, I am proposing here that instructors reflect on the underlying premises of 
their courses. What sort of discourse is valued? Does this discourse ask students to become 
certain kinds of rhetors or citizens? Is it possible that these values may conflict with some of the 
values students bring into the classroom? If so, revealing the premise of an assignment or 
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discussion may be an important practice when students object to the assignment itself. As 
Roberts-Miller (2017) noted, rhetors work against demagoguery when they conduct “arguments 
about how we should argue…especially if those arguments concern whether the rules are being 
applied to all participants equally” (p. 15, emphasis original). In a situation like CJ’s, where a 
student was engaging in polarizing and potential demagogic rhetoric, making the terms of an 
assignment up for argument might work to counteract otherwise problematic encounters. 
Students must, however, feel like they can voice such objections; an atmosphere of openness and 
listening is required.  
 
Deliberative Argument as a Solution to Demagoguery: Suggestions for Practice 
I turn now to curriculum. Now that I have surveyed what politics in FYC currently looks like, 
what could it look like? How might we avoid what Roberts-Miller (2004) termed inconsistent 
“eclecticism” and articulate “which political theory we are using” as instructors (p. 223)? What 
implications might this study have for responding to the “political” turn? 
 Perhaps the most obvious implication is that instructors should consider integrating 
political topics, discussions, and assignments into their FYC courses, particularly if those courses 
are already imbricated into politics by virtue of being “rhetorical.” Though our culture of 
demagoguery makes political instruction a potentially fraught task, it is difficult to see how 
students will transfer rhetorical virtues to the public sphere—in Duffy’s (2019) terms—without 
applying those virtues to an analogous argumentative situation, such as a class assignment. If 
compositionists are to respond to the “political turn,” they may have to “get political.” But how 
should compositionists approach this task? 
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As I’ve made clear, I think that the deliberative approach is the most fruitful for 
countering demagoguery and toxic discourse in political argument. When I began this study, I 
thought that this perspective was limited among writing instructors and nonexistent among 
students. Like many scholars, I saw FYC students from a deficit-based mindset (recognizing 
their deficiencies), rather than an asset-based perspective (highlighting their strengths). One of 
the most challenging and surprising findings of this study was that the deliberative model was a 
close second to the liberal model as the most common way of approaching argument, either in 
practice or hypothetically. Furthermore, this approach was led by students, students who were 
sick of “hateful” arguments and had ideas for how to productively discuss and write about 
politics in FYC. While they didn’t always have the nuance or theoretical rigor of scholars in 
writing studies, the students in my study were far from lacking. Intuitively, they responded to 
demagoguery with democratic deliberation. Consider this striking passage: 
 
Kate: I just thought of that, where, I kind of saw that there might be a lot of 
disagreements that might cause a lot of, like, more arguments and cause more hate than it 
would the purpose of the argument, or like the discussion…. I mean, I think it would be 
very interesting to have more political conversations in class. But again, the arguments 
might get out of hand, I feel like, [and] that's why I said that it wouldn't be as beneficial.  
 
Interviewer: Sure. What would you say it would take for a political conversation to be 
constructive in an English class, or I guess in other classes? 
 
Kate: …If the teacher were to ask a question and just say…oh, here's this policy, what are 
your, just comment your thoughts on it or something, or like which side do you support. 
Kind of like what you asked me earlier. Versus something that's like, um [pause] here's 
this policy and discuss like, what you think each side of, each, three different sides I 
guess, what that entails and how do you think people that support those three sides, how 
do you think they feel, do you agree or disagree with them, kind of just getting more 
specific…. I mean, basically just giving a lot more direction than just asking a question 
and your thoughts on it. 
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Here, Kate began with an offhand reference to demagoguery, which would “cause more hate” in 
political arguments and “get out of hand.” The possibility for hateful or polarized arguments 
were the main reason why Kate hesitated about integrating political topics in FYC. When I asked 
what it would take to have a productive, constructive political conversation in FYC, however, 
she pivoted from expressive argument (“comment your thoughts on it”) to argument as empathy: 
“how do you think people that support those three sides, how do you think they feel.” By 
directing students to consider multiple perspectives and empathize with other points of view, 
Kate told me, political conversations could be interesting and beneficial. Kate’s argument is 
democratic deliberation through and through, from the importance of diverse perspectives (“what 
do you think each side…entails”) to a highly empathic, emotionally robust form of inquiry 
(“how do you think they feel”).  
This trend was present among instructors as well. Consider, for instance, why Josiah 
positioned his class as listening and exploration-oriented (i.e. deliberative): 
So, my main purpose—I want to feel like it's a welcoming place where students can 
explore the perspectives that they want to engage in and explore with, because I feel like 
a lot of times many students, especially from a moderate to a conservative background, 
will be a little afraid to explore topics that are often labeled as politically conservative at 
the university. Because they will have been told or it has been implied or maybe they will 
have encountered it in high school that they might receive some kind of bias or backlash 
from various topics that are explored that way. 
 
In other words, Josiah responded to a culture of demagoguery (where conservative students may 
be afraid to explore certain topics because of how they are inflected by political identity) by 
creating a deliberative environment (where those students feel listened to and invited to explore 
various topics).  
 In other words, Roberts-Miller is not the only one who believes that deliberative practices 
represent an antidote to political demagoguery; these participants indicated much the same. 
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Indeed, the anecdotes above are already suggestive for how composition instructors could begin 
to integrate a more consistent, deliberative approach to teaching political topics. As Kate 
suggested, inviting as many perspectives as possible and asking students to respond to others in 
empathy (seeking to investigate why they might believe what they believe) is the foundation of 
effective, deliberative inquiry. A classroom that values diversity and empathy must first (as 
Josiah demonstrated) establish a culture of listening; students will only speak if they believe they 
will be heard, and listening allows for productive conflict. Practically speaking, this principle 
means setting ground rules and modeling what “virtuous arguments” should look like in class 
discussions and assignments about politics, as suggested by Duffy (2019).  
 In addition, research and writing in a deliberative classroom may look less like thesis-
driven argument (at least at first) and more like exploration and investigation, what Amos 
referred to as “cultivating inquiry.” One of the students, Matt, thought it “could be constructive if 
[the class] was just learning about politics instead of maybe having a debate.” While Matt’s 
perspective is particularly irenic, the assumption behind it was that the process of learning 
counteracted the negative possibilities of “debate.” Similarly, Roberts-Miller advocated for a 
change to the thesis-driven teaching of argument. When we ask our students to write a thesis-
driven list of reasons with topic sentences and call it an essay, Roberts-Miller (2004) argued, “we 
insist that students establish a certain kind of relationship with their audience. We ask that 
students tell their audiences things” (p. 216). Roberts-Miller instead proposed the partition, or a 
statement telling the audience what the paper or argument aims to do (much like I did at the 
beginning of this chapter). Roberts-Miller (2004) concluded, “In short, separating the thesis and 
partition enables a writer to imagine discourse as a form of exploration. A continual immersion 
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in such writing might help students (and teachers) imagine public discourse as a form of testing 
and exploration, rather than as a form of expression or aggression” (p. 218).  
 To summarize: a deliberatively minded instructor might respond to the “political turn” by 
teaching political topics; by cultivating an environment of listening and empathy before 
broaching potentially divisive issues; and by teaching argument as exploration through research 
and consideration of other perspectives, providing an alternative to the aggressive, expressive 
discourse of the post-Trump public sphere.  
 
Conclusion: Future Directions and Charting Possibilities 
As discussed in Chapter 2, this study is necessarily limited by the sample size, by the lack of 
representation from certain groups, and by the fact that qualitative research (by its nature) is 
suggestive rather than summative. Much more empirical research is needed, especially since in-
person composition instruction was a rarity in this study. As some participants indicated, in-
person coursework would likely change the frequency and tenor of political discussions in FYC. 
This study also primarily examined the first course of a two-course sequence, and one that was 
particularly rhetorical in its orientation. Future scholarship might explore how participants’ 
openness to political topics changes in courses that are oriented more toward academic research, 
writing about writing (WAW), or writing across the curriculum (WAC). 
 In addition, this study was almost entirely descriptive; in other words, it examined 
politics in FYC as they currently stand at a single public university. My hypothesis—that a 
deliberative approach to composition would help counteract demagogic rhetoric—has been 
enacted in part by some of the instructors in this study, but it needs much more testing, 
theorizing, and concrete pedagogical application. How might a deliberative approach change the 
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nuts-and-bolts of a composition course? How do students in deliberative composition classes 
react to this approach, and does it actually work to counteract demagoguery? What counts as 
“evidence” that such a rhetorical education actually works—in other words, how can 
compositionists seek evidence of transfer? These are important questions in need of further 
exploration and empirical inquiry. 
 The last and most striking opening for future research is the need to investigate 
conservative students’ experiences and perceptions of politics in FYC. Though a number of 
conservative students participated in the survey, none of them volunteered to be interviewed, 
representing a huge gap in the data. Even with this absence, conservative students were 
everywhere in this study, from frustrating encounters (Deborah; CJ; Kate) to students afraid to 
speak up (Josiah) to the perceived majority of the student body (CJ; Josh; Matt; Josiah; Mandy). 
As the Other of much of the composition scholarship on politics (and certainly the Other of this 
study), compositionists committed to rhetorical empathy and empathic research have a 
responsibility to listen to the perspectives of conservative students.  
 As I close out this study, I want to reiterate that I am under no impression that this 
empathic, deliberative approach to composition is fully achievable. Yet, as Roberts-Miller (2004) 
has noted, “If public argument is bad, perhaps there is something wrong with the teaching of 
public argument. Instead of replicating exactly the practice that leads to consequences we dislike, 
we can reflect on it, and try to enact a practice that might get us the kind of public discourse we 
would like to see” (p. 228).  
That desire—to understand, reflect on, and change our approach to public argument—is 
at the core of this study: describing what’s currently happening in FYC, understanding the 
experiences of students and instructors in those situations, and then determining how this 
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understanding might help scholars of composition aim toward something better. To change our 
approach to teaching composition is ambitious, especially since deliberative democratic 
engagement “makes high demands of its citizens” (Roberts-Miller, 2004, p. 187). And to reach 
for the healing and transformation of our toxic public discourse is more than ambitious—it is, 
perhaps, a pipe dream. It is, I believe, still an ideal worth pursuing.  
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Appendix A: Survey Protocol 
Student Survey 
 
[The online consent form was attached first.] 
 
1. I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my questions 
answered.  If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact.  By clicking the “I 
Agree” button below, I am agreeing to be in this study.  I can print or save a copy of this 
consent information for future reference.  If I do not want to be in this study, I can close 
my internet browser. (Yes, I agree to participate; No, I do not agree to participate [routed 
to end]). 
2. Are you 18 years old or older? (Yes/No; if no, directed to the end of the survey.) 
3. Please select your gender. (Female, male, other [open answer].)  
4. Are you currently enrolled in English 101 or English 102? (Closed answer multiple 
choice: English 101, English 102, and “I’m not enrolled in either.” If the latter option is 
chosen, the student will be directed to the end of the survey.) 
5. What is the modality of your class? Select all that apply. (Online/asynchronous, 
online/synchronous, hybrid [online and in person], face-to-face) 
6. The following questions ask about your English class’s theme. 
a. Does your course have a main theme or topic? (Yes/No) 
X. (If yes): What theme or topic does your course have? Choose one of 
the following:  
1. Metacognition (English 101) 
2. Social Media (English 101) 
3. Fake News or Journalism & Ethics (English 101) 
4. Inquiry into Monsters/Myths (English 102) 
5. Inquiry into Food (English 102) 
6. Inquiry into Heroes/Heroines (English 102) 
7. Other (closed answer) 
b. My class topic is interesting. (Strongly agree---Strongly disagree)  
c. I consider my class topic to be political. (Strongly agree---Strongly disagree)  
7. Please respond to the following statements. 
a. I think politics is important. (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
b. I follow politics closely.  (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
c. I consider myself politically informed. (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
d. I consider myself politically liberal. (Strongly Agree---Strongly Disagree) 
e. I consider myself politically conservative. (Strongly Agree---Strongly Disagree). 
4. If or when political topics come up during your English class, why do they come up? 
Select all that apply. (Because of the class theme; because of the class assignments; 
because of the professor’s examples; because my classmates bring them up; other, open 
answer.) 
5. Politics comes up often in my class. (Strongly agree---strongly disagree) 
6. I bring up politics often. (Strongly agree---strongly disagree) 
7. My professor brings up politics often. (Strongly agree---strongly disagree) 
8. The following questions are about your classmates.  
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a. My classmates bring up politics often. (Strongly agree---strongly disagree)  
b. I usually agree with my classmates’ political opinions. (Strongly agree----Strongly 
disagree) 
c. My classmates’ political opinions make class more interesting. (Strongly agree---
Strongly disagree) 
d. I think students in my class have a lot of different political opinions. (Strongly 
agree----Strongly disagree)  
e. I feel comfortable with political discussions in class. (Strongly agree----strongly 
disagree.) 
9. The following questions are about the class material in your English 101 or 102 class 
(assignments, readings, and/or discussions). 
a. Political references or discussions make class interesting. (Strongly agree---
strongly disagree) 
b. Political references or discussions benefit the class. (Strongly agree----strongly 
disagree.) 
c. Political references or discussions distract from the class. (Strongly agree----
strongly disagree) 
d. Discussing politics in class is constructive. (Strongly agree----strongly disagree) 
10. Have you ever felt frustrated as a result of a political discussion or topic in class? 
(Yes/No/Not sure) 
11. If so, please briefly elaborate. (Short answer) 
12. Any other comments or clarifications? (Short answer) 
 
13. Thank you for completing the survey! Would you like to continue participating in the 
study? Continuing to participate will entail a small payment in the form of a $10 gift 
card, upon the completion of a follow-up interview. (If the student clicks “Yes,” they will 
be routed to the Consent for Continuing Participation form.) 
 
a. I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my 
questions answered.  If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact.  
By clicking the “I Agree” button below, I am agreeing to continue to participate 
in this study. I can print or save a copy of this consent information for future 
reference. If I do not want to be in this study, I can close my internet browser or 
email the research team. (Yes, I agree to participate; No, I do not agree to 
participate [routed to end]). 
b. Thanks for agreeing to participate! Please provide your email address below so 
that we can contact you regarding your follow-up interview. (Open answer) 
c. In general, when might you be free to meet with a researcher for an interview? 







[The online consent form was attached first.]  
 
1. I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my questions 
answered.  If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact.  By clicking the “I 
Agree” button below, I am agreeing to be in this study.  I can print or save a copy of this 
consent information for future reference.  If I do not want to be in this study, I can close 
my internet browser. (Yes, I agree to participate; No, I do not agree to participate [routed 
to end]). 
2. Are you currently teaching English 101 or English 102? (Closed answer multiple choice: 
English 101, English 102, Both, and “I’m not teaching either.” If the latter option is 
chosen, the instructor will be directed to the end of the survey.) 
3. Please select your gender. (Female, male, other [open answer].)  
4. Please select your standing in the department. (Graduate Teaching Associate, non-tenure-
line faculty, tenure-line faculty (untenured), tenure-line faculty (tenured)) 
5. What is the modality of your class(es)? Select all that apply. (Online/asynchronous, 
online/synchronous, hybrid [online and in person], face-to-face) 
6. The following questions ask about your English class’s theme. 
a. Does your course have a main theme or topic of inquiry? (Yes/No) 
i.  (If yes): What theme or topic does your course have? Choose one of the 
following:  
1. Metacognition (English 101) 
2. Social Media (English 101) 
3. Fake News or Journalism & Ethics (English 101) 
4. Inquiry into Monsters/Myths (English 102) 
5. Inquiry into Food (English 102) 
6. Inquiry into Heroes/Heroines (English 102) 
7. Other (closed answer) 
b. My class topic is interesting. (Strongly agree---Strongly disagree)  
c. I consider my class topic to be political. (Strongly agree---Strongly disagree)  
8. Please respond to the following statements. 
a. I think politics is important. (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
b. I follow politics closely.  (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
c. I consider myself politically informed. (Strongly Agree----Strongly Disagree) 
d. I consider myself politically liberal. (Strongly Agree---Strongly Disagree) 
e. I consider myself politically conservative. (Strongly Agree---Strongly Disagree). 
9. If or when political topics come up during your English class, why do they come up? 
Select all that apply. (Because of the class theme; because of the class assignments; 
because of the examples I choose; because my students bring up politics; other, open 
answer.) 
10. Politics comes up often in my English class(es). (Strongly agree---strongly disagree.) 
11. The following questions are about your experience in teaching your English class(es). 
a. I bring up politics often in my English class(es). (Strongly agree---strongly 
disagree) 
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b. I usually express my political opinions in class. (Strongly agree---Strongly 
disagree) 
c. I feel comfortable with political discussions in class. (Strongly agree----strongly 
disagree.) 
d. My students usually agree with my political opinions. (Strongly agree----Strongly 
disagree; “I’m not sure” option.) 
e. Do you bring up politics in your English class? Why or why not? (Open answer) 
12. The following questions are about your students.  
a. My students bring up politics often. (Strongly agree---strongly disagree)  
b. I usually agree with my students’ political opinions. (Strongly agree----Strongly 
disagree; “I’m not sure” option.) 
c. I think the students in my class(es) have a lot of different political opinions. 
(Strongly agree----Strongly disagree; “I’m not sure” option.)  
d. My students seem to feel comfortable with political discussions in class. 
13. The following questions are about political content in your class(es). 
a. Political references or discussions make class interesting. (Strongly agree---
strongly disagree) 
b. Political references or discussions benefit the class. (Strongly agree----strongly 
disagree.) 
c. Political references or discussions distract from the class. (Strongly agree----
strongly disagree) 
d. Discussing politics in class is constructive. (Strongly agree----strongly disagree) 
14. Have you ever felt frustrated as a result of a political discussion or topic in your English 
class(es)? (Yes/No/Unsure) 
15. If so, please briefly elaborate. (Short answer) 
16. Any other comments or clarifications? (Short answer) 
 
17. Thank you for completing the survey! Would you like to continue participating in the 
study? Continuing to participate will entail a small payment in the form of a $10 gift 
card, upon the completion of a follow-up interview. (If the student clicks “Yes,” they will 
be routed to the Consent for Continuing Participation form.) 
 
d. I have read this form, been given the chance to ask questions and have my 
questions answered.  If I have more questions, I have been told who to contact.  
By clicking the “I Agree” button below, I am agreeing to continue to participate 
in this study. I can print or save a copy of this consent information for future 
reference. If I do not want to be in this study, I can close my internet browser or 
email the research team. (Yes, I agree to participate; No, I do not agree to 
participate [routed to end]). 
e. Thanks for agreeing to participate! Please provide your email address below so 
that we can contact you regarding your follow-up interview. (Open answer) 
f. In general, when might you be free to meet with a researcher for an interview? 




Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
The interviews for this study were conducted in a semi-structured interview format. Many of the 
specific questions for follow-up interviews were constructed based on participant-specific survey 
responses and general trends across the data. However, the questions listed below formed the 
basis of the interview protocol, and Questions 1, 3, 5, and 8 were asked in every interview. 
 
1. Before we get started, I wanted to clarify a key term for this study. Almost all of the 
questions you answered in your survey had to do with “politics.” How would you define 
that word, personally? What idea did you have in mind when you completed the survey? 
2. In this survey question, you stated ________. Can you say a little more about that? 
3. In your survey, you mentioned _________ about your political values. Would you 
elaborate on that? 
4. In your survey, you stated that the students in class mostly agreed/disagreed with your 
political opinions. Why do you say that? 
5. What role, if any, do you think politics should play in English classes? Why? 
6. How do you think x answer affected y answer? 
7. In this question on the student/teacher survey, the majority of students/teachers said 
______. What is your reaction to that? 
8. Tell me about a time when you felt like a political discussion in class went especially 
well. 
a. On the other hand, were there times when you felt that a discussion was 




Appendix C: Codebooks 
The following codebooks (which are descriptive and hypothesis coding, respectively) were 
paired with magnitude coding (Saldaña 2016) to gauge how students and instructors evaluate 
political experiences and beliefs and either critique or affirm them. The magnitude codes were 
used as follows: Political-Positive, Apolitical-Positive, Political-Negative, Apolitical-Negative, 
Political-Mixed, Apolitical-Mixed, Political-Neutral, and Apolitical-Neutral.  
 











This code refers 




To fit this code, the 
codeable unit must 
feature a student 
reflecting on the political 
beliefs or actions of their 
classmates. If this code 
refers to interactions 
outside of class, this code 
cannot be applied. 
“I mean, sometimes, there is 
a sense where you can 
interact with a [fellow 
student], even online, and 
get a little bit of a sense for, 
oh, they probably believe 





This code refers 
to how students 
perceive their 
instructor as a 
political actor. 
To fit this code, the unit 
must feature a student 
reflecting on their 
instructor's political 
beliefs or actions. If the 
unit refers to instructors 
in general, this code 
cannot be applied. 
“This semester I have not 
had any interaction with any 





This code refers 
to how students 
see themselves as 
political actors. 
To fit this code, the unit 
must feature a student 
reflecting on their own 
political beliefs or 
actions. If the unit occurs 
in the context of a student 
comparing their beliefs to 
the other students in their 
class, “Student Perception 
of Classmates” may be 
applied. 
“I did not talk about politics 




“[In my paper], I did talk 
about how, just, overcast in 
general, how do political 
parties utilize false 
information, false news, 
misinformation to get, to 







This code refers 
to how instructors 
see themselves as 
political actors. 
To fit this code, the unit 
must feature an instructor 
reflecting on a) their own 
political beliefs or 
actions, or b) how their 
own political beliefs 
intersect with their 
teaching. If the unit 
primarily addresses 
course content, this code 
cannot be applied; the 
code may be “Perception 
of Class.” 
“I definitely think [my 
political identity] intersects 
in the way that I grade [my 
students] on conventions 
and style in their writing.” 
—Amy, instructor 
 
“I really try hard not to 
make it incredibly apparent 






This code refers 







To fit this code, the unit 
must feature an instructor 
reflecting on their 
students' political beliefs 
or actions. including their 
writing. If the unit 
primarily features self-
reflection, even if student 
political perspectives are 
included, this code cannot 
be applied. 
“In my experience, students 
have, in the past, brought up 
politics often. It's something 





This code refers 
to how both 
students and 
instructors view 




To fit this code, the unit 
must feature a student or 
an instructor reflecting on 
the current course content 
as political or apolitical. 
If the unit refers primarily 
to specific actors in the 
class, rather than to the 
content of the course, this 
code cannot be applied. If 
it applies to potential 
content in the class, it 
may be “Perception of the 
Class (Hypothetical).” 
“We did an assignment 
where I had given them like 
five internet conspiracy 
theories, and this was 
working on like fact-
checking and source 
validity. So they had to go 
through and look at the viral 
news article and then find a 
more reliable article related 
to that source and then 
evaluate which one was 







This code refers 








reference to the 
ideal role of 
politics in FYC. 
 
To fit this code, the unit 
must feature reflection on 
potential situations in 
FYC, not current ones. 
This especially means 
reflection about the role 
of politics in FYC or 
evaluation of 
implementing/avoiding 
political topics in a 
hypothetical situation. 
If the unit refers to a 
current class, classmate, 
or instructor, this code 
cannot be applied; it is 
strictly hypothetical. 
“So as a place to explore 
political opinions, I think 
English class works. It's, 
especially the way we teach 
it [here], it's asking people 
to learn and deploy different 
methodologies, and as I said 
before, political subject 




“I mean, I think it would be 
very interesting to have 












Assumes that a 
rhetor can use 
rational discourse to 
discern a policy in 








no judgments about 
the good, only about 
the right. 
To fit this code, the codable 
unit must feature one or more 
of the following: a neutrality 
that transcends one's own 
position; the value of 
objectivity and/or rationality; 
“banking” pedagogical 
methods; writing argument as 
a thesis-driven list of reasons; 
student autonomy as an 
ultimate goal. If the student or 
instructor emphasizes 
neutrality with caveats, then 
this code cannot be applied. If 
rationality includes affective 
modes of argument as valid in 
an exchange, the codeable 
unit is deliberative, not 
liberal. 
“Whenever it 
comes to writing 
specifically, I try 
to quarantine my 
political thought. I 
try my best to 
write as balanced 
as possible. I focus 
on, whenever I'm 
writing, is the 
truth, the facts, as 





Assumes that policy 
questions are best 
left up to the 
experts; either 
experts make all of 
the decisions, or the 
general public 
makes the decisions 
after gathering 
information from the 
experts 
To fit this code, the unit must 
conflate public discourse as 
technical discourse and thus 
see composition courses as 
technical training for either 
becoming an expert or making 
political decisions based on 
information from experts. If 
the unit implies the “technical 
skills” of composition are 
apolitical training in 
discourse, then this code 
cannot be applied; it may be 
the liberal model instead.  
There were no 
occurrences of this 






based in self-interest 
(rather than 
universal principles), 
and that the role of 




expressivist as a 
result, because each 
person has their own 
perspective based in 
their own self-
interest. 
To fit this code, the unit must 
feature one or more of the 
following: argument that sees 
catering to the audience as the 
primary consideration; 
expressive argument; self-
interest or positionality as the 
primary way one 
(functionally) decides 
political stances. In addition, 
if the unit addresses 
expressive argument or self-
interest in a way that is 
explicitly factional, it is 
demagoguery, not the interest-
based model. 
“It's just very red 
state, and if they're 
from anywhere in 
this region, they 
mostly identify 
with their family's 
political beliefs, 
and most of those 
political beliefs are 






confrontation is the 
best way to address 





conflict as helpful, 
not problematic. 
Productive agonism 
requires some level 
of listening. 
To fit this code, the unit must 
emphasize the presence and 
value of conflict, 
confrontation, or adversarial 
argument about a political 
topic, or see conflict or 
argument as a productive tool 
for clarifying positions. If the 
unit does not imply that 
reconsideration is a possibility 
(rather than a betrayal of one's 
position), or if the unit 
emphasizes factional conflict, 
it may be demagoguery. If 
conflict does not seem to be 
“I try to choose 
texts that challenge 
the idea that we 
just have to meet 
in the middle, or 





an end in itself, it may be the 






their values are 
socially constructed 
and thus not neutral; 
argument is aimed 
toward the common 









To fit this code, the unit must 
emphasize one or more of the 
following: consensus-building 
to avoid ongoing conflict; 
civility as a primary value; the 
need for students to learn the 
values or language of a 
community in order to join it. 
If the inculcation of character 
is aimed toward individual 
autonomy rather than the 
common good, or if 
democratic values are 
universal values rather than 
socially constructed norms, 
this unit is the liberal model, 
not communitarianism.  
“You see how 
certain things, it 
might not be the 
most credible 
'cause it's like a 
blog post or just 
written by Joe 
Schmo or 
whatever. See if 
you can find an 
article that we 
would consider 
credible that's 











but should rely on an 
expansive definition 
of rationality, one 
that includes 
affective modes. 
Rhetors must move 
beyond their 
subjectivity but not 
ignore it. Difference 
is the key to 
successful 
deliberation, and 
attending to the 
difference in one's 
audience is what sets 
the deliberative 
model apart from the 
liberal model. 
To fit this code, the unit must 
feature one or more of the 
following: exploratory 
argument (rather than thesis-
based); fairness as the role of 
the teacher (not neutrality); 
affective argument as valid 
for discussion (while neither 
particular nor universal); 
difference as key for refining 
public discussion, but requires 
a culture of listening and be 
ultimately aimed toward 
communication. It may also 
feature mediation in some 
form or the desire to find 
temporary points of 
agreement. If the codeable 
unit features ongoing conflict 
that is not aimed toward 
moving beyond one's 
subjectivity and using the 
words ot language of the 
intended audience, it may be 
agonistic. 
“I think that doing 
research for that 
too, maybe in the 
assignment [it] 
could say, you 
have to do 
research for a left, 
middle, and a right 
wing on one topic, 
just to see all three 
sides and compare 
your [thoughts] on 
that. I feel like that 
could be, that 
would be a good 






political argument is 
an ongoing conflict 
between factions, 
where the good guys 
are “us” and the bad 
guys are “them.” 
Policy issues are 
about identity, and 
politics thus 
becomes a zero-sum 
game where a win 
for one side is a loss 
for the other. 
Demagoguery can 
be either irenic 
(strictly enforcing 




dissent from outside 
the faction). 
To fit this code, the unit must 
feature one or more of the 
following: highly polarized 
communities or rhetoric; the 
perceived simplicity of truth 
(i.e. black-and-white thinking 
that adheres to political 
factionalism); constructions of 
“need” that blame an outside 
group for the problem; 
accusations of bias that allow 
an argument to be dismissed 
on the basis of identity; 
aggressive rhetoric that sees 
political deliberation as a 
zero-sum game. If the unit 
emphasizes conflict, even 
emotionally charged or 
offensive conflict, but does 
not imply a rhetoric of “us vs. 
them,” it is agonism, not 
demagoguery.  
“What I've been 
afraid of and what 
I've tried to avoid 
is the idea that any 
pushback that they 
get, in terms of 
their grade being 
penalized, is 




“I think with the 
society we have 
today, you're kind 
of primed to be 
very us vs. them, 
you're primed to 
treat people who 
disagree with your 









Jacob (Jake) Buller-Young is a sixth-generation Kansan, a windowsill gardener, a birder, and a 
Graduate Teaching Associate at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. After moving two dozen 
times in his first eighteen years of life, he attended Abilene Christian University, where he was a 
University Scholar and received a Bachelor of Arts in English and Biblical Text before going on 
to graduate school at University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He is currently studying English with a 
concentration in Rhetoric, Writing, and Linguistics (RWL) and plans to continue his education 
by entering the RWL PhD program in Fall 2021. His research interests center broadly on the 
intersections of composition pedagogy, religious rhetoric, and civil discourse.  
